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With the growth of population in the Borough of Queens in New
York City, it became necessary to build a new high school. Coinci-
dentally, in 1966 the new administration of John Lindsay, faced with the
threatened loss of federal funds for 7, 500 units of public housing, de-
cided to embark on a new program combining vest-pocket low-income
housing in the slums and scatter-site low-income housing in white middle-
class areas that were relatively better served with city services. In
Queens, bringing this social policy strategy for racial and economic
integration into physical reality was hindered by the competition of these
school and housing needs for a scarce large parcel of undeveloped land.
The site difficulties were compounded by rigid technical standards, po-
litical differences of values (partly influenced by a large real estate de-
veloper) and engineering foundation requirements that made realization
of the original architectural public housing designs difficult to achieve
within the cost limits set by the federal government.
Passage of time saw changes in prevailing social attitudes on
race relations, community control, ethnic neighborhoods, and environ-
ment. Problems of information dissemination and communication both
within the government bureaucracies and between government and com-
munities exacerbated citizen opposition to both projects. Confusion
about the reasons for the changes of sites for the housing project and
school and about the process by which these changes were made raised
questions about the motives of those involved.
In Corona, people fought against their homes being town down
for a high school and athletic field. After four years the city made the
unprecedented offer to return some of the homes already acquired both
by reducing the school site size and by physically moving some of the
old houses to new lots. But this did not resolve the matter - the com-
munity was split, it took two years to get state legislation authorizing
the compromise, and to this day the needed school remains unbuilt as a
result of changes in values among school planners in the Board of Edu-
cation and the consequent time delays needed for architectural redesign
and bureaucratic conflict resolution over capital budget funding.
In Forest Hills opposition to a housing project that local people
had assumed to be dead grew from small proportions to an issue of city-
wide and - eventually - national impact. Media stressed the racial and
Black-Jewish aspects of the controversy, but many other issues were
also involved. These included citywide housing production goals; people' s
fears of welfare recipients, increasing crime, and changing patterns in
the ethnic and racial composition of the whole public school system' s en-
rollment; provision of city services and overcrowding of the transportation
system; the scale of buildings in a neighborhood; economic class integration
as well as racial integration; and the principle of government following
through on a decision once it had been made.
In tracing the history of the Forest Hills project, this paper em-
phasizes the role and activities of government agencies, the positions they
took relevant to these issues, and the interrelationships with the activities
of particular individuals, both in and out of government (including that of
the author in the process that led to the halving of the size of the public
housing project in 1972). It examines the problems created by the taking
of ideological positions, rather than making decisions based on the indi-
vidual history and goals of the particular project. The paper concludes
by making various observations about the effects of bureaucracy, in-
formation flow, time, and specialized value structures on the achievement
of larger social goals.
Thesis Supervisor: Tunney Lee
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But there are much more difficult questions.
Like bussing and scatter-site housing and minority employ-
ment in the unions.
The flash points.
The cutting edges.
Where the two groups collide, interests compete, tempters
are frayed and fears arise.
This is the real challenge for our Party. To find a way to
harmonize the competing interests. To serve the poor without crush-
ing the middle-class. And while doing this - to make clear to the
middle-class that it isn't our intention to crush them. It can be done -
if we remember what Burke and Webster and John F. Kennedy tried to
teach - that social truths in these hard areas are not painted in pure
black and white - that while principles may never be compromised,
issues may.
- Mario Cuomo
Address to the New Democratic Coalition
of New York City in his campaign for the
nomination for Lieutenant Governor.
May 11, 1974
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INTRODUCTION
To housing planners, social planners, and politicians the
words "Forest Hills" in 1971 meant not the famous tennis courts but
white middle class resistance to the construction of public housing in
their "suburban" neighborhood. The proposed Forest Hills - Rego
Park development, part of New York City' s scatter-site, low-income
housing program, attained a level of national notoriety matched by only
one other public housing project in recent years - St. Louis' Pruitt-Igoe.
As a symbol which people around the country could point to as the epitome
of what they did not want, the perceived image of 24-story buildings ris-
ing amidst a single family home area was as disturbing as the network
television films of buildings being deliberately demolished at Pruitt-Igoe.
Media coverage of people marching around the site as a protest against
alleged government insensitivity to their Jewish neighborhood struck a
responsive note in many people' s minds. For although there were some
differences - such as the identity of the protestors - it seemed to consti-
tute a continuation of what had been heard for years in citizen battles
against unresponsive government intrusion into central city neighborhoods
with urban renewal and interstate highways, battles which academic social
scientists later joined. But more importantly, the Forest Hills conflict
was seized upon by planning professionals as something to be used in gen-
eral policy discussions as a code-word for middle class white racism,
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just as "the West End" came to represent the inequities of urban re-
newal in professional discussions after Herbert Gans wrote The Urban
Villagers.
With this sense of the growing importance of the Forest Hills
project and controversy, Sylvia Chaplain and I decided in 1972 to write
a case history of it. We hoped that the chances of implementing future
scatter-site housing would be improved if planners understood the mis-
takes made in this much-publicized one - a liberal bias of ours toward
scatter-site housing that underwent much soul searching as the study
proceeded. Our hypothesis, based on what we had heard and read in the
national media (articles by both professional reporters and academicians),
was that we would find many basic mistakes made by planners and poli-
ticians, since the conditions being reported seemed to be incompatible
with a reasonable planning and political decision-making process. We
thought we would find such things as 1) an insensitivity of physical plan-
ners to neighborhood scale - for how else could one explain the three 24-
story buildings? 2) a failure of the governmental system to talk with
community leaders when the project was being planned - for our previous
experience with government made it easy for us to accept in advance a
"theory of incompetency" in this case, and 3) a lack of appreciation of
the ways of "bribing" a community with a school or other public services
as a way of countering the traditional argument that any additional housing
for families would overload public services.
-3-
But we found much more than we expected. We discovered it
was necessary to go back through a very tortuous and complex history
to 1966 in order to understand how the decision-making process logically
arrived at a result that might, and did, appear absurd to many of the un-
initiated. Furthermore, our hypothesis proved to be at least partially
incorrect. The published articles at best told only a fraction of the story
and at worst reinforced previous misconceptions. It was not a case of
decisions made quickly with little forethought about the consequences.
Rather we found a set of actors whose decisions often were virtually
forced by the context of a larger system they could not control, such as
federal cost limits on construction. and the political power realities of a semi-
centralized and semi-decentralized governmental entity in the form of the
City' s Board of Estimate. In some cases we found that the people who fore-
saw the dangers of what might happen if a certain course of action were
taken were overruled by others with a different set of values. We dis-
covered, much to our chagrin, that the Forest Hills conflict was closely
intertwined with the roots of the second of the three major community con-
flicts to occur in New York during this six year period - the struggle of the
old Italian homeowners of Corona to save their houses from condemnation
for a high school athletic field, and it was affected by the third conflict -
the Oceanhill-Brownsville school decentralization dispute and teachers strike,
and the subsequent change in community racial and religious attitudes. We
found that the project was a small but politically crucial part of the city-
wide strategy to build 7, 500 units of low-income housing: scatter-site in
middle-income areas and vest- pocket in slum areas.
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As we conducted our research the influence of Forest Hills con-
tinued to expand. Its effect on national politics increased when it became
a factor in John Lindsay' s poor showing in the Florida and Wisconsin
presidential primaries and to a lesser extent, in the shift of Jewish sup-
port toward Richard Nixon in the 1972 presidential election. After the
project was reapproved in "compromise" form by the New York City
Board of Estimate in the fall of 1972, it remained as an issue affecting
the 1973 New York mayorality race and the perceived "shift to the right"
of the electorate.
Although this paper is essentially a political case study, it is
written from the viewpoint of the planner by taking the original concept as
conceived in 1966 and tracing it through the web of political, legal, archi-
tectural, and financial obstacles that must be overcome if a proposal is to
evolve from a social policy idea to brick and mortar reality. For the
Forest Hills project exemplifies the interrelationship between planning
and political philosophy by showing the types of conflicts that can occur
when the underlying social philosophy of an operating agency, the Housing
Authority, is challenged by a new social philosophy. This new attitude was
that public housing should be distributed throughout the city in order to
help achieve a more heterogeneous society, racially and economically.
This ran counter to the implicit social conservatism of the Authority' s
previous modus operandi, that of producing a maximum number of low-
income units per year by locating large projects in areas where political
resistance would be either absent or (if present) ineffective, i. e., in
slums, ghettos, or environmentally undesirable places.
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The direction that this change took is especially interesting to
note in view of the comments made in 1963 by Banfield and Wilson in
their book City Politics. In discussing the rise of a reform wing within
Manhattan' s Democratic Party and the increasing power these middle
and upper class liberals were starting to acquire, they state that "what
substantive program the Manhattan reformers would offer if they came
to power is not at all clear. "I
Scatter-site housing and Forest Hills provide part of the answer,
and it is therefore important that planners and other observers of the urban
scene not misconstrue what happened in this case. Obviously, much that
occurred involved planners versus politicians and politicians versus each
other, as will be true in any major dispute over city budget and land use
policy. But it also involved planners versus planners, as 1) liberal goals
and values collided in the search to implement both school integration and
low-income housing dispersal and 2) technical planning standards were ap-
plied so rigidly that broader objectives were forgotten, thereby producing
undesired social and physical results. As this case will show, the domi-
nance of the specialist planner and the very detailed standards which have
been created for administrative and economic efficiency, as well as a
guard against corruption, can be self-defeating. They can lead to an iso-
lation from the reality of the area being planned (especially when there is
little personal contact) and the substitution of relatively unimportant de-
tails for the larger need to strengthen the social bonds between different
class and racial groups so that there will be peace and a viable "social
contract" among the many residents crowded together in a large city.
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The idea for this project was formulated jointly with Ms.
Sylvia Chaplain, for together we had a range of personal contacts which
made the project feasible. Some of the interviews and research were
also conducted jointly. However, I am solely responsible for the writing
and content of this paper.
This document is not the definitive study of the Forest Hills pro-
ject. No major items have been omitted, though certain aspects could
have been gone into in much greater depth. Because this study started
as a paper for a graduate course, many of the people interviewed were
told it would be kept confidential, and they spoke freely under that belief.
Since it has become a thesis which must go into the M. I. T. archives and
cannot be kept confidential, and since there is no time to go back to all
these people to obtain permission to attribute quotations directly to them,
I am forced to withhold the names of the people interviewed. This means
that quotations in the paper that are attributed to a particular individual
and are based on an interview cannot be assumed to be first hand sources,
unless the footnote specifically indicates otherwise. This clearly detracts
from the value of the paper to the reader, but I see no other way to resolve
the problem at this time.
I therefore cannot give thanks by name to all the past and present
government officials, private citizens, and officials of organizations who
gave so generously of their time and were willing to be so candid with
their thoughts and knowledge about a situation which, for many of them,
was still a "live" political issue at the time they were interviewed. To
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all of them goes my sincere gratitude. I found them all to be fascinating
people, and I am glad to have had the opportunity to have met and talked
with them.
Thanks also must go to Dr. Frank Kristof, and all the other
people at the New York State Urban Development Corporation who were
so kind to me while I was there.
To Mrs. Betty Griffin goes the credit for the typing and cor-
rection of the manuscript, as well as for having the patience to endure
the very awkward logistical situation brought about by my being in New
York City while she worked in Waltham, Massachusetts.
Finally, deep thanks to Langley Keyes, Jay Ostrower, Tunney
Lee, my mother, father, and stepmother, for without all of their en-
couragement, patience, and suggestions, this paper never would have
been completed.
CHAPTER I - 1966 - A NEW POLITICAL ERA DAWNS
On the day in 1965 that John V. Lindsay an-
nounced his decision to run for Mayor of New York
City, a young lawyer active in Reform Democratic
politics sent him a note asking if he would like to
talk with the 'loyal opposition.'
The following day, as the young lawyer was
helping his wife and three sons prepare for a week-
end trip to their Dutchess County retreat, the tele-
phone rang. The weekend trip was never taken. The
author of the note, Donald Harrison Elliott, had been
enlisted in the Lindsay campaign.
At its successful conclusion, he was named
counsel to the Mayor, and on Nov. 28, 1966, he wa
named chairman of the City Planning Commission.
January 1, 1966 was a day of hope for many concerned about the
future of New York City. A coalition of liberals - Republicans, Demo-
crats, and Liberal Party members - had elected John Lindsay as Mayor
of New York. His opponent, Controller Abraham Beame, had represented
the 'old guard' of machine politics, while Lindsay represented a new
wave. Young, with a solid liberal Congressional image, he was seen as
being in the forefront of a new type of mayor for American cities. Here
was a person who could continue the progress that was hoped for in the
Kennedy tradition of idealism - progress that was being proclaimed at
the national level by Lyndon Johnson with his "Great Society" proposals,
resulting in a plethora of social legislation which a heavily Democratic
Congress was passing. These included the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
widely heralded Model Cities program announced in that same January of
-8-
-9-
1966. Although the Vietnam War had been an issue on some college cam-
puses for two years, troop levels were still going up, and the nation had
not yet been caught up with its moral and fiscal consequences.
Against this backdrop came the harsh realities of New York City
on that January 1. Mike Quill and his Transport Workers Union went out
on strike, and the subway and bus systems were shut down. A mayor who
had proclaimed himself against the "power brokers" discovered that trying
to change the rules of the game involved serious consequences when the
stakes were so high. One could not make statements personally antagoniz-
ing to people like Mike Quill and then expect them to be "reasonable. "
As a number of people said, former Mayor Robert Wagner and Mike Quill
would play the game of strike threat up to the last minute, knowing they
would settle with no strike. "Of course, the workers got screwed, but the
system kept working. "2
Into this atmosphere came those reform supporters of Lindsay
who were interested in housing policies. And the day-to-day problems in
running the housing programs in a city of 8 million, along with the in-
evitable daily crises, it must be remembered, are time consuming enough
for regular city officials. Long range planning is a luxury both because it
does not give immediate political rewards and because it is more difficult.
It is also not as exciting as "fire-fighting" a crisis or rushing to secret
3
top-level meetings. And there were plenty of housing crises for the Lind-
say administration to deal with. Summaries of the New York Times show
that there were such scandals as housing foundations sinking into marshes
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in Staten Island after they had been approved by inspectors of the Building
Department and secret fee-splitting between sponsors and contractors on
Mitchell-Lama subsidized housing developments, which was discovered
in January. There were also the more legitimate pressing problems to
be dealt with, as illustrated by Mayor Lindsay' s March, 1966, request
that the City' s ability to borrow funds for Mitchell-Lama middle and mod-
erate-income housing projects be raised by $225 million in order to allow
the City to continue that particular housing program. 4
However, a few people in the incoming administration were con-
centrating on changing overall housing policy while the rest of the struc-
ture dealt with daily problems. The foundations for their work had been
set before the mayoral inauguration with a number of studies on housing
policy and government reorganization by an official blue-ribbon commission
(I. M. Pei, Charles Abrams, Ed Logue and others, with a staff which in-
cluded Edward Robin and Eugenia Flatow) funded by the Ford Foundation
through the non-profit Institute for Public Administration.
After Lindsay' s inauguration some of these same people were ap-
pointed to positions of power, and an interagency task force on housing was
created. As one of its members explained, it was easier to change policy
in the early days of the administration because just 4 or 5 top people,
knowledgeable of each other' s activities, could sit down together and set
policy. This becomes more and more difficult, this official continued, as
the life of an administration lengthens. More people achieve niches of
power and have to be considered or consulted. 6 Additionally, as the end
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of the mayor' s term approaches, concerns for his re-election change
both power relationships and policy considerations.
This Housing Task Force discovered several areas of concern
with regard to public housing: one was that, contrary to popular con-
ception, the Housing Authority' s administrative application of admission
criteria had made public housing virtually "antiseptic" in comparison
with the social characteristics of the low-income population of the city
which needed housing. Another concern was that a federal reservation
of funds for 7, 500 units of public housing would be revoked and redistribu-
ted to other cities (under a federal policy of giving priority to cities which
This gets into the complicated areas of housing management, the
role of tenant selection in determining the character of a housing develop-
ment, and the different set of social criteria and pressures which govern-
ment should be responsive to in providing housing but which private land-
lords can in many instances ignore. The desire of management to screen
out potentially undesirable tenants hinges on an ability to use criteria, either
explicit or subjective, that in fact can predict who will be a "problem" ten-
ant. Whether such a social indicator(s) exists, however, with a sufficiently
high accuracy so as not to be considered arbitrary is in question; and unlike
the case of persons with higher incomes, people who are rejected or evicted
from public housing have nowhere else to go in New York that can provide
that kind of quality housing at an affordable rent. During the 1966 era the
Authority' s admission criteria tended to exclude such persons as unwed
mothers, families with a female head of household, anyone with any kind of
arrest record, etc. Needless to say, these and other criteria came under
attack as being racially discriminatory in their effect and not being the kind
of socially undesirable behavior which either should be barred per se or
could, in fact, be legally barred.
But whereas the private landlord can simply turn these people away,
there were those in the government, especially the liberal reformers, who
felt that it was better to try to be responsive to the housing needs of these
people and to try to deal with whatever problems that might create in the
housing projects than to let the present practices continue by default.
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could demonstrate an ability to use the money) if New York did not find
sites for the housing by June 30 of that year. Further, they found that
the previous Wagner administration had not taken any action on planning
for these sites. 8
To rectify the first set of problems, as well as to correct some
of the other difficulties the Authority'was experiencing, efforts were made
both to make the Housing Authority more flexible in its policies as well as
to ease certain legal restrictions that hampered administrative flexibility.
Legislation was introduced in late January in the State legislature to allow
the Housing Authority to raise the upper income limits for tenants in its
buildings that had been constructed with New York State money so that the
same set of income limits would apply to tenants in State or federally
funded public housing. Also, on January 31, it was announced that the
Authority would run an experimental program that aimed to "ban economic,
social and racial segregation'9 by having "500 low-income families move
into privately owned middle-income apartments with the aid of Federal rent
subsidies. ",10
As stated earlier a new administration made it easier for a few
people to decide policy. Three of these key people were Donald Elliott,
Edward Robin, and Eugenia Flatow. All were a part of the Reform Demo-
cratic movement on Manhattan' s Upper West Side, the location of a massive
urban renewal project conceived in the 50' s and still being built today.
Elliott, at first counsel to the Mayor, was appointed Chairman of the City
Planning Commission and Director of the City Planning Department in late
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1966. He occupied that post until 1973, one of the last three to leave
office out of the original 60 Commissioner-level persons Lindsay ap-
pointed in 1966. Edward Robin, a close associate of Don Elliott' s for
many years, was his number two man at both the counsel' s office and
at the Planning Department. Eugenia Flatow, originally appointed as a
program planner for the Housing and Redevelopment Board, later was
the first director of New York' s Model Cities Agency, and was a special
assistant to Don Elliott for about nine months during 1970-71 before re-
turning to private practice.
The philosophy of the reformers in charge of the new adminis-
tration' s housing policy was that public policy could not continue the
segregationist patterns of the city' s ghettos and that the tremendous need
for housing in the city had to be met in such a way as to end de facto segre-
gation in the city. In this way they were continuing a particular thrust of
the Civil Rights movement that was prevalent at the time. For example,
it was from March to July of 1966 that Dick Gregory and Martin Luther King
were leading marches in Chicago to protest housing conditions and the treat-
ment of blacks by the city and its mayor, Richard Daley.
This integrationist. philosophy was consistent with the addition per-
ceptions that one had to get away from both the "cookie-cutter" massive
housing projects of 2, 000 to 3, 000 units that the Housing Authority had built
His successor as Chairman was John Zuccotti, a lawyer who had been
a member of the Commission for about two years, .and who had previously
been a staff member for one of the Congressional housing committees.
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in the past and also away from the bulldozer tactics of urban renewal,
which involved massive relocation problems. (See tables on following
pages for public housing project and household characteristics. ) At the
same time, there was the immediate need to avoid losing funds for the
7, 500 units and a recognition that smaller sites could be located more
readily than large ones. From these views there evolved what became
known as the scatter-site and vest-pocket housing programs of the new
Lindsay administration.
Because of the long history of support for public housing in New York
City and State, with financing for public housing coming not only from the
federal government - as was the case in most of the rest of the United
States - but also from the city and state, there was in fact a wide variety
of sizes and types of housing projects built at various times. What was
built depended on what was considered important at the time, and in the
more immediate past the emphasis had tended to be on large sized pro-
jects and on high rise buildings. One can cite many factors: the desire
for minimum per unit cost, the popularization of the superblock concept
with large open spaces - for play and increasingly for parking spaces, etc.
TABLE 1
Occupancy Characteristics by Percent
New York City Public Housing Projects
January 1, 1965
Puerto
White Negro Rican Other Total
Number of families 39. 8 40. 6 19. 6 - 100. 0
Number of persons 34. 0 42. 9 23. 1 - 100. 0
Percent of household
heads age 62+ 33.0 10.0 7.0
Percent of broken
families 10. 6 24. 0 15. 2
Percent of families
on welfare 5. 4 13.3 16.3 10.7
Source: New York City Housing Authority
Confidential material
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Note: Although these tables are for 1968, they provide a fair indication of
what the overall situation was like for the immediately preceding years,
given the low turnover and construction rates in New York public housing.
TABLE 2
Public Housing Projects by Borough
New York City, 1968
Number Percent
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Staten Island)
Total
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer,
Tenants of the City: The
Present, Potential, and Former Occu-
pants of Public Housing in New York City,
New York: Columbia University, 1970
(Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis), Table VI-2
TABLE 3
Households in Public Housing by Borough
New York City, 1968
Number
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Staten Island)
Total
47, 526
49, 290
36, 440
16, 490
4, 530
154, 276
Percent
30. 8
31. 9
23. 7
10. 7
2. 9
100. 0
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer,
op. cit., Table VI-5
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53
45
34
15
9
156
34. 0
28. 8
21. 8
9. 6
5. 8
100. 0
TABLE 4
Average Size of Public Housing Projects by Borough
New York City, 1968
Number of
Dwelling Units
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Staten Island)
New York City
897
1, 095
1, 072
1, 099
503
989
Source: Derived from Tables 2 and 3
TABLE 5
Public Housing Households by Ethnic Group
New York City, 1968
Number Percent
Black 65, 487 42. 5
White 56, 038 36. 3
Puerto Ricana 31, 635 20. 5
Other 1,116 0.7
Total 154, 276 100.0
a Head of Household born in Puerto Rico
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer
op. cit., Table VI-6
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TABLE 6
Percentage of Public Housing Households by Borough and Ethnic Group
New York City, 1968
Manhattan Brooklyn Bronx Queens Richmond
Black 41. 9 48. 3 39. 1 40. 1 21. 0
White 25. 4 37. 2 37. 3 52. 5 75. 3
Puerto Rican 30. 8 14. 4 23. 4 7. 1 3. 5
Other 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Total 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer
op. cit, Table VI-9
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But there was a more positive philosophical basis for the
scatter-site program than just a-desire to promote racial integration
and to avoid massive concentrations of public housing on sites of old
slums by selecting vacant sites in what may be considered the "sub-
urban" portions of New York City. The best description that I have
*
seen of this philosophy was written by Roger Starr in his 1972 article,
"The Lesson of Forest Hills. "
If it has always been hard to find a clearly
stated rationale in writing for scatter-site housing,
one could get at some of the reasons behind the policy
in conversation with the New York City officials who
were responsible for the original development of the
program in 1966. These officials held the view that
a neighborhood which contains people with a wide
variation of incomes is better than an economically
homogeneous neighborhood; and they further believed
- as apparently federal housing officials have also
come to do - that government has the right and the
duty to foster the development of such heterogenous
neighborhoods. **
The enthusiasm of New York' s officials for
scatter-site housing did not rest simply on the effects
they expected it to have on the mostly non-white poor
people who would be moved into more prosperous
neighborhoods inhabited mostly by whites. They be-
lieved that scattering low-rent units in middle class
areas would also have a healthy effect on the middle-
class residents of those areas who would perforce be-
come more tolerant and more worldly - more, in
short, like residents of the West Side of Manhattan,
from which the key figures in the Lindsay adminis-
trationp early housing program themselves largely
came.
Roger Starr had been active for many years in housing and planning
issues of New York City as the Executive Director of the Citizens' Housing
and Planning Council of New York, a post he held at this article' s writing.
The legal mandating of scatter-site public housing by a Chicago Federal
Court of Appeals did not take place until September, 1971, in the Gautreaux
case.
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Having decided upon an objective, the administration found
that its effectuation would require change in the accepted ways of doing
things, and this slowly began to be made clear to all involved, both the
public and government officials.
The first outward sign of a change in policy came when the
City Planning Commission held a legally required public hearing on pro-
posed public housing sites on April 20th and listened to residents of 6
middle-class areas attack the Housing Authority for submitting them.
What was to become a familiar complaint was voiced - that the areas
were already overcrowded. 12 This was duly reported in the New York
Times on page 35, a not unusual spot in the paper for its reports on
public hearings of City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate.
Then, on May 5th, in a front page story in the New York Times,
the magnitude of the situation being dealt with was brought to public
awareness. It was announced that the Housing Authority would buy
2, 000 - 3, 000 units in publicly subsidized Mitchell-Lama (moderate to
middle-income) cooperatives (not yet selected) and then rent them on a
standard public housing basis. It was also stated that to make up the rest
of the federal allocation of 7, 500 units for the fiscal year that about 4, 000
units would be built in middle-income areas of the city, eleven sites for
which were already being processed by the City Planning Commission,
(the six in April plus five scheduled for public hearings in a week). None
of the sites were mentioned by name, nor were any details of this aspect
of the program given. 13
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Although the wording of the article was along the lines of "the
Housing Authority announced . . . " in fact the person who was quoted
extensively in the article describing the details of the program was the
deputy counsel to the mayor, Edward Robin. No one from the Housing
Authority was referred to at all, and this in fact was indicative of where
the initiative and thrust for change was coming from. Yet, for at least
some at a staff level in the Housing Authority who did not like either the
programs and/or the interference from outside the agency, it also sowed
the seeds of distrust of the City Planning Department and the belief that
planning in New York was not professional, but political. The invalid
belief that such an absolute distinction can be made - arising out of a de-
sire of professional technicians to elevate their social status and to mask
the social value judgments inherent in any technical decision - is satisfy-
ing to many in government service. Furthermore, it can color a civil
servant' s behavior pattern and manner of cooperation with persons in
other agencies.
On May 11th the New York Times printed what in retrospect
proved to be a revealing and remarkably accurate assessment of the situ-
ation' s political ramifications. The page 29 article, "City Hall Ends Veto
by Borough Presidents Over Housing Sites, " also noted an incident involv-
ing the Queens Borough President which may have been an harbinger of
things to come:
City Hall is no longer giving Borough Presi-
dents the chance to veto public housing sites proposed
for their boroughs. This new policy is necessary,
officials said, if the Lindsay administration is to plan
its program "in the best interests of the city as a whole.??
22
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In the past the Housing Authority chose a
site and submitted it to the Borough President con-
cerned before it was made public. Although the
Borough President had no power beyond his vote
on the Board of Estimate, "borough courtesy" gave
him the right to kill the plan if he did not approve.
Under the new system the sites are selected
by a special interagency committee headed by Edward
Robin, the Mayor' s deputy counsel.
Consultation Planned
The Borough Presidents have a legitimate
knowledge and concern about their boroughs and we
intend to consult them regularly ?' said Donald H.
Elliott, counsel to the Mayor. But they can' t over-
ride our final decisions. Public housing has citywide
implications and we have to have an over-all plan for
its development.'
In at least one case a Borough President was
not even consulted about a site. Borough President
Mario J. Cariello of Queens learned that two sites had
been proposed for his borough when he saw them listed
on the City Planning Commission calendar, according
to his deputy, Sidney Leviss.
The Commission will hold hearings on the sites
today, and Mr. Cariello will probably appear as a wit-
ness. 'We are very angry, ' Mr. Lewis said.
City officials said that Mr. Cariello was not in-
formed because of a 'bureaucratic snafu. ' However,
he explained that the incident was symptomatic of the
problem the city faces in planning public housing.
When Mayor Lindsay formed the inter-agency
committee to select housing sites last March, he said
it should follow two basic guidelines:
- Concentrate new construction on vacant land
and underutilized areas in outlying areas of the city.
- Stress rehabilitation and small, vest-pocket
projects in the densely populated areas that have al-
ready received most of the public housing projects.
Integration to Result
Since most public housing tenants are Negro and
Puerto Rican, and most vacant land is in predominantly
white areas, the policy would have the effect of integrat-
ing previously segregated neighborhoods, the officials
no ted.
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The policy could not be implemented if the
Borough Presidents retained their veto, officials
declared. They said that Queens and Staten Island
had lagged behind other boroughs in public housing
because of the opposition of small home owners,
whose hostility has been mirrored by the Borough
Presidents.
The success of City Hall' s strategy rests
primarily with the attitude of the Borough Presi-
dents. Each one has two of the 22 votes in the
Board of Estimate, which has final authority to
designate housing sites. An alliance of the five
Borough Presidents and either the Controller or
the City Council President, each of whom has four
votes, could block Lindsay administration plans.
Both Controller Mario A. Procaccino and
Council President Frank D. O' Connor are Demo-
crats. The only Republican Borough President is
Robert T. Connor of Staten Island, who could not
be reached for comment.
Stark Gives Views
Borough President Abe Stark of Brooklyn
said 'the Borough President should play the most
important part [because] who knows better what
the borough needs?'
Mrs. Constance Baker Motley, Borough
President of Manhattan, and Herman Badillo, the
Bronx chief, strongly backed the City Hall plan.
'It is important to disperse the nonwhite
population throughout the city, ' Mrs. Motley, a
Negro, declared. *Integration, and more im-
portantly, the quality of education, is inter-related
with housing patterns. '
The city has been allocated 7, 500 units of
public housing by the Federal Government for the
fiscal year ending June 30. Fourteen sites that will
have about 3, 500 units will be considered by the
Planning Commission by June 1.
The rest of the available Federal money will
be used to finance the rehabilitation of several thou-
sand units and the purchase of several thousand others
in middle-income cooperatives that will be rentj by
the Housing Authority to public housing clients.
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That same May 11th at a Planning Commission public hearing
homeowners opposed proposed public housing in one area of the Bronx
and in Woodlawn and Flushing in Queens; the effort by the city to get
15
sites approved in time to meet the federal deadline was in full swing.
By June 2nd 4 sites had been approved by the Board of Estimate, 2 were
under consideration, and the Planning Commission had just approved
three more for the Board to consider, even though there was much local
political opposition. 16
But with one month to go complications began to develop. At
the June 1st hearing of the Planning Commission proposed sites in Corona
and Howard Beach in Queens, and Kingsbridge in the Bronx, were denounced,
as middle class residents said they were overcrowded. In the Bronx case
the State Senator and Assemblyman led the opposition, and in Queens it was
Borough President Cariello who asked that the matter be postponed until
fall. "' Suddenly and without notice four or five housing proposals were
placed on the commission calendar, ' Mr. Cariello said. 'We have not had
time to study these proposals, and if you don' t continue the hearings you
will in effect deny our right to be heard. ' "7When this was denied by
Chairman Ballard because of the possible loss of federal funds, "Mr.
Cariello expressed the belief that the Government 'would not shortchange
New York' if the hearings were postponed, but Mr. Ballard stood firm, " 18
though he agreed to continue the hearings on the Queens sites and 3 other
postponed sites two weeks later. In fact, this was all "a ploy" by Cari-
ello, because "we (the administration) had been negotiating with him for
2 months. " 19
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On June 7th the City set in motion the machinery for the other
part of its strategy, when the Planning Commission met in special ses-
sion to give the required 2 weeks notice for a public hearing on sites for
4, 000 units of "vest-pocket" public housing. These had been announced
by Mayor Lindsay that same day and were to combine with the 3, 500
scatter-site units to make the 7, 500 unit total (the totals in each program
kept changing as details of various sites changed).
The next day, under a headline of "Housing in Slums to Avoid
Towers, " the public read:
The towering public housing projects that forest
the ghettos and are seen by some poor people as sym-
bols of second class citizenship will no longer be built
by the city.
Instead it will construct low income apartments
in rehabilitated buildings and small new structures
averaging six to eight stories, or about half the height
of older projects . . . .
Most of them will be concentrated in four slum
ridden sections . . . .
About 3, 500 units in middle-income neighbor-
hoods, where high rise buildings will still be built,
have already been proposed . . . .
The low-income projects will be combined with
a campaign to encourage private property owners and
non-profit groups, such as churches, to renovate houses
in the neighborhood for middle-income families . . . .
(by encouraging use of the Municipal loan fund and the
221d3 federal program) .
The aim of the campaign, as in the scattering of
public housing in middle-income areas, is ethnic and
economic integration, according to Mrs. Eugenia M.
Flatow, assistant for program plann 8 g to the Coordinator
of Housing and Development . . .
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Unfortunately, two things were happening to foil this strategy.
In the long run, there was the misunderstanding by most people of the
term "scatter-site. " It was generally considered to refer to the same
type of physical design as the vest-pocket housing program, a conno-
tation which one sentence in the above article clearly states is not true,
but one which nevertheless came to be inferred by most people. The
Times articles describing the scatter-sites being opposed did not men-
tion the number of units or the size of buildings being proposed, a fine
point that only years later would become an issue; they only described
general statements of opposition.
In the short run certain events were taking place behind the
scenes that would make it impossible for the Lindsay administration to
get its total program approved unless it made a political deal on the
proposed Corona site. But to understand the factors that created the
shape of the deal, one must first understand the role which the borough
of Queens played in the historical development pattern of New York City.
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CHAPTER II - THE BOROUGH OF QUEENS
To heighten the imageability of the urban en-
vironment is to facilitate its visual identification and
structuring. The elements isolated above - the paths,
edges, landmarks, nodes, and regions - are the build-
ing blocks in the process of making firm, differentiated
structures at the urban scale . . . .
Edges as well as paths call for a certain conti-
nuity of form throughout their length. The edge of a
business district, for example, may be an important
concept, but be difficult to discover in the field because
it has no recognizable continuity of form. The edge also
gains strength if it is laterally visible for some distance,
marks a sharp gradient of area character, and clearlyjoins two bounded regions. Thus, . . . the clear trans-
ition from water to land . . . (is a) powerful visual im-
pression. When two strongly contrasting regions are
set in close juxtaposition, and their meeting edge is laid
open to view, then visual attention is easily concentrated . . .
An edge may be more than simply a dominant
barrier if some visual or motion penetration is allowed
through it - if it is, as it were, structured to some
depth with the regions on either side. It then becomes a
seam rather than a barrier, a lone yf exchange along
which two areas are sewn together.
- Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City
[ In 1867] the Times. . . described the [proposed Brooklyn]
ridge as a sort of grand long needed pressure valve that
would do much to alleviate New York' s two most serious
problems, crime and overcrowding. 2
- David McCullough, The Great Bridge
The rallying cry that is still bringing together the com-
munity civic groups (there are more than 200 of them in
Queens) and community planning boards is ' We don' t
want to be Manhattanized.' This isT metimes followed
by: 'We are the forgotten borough.
"Queens: Bastion of the Middle Class,"
New York Times, April, 1972
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New York City is a collection of five boroughs - four of them
separated by major natural barriers of water - that in 1898 agreed to
consolidate under the name of New York City, a term that until then
referred only to the island of Manhattan. To help make that union pos-
sible four chartered towns agreed to join Long Island City to form the
Borough of Queens, the largest of all the boroughs with 115 square miles.
Its population of 153, 000 was spread over numerous small
towns and farmland, with the industrial center in Long Island City across
from Manhattan. 4 Though many people in all boroughs were opposed to
consolidation, a sufficient number were convinced by the objectives of
promoting mutual economic growth and using the financial base of Man-
hattan to pay for both the construction of bridges to link the boroughs
together and the improvement of municipal services - such as replacing,
over time, the numerous volunteer fire departments in Queens and
Staten Island with the paid New York City department.
As the data below show there ensued tremendous population
growth in the City, with Queens, the fastest growing borough between
1920 and 1960, overtaking Manhattan in 1960 to become the second most
populous borough (see Table 7 ).
As was predictable, the investment in bridges, tunnels and
other transportation facilities led to land speculation, especially in the
1920' s; and construction of the Grand Central Parkway, the Triborough
Bridge, the Belt Parkway system, and the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge in
the 30' s and 40' s gave further impetus to this growth.
(All n*
TABLE 7
Population, New York City and Boroughs, 1890-1970
umbers rounded to nearest thousand; numbers in thousands)
1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
New York City 2, 507 3, 437 4, 767 5, 620 6, 930 7, 455
Bronx 431 732 1, 265 1, 395
Brooklyn 1, 634 2, 018 2, 560 2, 698
Manhattan 2, 332 2, 284 1, 867 1, 890
Queens 284 469 1, 079 1, 298
Richmond 86 1171970----------------------
(Staten Island) Minority Races Popu-
19 Negro Land lation
---.- 1960---.-- %of Area Per
1950 Total oNegro Total Number Total Other Sq.Mi. Sq. Mi.
New York City 7, 892 7, 782 14. 0 7 895 1, 668 21. 1 178 299. 7 26
Bronx 1,451 1,425 11.5 1,472 358 24.3 33 41.2 36
Brooklyn 2, 738 2, 627 14. 1 2, 602 656 25. 2 40 70. 3 37
Manhattan 1, 960 1, 698 23. 4 1, 539 380 24. 7 69 22. 7 68
Queens 1,551 1,810 8.1 1,986 258 13.0 33 108.0 18
Richmond 192 222 4.4 295 16 5.3 2 57.5 5
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, U. S.
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1951 (p.
1963 (p. 23), 1972 (p. 23).
Dept.
53),
(All n
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There are two topics which are of concern - the physical pattern
of land use which emerged and the ethnic patterns of population distribution
which occurred. Physically,
(t)he development of western Queens generally occurred
around existing communities. Development in eastern
Queens following World War II occurred rapidly on large
vacant tracts and was spurred by mortgages insured by
the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Ad-
ministration. Orchards and truck farms vanished, entire
new communities appearing where once there had been
only rural villages. The new communities invariably
adopted the names and many of the values and traditions
of these rural villages which explains to some extgnt the
strong community identification that exists today.
What the City Planning Commission' s proposed Plan for New York
City, from which the above quote was taken, does not say - perhaps because
it would needlessly antagonize the present residents - is that the growth of
Queens was uncontrolled urban sprawl, with the profit-motivated forces of
the real estate market determining the pattern of growth. The zoning ordi-
nance of 1916, being the first in the country, was no real obstacle: it
would have allowed a total population of 50 million people in the city. Thus,
it was the developers' perception of the market, not the zoning, that was
the factor behind building low density housing in most of the growing areas.
Furthermore, New York City does not have a subdivision ordinance. Rather
it relies on the official "City Map" to govern where streets are built. Con-
trol of the map for many years rested for all practical purposes with the
civil engineers in the offices of the Borough Presidents, though changes
legally required approval of the City Planning Commission after that body
was created in the 1930' s. So, with the prior example of the 1811 com-
mission that mapped Manhattan, a standard grid-iron street pattern, con-
-31-
ducive to real estate transactions through simplified legal lot descriptions
and creating a very simple street and lot numbering system but ignoring
topography and streams, was the result for the other boroughs as well.
Furthermore, it became virtually impossible to change the pat-
tern after land speculators subdivided and sold off parcels, even if they
were not built on, since 1) every small lot owner on a "paper" street
now had a legal right of access that could not be taken away from him with-
out compensation, 2) even if one person owned all the frontage for blocks,
any change had to be approved by a lengthy City process (an "all-agency
conference" that can take years) which was controlled by "old-line" bureau-
crats and 3) all engineering and survey costs for a new street pattern had
to be paid for by the applicant, a cost that most small developers could not
afford anyway. Thus, private street systems that the City did not design
historically took effect anyway.
When one combines this with 1) the City' s inevitable failure to
provide urban services on time - often involving a 20 year delay -
2) the ineffectiveness of the City Planning Commission as an in-
novative force during the 1930' s, 1940' s and 1950' s (it only had about 100
total employees in one lower Manhattan office to deal with the entire City);
3) the dominance of Robert Moses over the City' s public works
program;
4) the administrative power of Borough Presidents in the govern-
mental structure before the new City Charter of 1961;
5) the political influence of real estate interests, who to this day
constitute a powerful political lobby and source of campaign contributions; and
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6) the failure of most people to foresee the impact of post
World War II growth on the social structure of the country;
one cannot really be surprised at the way Queens developed.
In the post World War II period, Queens, and more recently
Staten Island, had the commodity which the private developer finds most
easy to build upon - vacant land to which people can "escape" - a totally
new environment whose physical problems only become apparent after it
is built, and whose social problems may never become fully apparent to
the residents themselves. For, as the census data show, while total
New York City population stayed the same, there were significant shifts
on a borough basis, with Brooklyn and Manhattan declining, Bronx stay-
ing about the same, and Queens and Staten Island (Richmond) significantly
increasing, both absolutely and on a percentage basis. In 20 years, 1950 -
1970, Queens increased its population by about 400, 000 (about 25%), and this
was in addition to an increase of 200, 000 that occurred primarily between
1946 and 1950. In both of these boroughs virtually all of the housing units
being built during this time when land was abundant and cheap were being
built by the private market for sale or rental at market rates. Public hous-
ing still was cast in its role as either taking otherwise undesirable sites or
being built in conjunction with slum removal programs that were a part of
urban renewal projects.
This process had two consequences of particular importance for
Forest Hills and this study. First, because the new housing market until
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the mid-sixties was largely racially segregated, it was possible for the
upwardly mobile white lower middle class to flee the physically deteriorat-
ing older parts of the city - with its problems of racial and economic change
and declining school quality - secure in the knowledge that not only were
they going to a new area, but one which would in all likelihood be almost
all white. Secondly, a large enough demand for housing was created for
developers to shift from building single family detached units to building
large apartment houses, a type of development which opens the door to the
larger developers of the City, men like Sam Lefrak, who are more skilled
in dealing with the governmental system than the small builder who con-
structs 50 - 100 units per year. Indeed, with Sam Lefrak, one was deal-
ing with the "largest individual builder-landlord in the City, if not the
country. " He is "landlord to a quarter of a million people, mostly middle-
income residents of Brooklyn and Queens, . . . and a quarter million more,
mostly [in Brooklyn] . . . live in buildings his father built and sold between
the First and Second World Wars. "6
Within the context of the above general history of development in
Queens, the social characteristics of the two neighborhoods involved, Corona
and Forest Hills, deserve elaboration, for they are a picture of contrasts
in many ways. Yet they both share the common condition that the popular
image associated with the historic name of the area is no longer valid. The
geographic area which the name is used to cover is no longer a homogeneous
collection of people with a common community of interests, either ethni-
cally or religiously. The fact that there is so great a contrast in the popu-
34
-34-
lar historic images - the one a blue collar working class area and the
other an expensive upper middle class area - makes it somewhat of a
surprise for one to realize that they are next to each other. This feeling
of separateness is encouraged by the physical nature of what is accepted
as the common boundary, the six-lane Long Island Expressway, with a
pattern of medium-high density development occurring along some of its
right of way. (The present zoning allows about 140 dwelling units per
acre; prior zoning allowed more.)
Corona
As described in 1969 by the Plan for New York City, it is within
Community Planning District 4 (see map following) and is
. . . located to the east of Junction Boulevard [ and] is
now the core of a stable Italian-American community.
The residents are mainly blue-collar workers who have
F urchased modest homes on small plots which they care-
ully maintain. The neighborhood has a village character,
with older, well maintained homes and clean streets.
Much of the local social and community life centers around
the church. There is strong civic pride, and the com-
munity maintains its own volunteer ambulance service. 7
The oldest part of Corona is south of the 44th Avenue railroad, where there
is a mixture of some old industry, storage yards, and "a variety of old,
well kept homes. The irregular street pattern helps maintain the tranquil
character of the neighborhood by discouraging through traffic. ,
It was this oldest area that was to get so much attention later, as
residents fought to save their homes. And there were more than the usual
reasons for their attachment to them. Not only had many of the families
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MAP 4
Queens Community Planning District 4
Land Use Policy
Undeveloped Developed
Areas Areas
LOW DENSITY RESIDENTIAL
Typical uses: single-family detached, two-story garden apartments,
row houses, local commercial in designated areas, public and
private institutions. Maximum densities: from about 4 to about
29 housing units per acre. Equivalent to R1, R2, and R3 zoning.
LOW-MEDIUM DENSITY RESIDENTIAL
Typical uses: two-story detached, row houses, garden apartments,
apartments up to six stories, local commercial in designated areas,
public and private institutions. Maximum densities: from about 40
to 63 housing units per acre. Equivalent to R4 and R5 zoning.
HIGH-MEDIUM DENSITY RESIDENTIAL *:??-"
Typical uses: old and new law tenements, brownstones, high-rise
apartments, local commercial in designated areas, public and
private institutions. Maximum densities: from about 111 to about
141 housing units per acre. Equivalent to R6 and R7 zoning.
HIGH DENSITY RESIDENTIAL
Typical uses: high-rise apartments, local commercial in desig-
nated areas, public and private institutions. Maximum densities:
from about 247 to about 435 housing units per acre. Equivalent to
R8, R9, and R10 zoning.
MAJOR COMMERCIAL CENTER -
Stores, service facilities, commercial recreation, and offices
serving large sections of the City. Equivalent to C4 zoning.
CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
Major commercial activity centers serving the City and Metropoli-
tan area. Office buildings, banks,corporate headquarters, cultural
and entertainment facilities. Equivalent to C5 and C6 zoning.
GENERAL SERVICE & 1--E-:
COMMERCIAL AMUSEMENTI""aM,
Heavy commercial and service activities including warehousing,
motor vehicle repair, amusements. Equivalent to C7 and C8 zoning.
LIGHT INDUSTRY :.
Light manufacturing, warehousing. Equivalent to M1 zoning.
HEAVY INDUSTRY
Manufacturing, warehousing. Equivalent to M2 and M3 zoning.
PARKS
Parks, playgrounds, and beaches; and marina districts equivalent
to C3 zoning. "Undeveloped Areas" classification includes land-
fill, marshes, and other areas presently unusable or inaccessible.
CEMETERIES
OUTSIDE NEW YORK CITY
CITY OWNED VACANT LAND
URBAN RENEWAL AREAS * ** * *
:* 9 0:
Note: "Land Use Policy"
means current zoning
Source: N.Y.C. Planning
Commission, Plan for New
York City, Volume i:
Queens, New Yorks 1969
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MAP 5
Queens Community Planning District 4
Community Resources
Undeveloped Developed
Areas Aras
Parks and Playgrounds
Publicly Aided Housing
(P) Public Housing
Project
Name - Under Construction
* Approved, not funded
Historic District
- City Owned Vacant Land
40 Social Services
Public School
Parochial or Private School
College
Hospital
Police Precinct Station
dO Fire Station
-0- Local Subway Station
<>Express Subway Station
i Municipal Parking Facility
o Other Faciities
.... .Urban Renewal Area
. . Designated by
* * Board of Estimate
Scheduled Improvements
In Capital E-1347.........--- ' Iat
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lived there for several generations, but many of the homes were built by
hand by the fathers or grandfathers of the present residents. One resi-
dent, Ralph Dellacona, said: "There was a city dump here when the
Italians first came here in 1900. We took the worst land, and we built
homes with our bare hands. Because I want to live with my friends and
keep my home, they call me a Mafia. "9 Visiting another resident, Lillian
Manasseri, in her home in 1972, I learned that the mortgages for some
of the houses had been paid off with funds that the families received from
the United States government for the deaths of their sons in World War II.
So in a very real sense, these homes were a physical link between the
present occupants and the sacrifices made by family members in the past.
For many years the area had been next to privately owned dumps
for the ashes and cinders from Manhattan' s coal furnaces. After the City
decided to take over the carting operations, the dumps and their mountain of
cinders were acquired for park land in 1934. Robert Moses, saying as
Parks Commissioner that the City could not afford to level the hill and
spread topsoil and grass seed, used his power as head of the Long Island
State Park Commission to build the Grand Central Parkway (connecting
with the Triborough Bridge that he was building as head of the Triborough
Bridge Authority) through the dumps. This enabled him to use the highway
money to develop the Corona-Flushing Park, which in buded using some of
the ash material to fill in low spots and Horse Creek.
"Ironically, filling Horse Creek also laid the groundwork for an
acrimonious dispute that broke out thirty years later. The filled area in
the creek provided the site for the now notorious Forest Hills public housing
project. If this had not been unstable filled land, private developers would
have claimed it long before. If it had been more solid land the public hous-
ing foundation costs would have been greatly reduced . . . ."
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Walking south a few blocks, one comes upon a very different
type of urban development. In the portion of Corona immediately north
of the Long Island Expressway and west of 100th Street, ". . . large
tracts have been developed with huge apartment houses, an extension
of the middle-income developments to the south of the Expressway in
Rego Park. "12 Of the more than half-dozen developments, the largest
is Lefrak City, with about 5, 000 families in 16-story buildings.
The important thing to understand is the urban dynamics at
work here, a dynamic not possible to know from aerial photographs or
statistics. Rather, as Lewis Mumford said, "One has to go out and
pound the sidewalks. "113 The Plan for New York City accurately de-
scribed the situation when it said:
There is little communication between the new
residents of Lefrak City and the old, tightly-knit
Italian-American community. Their different back-
grounds, needs, and aspirations cause friction: the
new apartment dwellers have higher incomes and more
urbane tastes. The older residents are fighting to
maintain the village character of their neighborhood.
They feel threatened on two fronts: by a spreading
pocket of decay on the north and by middle-income
development on the south. h
It is in the planning policy toward these threats that political
controversy is produced. In response to the fears of decay on the north,
the planners say, "The various programs for the Northern Boulevard area,
aimed to correct social problems and imporove the physical environment,
will help mitigate these fears. ,15 But with the latter threat, the planning
policy reinforces the fear by saying, "The growth of new, higher density
housing in the south is, in the long run, a desirable development, "6 one
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which will cause a growth of population in Corona from 20, 000 in 1960 to
30, 000 in 1970. Whereas the Plan praises the high-rise towers as a
"self-contained vertical city" with "highly developed local shopping and
a full range of resident services, " 1 another observer, Jack Newfield,
wrote in November, 1970 that
You don' t have to go to Harvard to know that Corona
is a community, and Lefrak City is a depersonalized
maze for those who run the rat race . . . The issue
in Corona is the preservation of a special community,
its protection from the glacier of plastic moving across
the country. Instead of destroying the homes on 102nd
Street, Lindsay should declare them a landmark, a
shrine to dying folkways, and appropriate funds to keep
them as they are. 18
Part of the problem, as we shall see, is that the identification of
these "newcomers" lay across the middle of neighborhood and community
lines. In the geographic terms of neighborhood, they were in Corona, and
thus would be referred to as residents of Corona. But in socio-economic
class terms, they were a part of the community to the south of the express-
way, a distinction that remains ambiguous to most New Yorkers who are
not intimately familiar with the area but who rely rather on fleeting memo-
ries of past visits or on a few newspaper stories for their present day judg-
ments.
Forest Hills
This problem of community identification with a neighborhood
name continues as one goes south of the Expressway, a move which it
should be noted takes one into a different advisory Community Planning
Board, for the Expressway serves as a convenient administrative boundary
line. Whereas the areas within Community Board 6 are called Rego Park
and Forest Hills, with a 1970 population of nearly 120, 000, again there is a
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vagueness about where one neighborhood ends and the other begins. In
general, the name Forest Hills tends to be used for a much larger area
than Rego Park, and its historic image of single family homes is no longer
applicable. Indeed, one of the first reactions by a staff member of the
City Planning Department was that the "Forest Hills" project was in
Rego Park. This definitional problem was seen also in Nathan Glazer' s
1972 article on the Forest Hills project titled, "When the Melting Pot
Doesn' t Melt. " He describes the area by saying:
*
Forest Hills is an amazing sight. The last
major subway line to be built in New York City, in the
nineteen-thirties, ran through the area, which was then
still, in large measure, empty lots and small communi-
ties of homeowners. Some apartment houses went up
before World War II, but the great expansion of the
neighborhood came after the war. The dominant build-
ing types shifted from the single family home and the
six story apartment house to taller apartment houses.
Queens Boulevard [12 lanes] became lined with great
apartment houses, stretching back from the subway.
The standard of density was, by any theory of city plan-
ning, outrageous. The standard of amenity was, by any
theory of city planning, equally outrageous. Enormous
freeways reaching out to Long Island cut up the area,
introducing a permanent roar and stench of traffic. There
were no new parks built; the only remaining open space
was some windswept, leftover corners. The schools
were consistently overcrowded, as the inadequate system
for school building in New York City failed to cope with
the flood of apartment dwellers. The public trans-
portation was among the worst in the city. The single
subway line that had been built to serve a few hundred
thousand now served a million. The sewers could not
accommodate the heavy rains and the area was regularly
flooded.
* The tract for the project is not in the old Forest Hills, the
section around the West Side Tennis Club, but a newer area
northwest of that, in a triangle bounded by Queens Boulevard,
the Long Island Expressway and Flushing Meadows Park.
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With all this, people poured into Forest Hills
from Brooklyn and the Bronx, which [Glazer claims]
were less crowded, had better transportation, cheaper
housing, less crowded schools, better drainage. Every
site in Forest Hills that ould be used for apartments
was covered with them. i
Glazer continues by saying that Lefrak City is in Forest Hills
(see quote, p. 179), thereby further showing how what many would con-
sider to be a clear definition of the neighborhood boundary between Forest
Hills and Corona - the Chinese wall-like Long Island Expressway - can
become an indistinct or blurred edge to others.
But the important point is recognized - the growth of large apart-
ment complexes identical to what people identify as being a Manhattan-
style pattern of development. Yet it is combined with a life style that is
suburban in nature with its dependence on the automobile, the two-story
department stores with their parking lots, etc. In short, it was a dream
for suburbia that could only be half realized, given the economic limitations
within which many of the people had to live.
With such an investment in large apartment complexes at stake,
and with a successful developer' s knowledge of what would encourage or
discourage the marketing of. his housing, it was therefore not surprising
that Sam Lefrak would take an active interest in the proposal of the City to
build a public housing project a block away from his Lefrak City com-
plex under construction - a development of office buildings, shops, and
apartment buildings for an eventual residential population of over 11, 000
people. At the same time the residents of this and other new apartment
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complexes adopted the same attitudes of self-protection as those in any
new neighborhood, and in the process alienated the earlier wave of occu-
pants in their one and two family houses, a group whose identity tended
to become lost as they became a smaller proportion of the area' s popu-
lation. And out of this confusion of identification of just which interests
were involved in the mix of community, neighborhood, and builder de-
veloped the controversy over the proposed public housing project in Corona.
CHAPTER III - THE SITE SELECTION BATTLE:
A HIGH SCHOOL VERSUS PUBLIC HOUSING
When the project was first conceived, it was
intended for Corona and then it would have contained
only 509 units. The project as so designed was aborted
almost immediately after conception and the site was
changed (for reasons that have never been fully agd
clearly understood by the public) to 108th Street.-
- Report to Honorable John V. Lindsay
of Investigation Concerning Forest Hills
Low-Income Housing Project by Mario
Cuomo, July 25, 1972
[ Emphasis mine]
These reasons must be understood. It is because they have not
been understood that passions eventually became so aroused. False per-
ceptions of why the Forest Hills public housing site was selected caused
people to get even more upset than the low-income housing itself would
have caused. Furthermore, it would make it easier to understand sub-
sequent decisions, as the governmental system continued the logic of the
political agreements that had originally been made. It would also
strengthen the argument that it was not the professional city planners who
went awry with their "social engineering" but rather a political process
that failed, not only at the administrative civil servant level, but also at
the critical level of the elected officials, who reversed some of the plan-
ners' ideas.
As the years have passed and as the list of community versus
government conflicts grows longer, there is a tendency to minimize the
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conflicts of a more peaceful era. What is now remembered as a very
quick change of site for the housing project from Corona to the Forest
Hills 108th Street site was in fact a complicated political issue that
took over six months to resolve.
To set the scene, it must be kept in mind that because the city
tended to provide services after an area was physically developed, it
was almost always faced with making the best of a bad situation in its
search for sites for any public facility. Land that was vacant was left
over by developers because it was in some way undesirable. Unless
there was a junk yard or something similarly unattractive, something
would have to be condemned to make way for the public improvement.
The larger the site needed, the longer the lead time required to get a
facility built; and the more desirable it was that the building be in a
residential neighborhood, the more people the condemnation process was
likely to affect.
This, of course, is exactly the description of a school site, and
schools are also the issue which is most capable of galvanizing a large
number of people from a neighborhood into political action, since so many
parents and prospective parents tend to have strong feelings about such an
important influence on their children' s lives. The normal lead time for
New York City to build a high school from the time that it is approved for
inclusion within the capital budget by the City Planning Commission and
the Board of Estimate, a decision which means starting the search for
sites by the Site Selection Board, is seven years. A few private developers,
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if they do not attempt innovations that involve city red tape, can easily
build up a residential area before the city agencies have internal agree-
ment that a school is needed enough to be included in an always tight
capital budget.
The official looking for public housing sites for the City is faced
with the same kinds of land use problems but for opposite reasons. If he
wants to locate a public housing project in an expanding, desirable resi-
dential area where there is an active private market, then he finds himself
faced with not only opposition from the local citizenry, who have just moved
there to escape a deteriorating environment and see his proposal as a
threat (both personally and to their property values), but he also finds him-
self faced with higher land costs. As a consequence the official also will
find opposition from the local real estate industry, which doesn't want to
see potential real estate values fall, and which by its own actions can
make that a self-fulfilling prophecy. To make matters worse, he may
even find that the only sites still vacant and "desirable" are wanted by
other city agencies to provide services that the new residents want. This
is a situation that a politically attuned bureaucrat in a city agency can
capitalize on during the normal "horse-trading" that occurs between
administrative agencies and politicians as a part of the daily process of
running a city. Queens, as the previous chapter indicated, had all of
these ingredients.
At its June 1, 1966 hearing on the Queens public housing sites,
the Planning Commission had agreed to continue the public hearing on the
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Corona site on June 15th. Although this appeased the community, it also
gave the Commission and the Lindsay administration time to consider a
new and more serious problem - a formal request written one day earlier,
May 31st, by the Board of Education that it wanted the site. The letter
from Adrian Blumenfeld, a long time and powerful figure in the upper level
bureaucracy who was in charge of all school planning, had the following
crucial passages:
It is of utmost importance that the Planning
Commission give consideration to the plan of the
Board of Education to construct an urgently needed
comprehensive high school in this section of the
Borough in order to relieve existing and increasing
congestion at Newtown and Forest High Schools. The
School Planning and Research Division has been view-
ing the general area between Radcliff Avenue and 57th
Avenue and between 100th Street and 102nd Street as
a possible site for the "New High school, " Queens,
which has been incorporated into the 1966-1967 Capital
Budget with an appropriation for site acquisition. This
location coincides almost exactly with the location of
the proposed housing project and, consequently, poses
a serious problem for the Board of Education. Our
preliminary studies have underscored the fact that it
will be extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible,
to locate an alternative acceptable high school site in
this section of the Borough. [Emphasis mine]
We respectfully petition the City Planning Com-
mission to give sympathetic consideration to the school
needs of this community with particular attention to the
urgent need for high school construction resulting from
the decision of the Board to shift from the present 3-
year high school plan of organization to a 4-year or-
ganization housed in comprehensive high school build-
ings.2
There was, however, one "slight" difference between this re-
quest and the Housing Authority' s, a difference that was very quietly kept
At this time I can only speculate about any possible pressures which may
have been put on Mr. Blumenfeld by either Sam Lefrak or Borough President
Cariello.
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from public notice by its proponents. Whereas the 5. 1 acre housing
project would have required condemnation of not more than 4 homes,
a 12 acre high school site, which is what the school system had in
mind, would have required condemnation of 70-120 dwelling units,
many of them not for the actual school building but for the athletic field.
For the next three weeks in June there were a series of dis-
cussions and meetings among the Housing Authority, Eugenia Flatow,
Edward Robin, Adrian Blumenfeld, and the City Planning Department.
Among the proposals advanced were a combination school and housing
project on the large 12 acre site, which was accepted by both Blumen-
feld and Flatow, but not very warmly by the City Planning Department' s
school section head, Richard Bader; placing the entire school in Flushing
Meadow Park, which was adamantly opposed by Parks Commissioner
Thomas Hoving; and an 8 1/2 acre site one-half mile north of the Corona
site and directly across the street from Flushing Park, which would then
be used for playground space, and which was also opposed by Commissioner
Hoving on the grounds that other uses were planned for the area. 3
While this was being pondered, several other things were happen-
ing. Some meetings were being held with community groups to discuss the
housing project. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate picture of
these meetings because there are apparently no written records, and one
must simply find those very few people who were involved at that time to
discover what happened. The off-the-cuff statement by a staff member of
the Housing Authority' s public information office six years later that "Of
course there were community meetings; City Planning does that as part
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of their job"4 is not sufficient. For at that time the Manhattan based
City Planning Department had no offices in the outer four boroughs,
and community groups simply were not as active in the planning process
as they are today. Meanwhile, Sam Lefrak, whose Lefrak City was only
partially built and was being heavily promoted, was trying to get the pro-
ject moved elsewhere and to have a school placed nearby instead. He had
the advantage that at that time "community approval" translated politi-
cally more easily into meaning approval by the local elected councilmen,
assemblymen, borough president, etc., and not as much by ad hoc com-
munity groups. (The day of the Model Cities program and its "maximum
feasible participation" had not yet arrived. ) Obviously, the local poli-
ticians had to be responsive to local pressures, but the central city ad-
ministration was more likely to let the local politicians work out their own
arrangements with their constituents, campaign contributors, and local
political clubs; and if the local politicians would "bite the bullet" the
central administration took that as meaning the local community scores
had been settled.
Simultaneously the city administration was putting together the
other part of its political package for low-income housing. On June 7
Mayor Lindsay had announced plans for 4, 000 units of vest-pocket public
housing for four of the worst slum areas in the city and the push was on
to get the sites for these units and the remaining scatter-site projects ap-
proved before the end of June. This detailed vest-pocket program was the
same one which had been generally referred to in the Times article of
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May 11 as being done in conjunction with the Mitchell-Lama middle-
income cooperative program to meet the federal 7, 500 unit total, but
apparently as the weeks went by it was decided that the city would have
to use just the vest-pocket and scatter-site programs to meet that fiscal
year' s federal allocation, so those two programs had to add to that total.
Whether that merely meant the purchase of the public housing units in
Mitchell-Lama co-ops was not going to be counted against the next fiscal
year because it could not be implemented fast enough or was not con-
sidered as satisfying the federal conditions for that particular type of
yearly allocation, I do not know. (During the ensuing several years, how-
ever, the Authority did implement the co-op units purchase program. )
On June 15, 1966, the Planning Commission again held hearings
on the Corona and Howard Beach sites. Approximately 700 Queens resi-
dents opposed the placing of public housing in middle-income areas. Dur-
ing this raucous hearing, which Chairman Ballard finally had to threaten
to cancel unless the disturbances were stopped, a number of my sources
(governmental, newspaper reporters, and others) alleged that Sam Lefrak
paid for the buses that took residents to these hearings, an action which
could easily be defended by Mr. Lefrak as being his "civic generosity" to
his tenants.
Vito Battista, chairman of the United Taxpayers Party and later
to play a pivotal role as a State Assemblyman in the fight against condem-
nation of Corona homes for a high school, opposed the housing projects,
characterizing the concept of public housing as "immoral. " Borough
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President Cariello continued his opposition, charging the Planning Com-
mission with "' steamroller tactics' by holding hearings on all our Queens
sites on the same day. "6 City Councilman Donald Manes, later to be-
come Queens Borough President when the Forest Hills project would be
making national headlines in 1971, also spoke in opposition because he
felt the public housing would encourage the flight of middle-income resi-
dents from the city. In support of the projects, William Booth, the Chair-
man of the Human Rights Commission, defended the scatter-site program
as the "only hope to get people out of ghettos, " and was greeted with boos.
The loudest cheers of all during the ten hour hearing, at which 117 persons
spoke, came, according to the Times, when a woman said, 'We improved
our lot by struggle. The Negroes want everything for free. How much can
we take? How much can we pay? We' d be better off on relief. " In con-
trast, "a middle aged Negro man addressed the crowd with tears in his
eyes. 'I don't like to ask for something I have a right to, ' he said amid
a chorus of hoots. 'I don't want you to love me. I don' t want it and I
don' t need it, but I want you to respect me. ' "8
At its June 22nd hearing the Commission approved the last four
scatter-site projects, including the one in Corona. It then heard testi-
mony that day on the proposed 4, 000 units of vest-pocket housing . Two
days later, Bronx Borough President Herman Badillo, later to be the City' s
first Congressman of Puerto Rican descent, criticized the Lindsay ad-
ministration for delaying the two Queens projects because of community
opposition. Whether he did this merely as a protest for the Commission' s
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delay or, what is more likely, to put pressure on the administration be-
cause he knew about the problems that were developing is not known.
With the project now scheduled to go before the Board of Esti-
mate one week later, June 28th, the behind-the-scenes activity increased.
I find that the popular press erred in subsequent years in its analysis of
the situation at this crucial juncture. Walter Goodman, writing in the
New York Times Magazine in 1972, says
The Corona site was approved by the Planning Com-
mission over community objections on June 21, 1966,
with the understanding that a new high school, which
everyone agreed was needed in Queens, would be built
a few blocks away, across the Horace Harding Express-
way, in Forest Hills-Rego Park. 9
The Village Voice, in its article of July 8, 1971, "Corona: Cause for a
Day, " wrote
Many people feel the City wanted the school there [ in
Corona] in the first place because it had been promised
to Lefrak, and that it used the threat of public housig
to soften up the residents into accepting the school.
In fact, the Planning Commission knew the Forest Hills site was
considered unacceptable for the high school by the school system because
of the May 31st letter from Adrian Blumenfeld, Administrator of the Board
of Education' s School Planning and Research Division. What the Commis-
sion was really doing by passing the Corona site for public housing was
avoiding the issue of the high school publicly while it and the administration
*
The Horace Harding Expressway is the name for that section of the Long
Island Expressway.
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tried to resolve the problem; and this had the benefit of letting the city
show the federal government that action was being taken and that the
allocation for public housing funds should not be reduced. Indeed, as
Don Elliott today admits, it was the failure of the City to find another
site that would be acceptable to the school system that enabled the Queens
Borough President to insist that the high school be placed on that Corona
site. In his opinion there were two realities - "the moral imperative for
scatter-site and the pervasive and accurate need for a new high school.
The Queens high schools were on double session. We failed to produce a
12 acre site that met the geographical needs of the high school, and we
thereby lost the moral imperative. "
To the people in charge of the administration' s scatter-site
program the possibility of a high school on the Corona site was an anathema,
not only because it would take away their housing site but because it meant
there would be the destruction of 70 or more houses instead of 3 or 4. Yet,
the pressure for the high school there continued to increase. A high ad-
ministration official confirmed to me that there was personal pressure dur-
ing the summer from Sam Lefrak to move the housing site. Lefrak had
telephoned the official' s father to try to exert pressure. In a second in-
stance, Lefrak met the official for lunch at the Columbia University Faculty
Club and "in effect offered to work out what I wanted in a Morningside
Heights problem he knew I was interested in if I would stop the Corona
public housing, and I refused. ,12
*
Morningside Heights is an edge of Harlem next to Columbia University, an
edge characterized not only by a black-white, residential-academic contrast,
but also by a sharp topographic change.
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The community meetings became a second battleground while
these housing officials negotiated privately with Board of Education
officials. Today, much misunderstanding exists over the role that resi-
dents of Corona played in determining the City' s actions on the site. A
large part of this can be attributed to the failure of the press to differenti-
ate between the two different types of communities that exist in Corona -
the old Italian culture and the new renters in the multi-story apartment
buildings. For example, Walter Goodman said in the New York Times
Magazine in 1972 that the Corona housing site,
vacant except for a swim club, was in a neighborhood
of one- and two-family houses whose owners rose up
against having four 14-story bui} ings with some 2, 000
inhabitants imposed upon them. 1
Martin Tolchin, writing in the Times in 1971 on "The Housing Tangle,
conjured up the same image when he wrote
In fact, the Forest Hills site originally was proposed
for Corona, which had enough political influence to de-
feat the proposal, as did Maspeth, Qu ens, the site of
another proposed low income project.
The New York Post, in a comprehensive five part series on "The Battle
of Forest Hills" in April, 1972, reported that in Corona:
The mostly small homeowners there, however, raised
a ruckus and the Lindsay administration made a drastic
change in plans, switching a high school that was to be
built on the Forest Hills gite to the Corona site and the
project to Forest Hills. 1
As various articles continued to repeat this line of argument, it
tended to become accepted as fact by later writers, whereas the reality
53
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differs markedly from that description. The small homeowners of Corona
did not have much political clout, nor were they the most vocal. There
were community meetings being held by various groups to try to raise sup-
port for the housing project. These meetings were admittedly not wildly
successful, but they were not total losses, either. Eugenia Flatow went to
five of them and recalls the one in Lefrak City as the worst, being "either
stacked or composed of the most hostile people. " At that meeting 350
people were in a room built for 200. These people, "to whom the project
meant blacks, " said, "Ours is a good integrated community, " according to
Flatow, who then adds, "There weren't any blacks in the room. " Her
summary of these meetings is "We didn't convert anyone at the Lefrak
City meeting, but they felt guilty. Other communities were not happy, but
they were not violent. "16
This view tends to be supported by Lillian Manasseri, who later
helped form and lead the Italian Corona "Fighting 69, " and with whom I
spoke. According to her, the members of their local civic organization
were unaware of the housing project proposal because it did not meet during
the summer months. Only the President of the Association knew what was
happening. When she, the Secretary for the Association, did hear some
rumors about it, she asked the president; he said no, that there would be
a high school on the site. The "Fighting 69 Fact Sheet" produced by her
states:
The management of Lefrak City hired buses for 1, 000
people, asking the cooperation of the Corona Community,
to go down to City Hall to protest the low income project.
Seeing the large protest gathering, it was suggested that
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instead of a housing project the land be dedicated for
use as a high school. The Corona Property Owners
Association, representing the owners of 64 homes
located adjacent to the site, stated their approva of
the school and the housing project was dropped.
Haskell Lazere, at that time executive director of the American
Jewish Congress (now New York Director of the American Jewish Committee),
substantially agrees. Judith Tuler of his organization, and Jane Benedict of
both the Metropolitan Council on Housing and Congress of Racial Equality,
were together trying to raise community support for the project. Lazere
states that
. . . according to my information, the Corona thing
was masterminded by Sam Lefrak, who convinced the
people they needed a high school, and who had his
public relations man shooting out press releases.
The head of the Corona Homeowners Association was
so cocksure of himself - he had been sold a bill of
goods. 18
These community meetings took on extra importance just after the
Planning Commission approval of the Corona site for housing, as a result
of the June meetings between City Housing officials and the Board of Edu-
cation' s Adrian Blumenfeld. 'We asked him if Borough President Cariello
could stand the pressure of losing 83 homes if the high school was placed on
the Corona site, and when he said, 'Yes, ' we knew we were in trouble, " a
high Lindsay administration official privately stated. 19
Efforts at convincing the community not to opt for the school were
redoubled. Haskell Lazere states:
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Judith Tuller went to the Board of Education
and found that the high school would take 65 to 70
homes. A tumultuous meeting in Corona voted over-
whelmingly for the school. She got up and said,
'Don' t do this. You'11 lose your homes. * The head
of the Corona homeowners said, ' You' re a liar. ' She
said, 'Go own to the Board of Education.' This was
rejected.
At about this time another event took place to which we were able
to find only one obscure press reference but which was confirmed in several
interviews. A small newspaper in 1971 reprinted an item from the News-
letter of the Metropolitan Council on Housing:
In 1966, the residents of Corona, Queens,
were warned, in an Italian and English leaflet put out
by Metropolitan Council on Housing and distributed
door to door by volunteers, that proposed construc-
tion of a high school in their area would mean the
demolition of at least 69 homes whereas construction
of a low-income project could be accomplished on*
vacant land. They were given a telephone numb to
verify this information. Not one person called.
Thus, this effort remained unsuccessful. On June 23 the Board of Estimate
decided to postpone a decision on the site for housing, giving as the reason
the request by the Board of Education for the site for a high school; from
July through October the issue remained unresolved.
On October 27, 1966, a compromise decision was announced at the
Board of Estimate public hearing, although the formal legal steps to imple-
ment it would take months. The executive assistant to the Mayor, Robert
Sweet, stating that agreement had been reached with community leaders
and the Borough President, said:
It was decided to deliberately give the number of a rabbi rather than a
government agency, to overcome people' s hesitancy to telephone.
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Lewis Avenue (Corona) is the only available site at
which the entire high school complex could be con-
structed and that . . . (t)he new site for low rent
housing is a vacant parcel a few blocks south of the
Lewis Avenue site near Flushing Meadow Park lo-
cated at 108th Street, 62nd Drive and 62nd Avenue. 22
Goodman, years later, observes that
. . . the uninstructed observer may wonder at the
political strategy or simple good sense of switching
from a plan that provided a housing site and a school
site without the need for evicting anybody to a plan
that necessitated the eviction of several hundred
people. 23
Yet the Borough President, who normally would be expected to be closest
to the residents' desire to avoid condemnation, said publicly:
This planning solution, which we have sought
for so long, is a victory for everything that is good
and visionary for the Borough of Queens. It protects
the Flushing Meadow-Corona Park area, home of two
World' s Fairs and the major hope for family parklands
that Queens so desperately needs, from the threats of
encroachment as a school site.
It locates the new North Queens High School at
the only available land in the area which will pro-
vide all the space necessary, offer complete integration
with the predominantly Negro Corona * and Elmhurst
neighborhoods and perdominantly white Forest Hills and
Rego Park neighborhoods and relieve the overcrowded
Forest Hills and Newtown High Schools.
It provides for a low rent housing project, also
important in the planning of our community life in the
same vicinity at 108th Street and 62nd Drive which is
equally accessible to transit and other services . . .
I feel that this is a victory for proper planning
for the entire area of the city and it has shown the tre-
mendous interest in community activit e4 s once again by
the citizens of the Borough of Queens.
The area referred to is actually "North Corona" in Community Planning
District 3, one mile north of the area of Corona with the site in question.
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Clearly, there is a divergence of opinion that should be explained.
What were political and social factors that caused the change from what
Goodman and others feel was a reasonably good plan to what they feel is a
bad plan? Why was the Borough President so enthusiastic and seemingly
persuasive? Was it because, as Goodman and other writers speculate, the
City believed the housing project would meet less opposition from the
"nmore liberal" Jewish occupants of Forest Hills-Rego Park than from the
"Italian homeowners of Corona"? Or were there more complicated motives,
arising from the fact that the "good plan" never existed as a coordinated,
agreed-upon plan among the agencies?
As already indicated one person who wanted a school instead of
a public housing project was Sam Lefrak, for the normal reasons that any
developer has. But he had no apparent influence with the new city adminis-
tration, which at the time was beginning its "good design of buildings"
emphasis rather than a production emphasis. Dr. Frank Kristof, a former
high housing official for the City and now chief economist for the New York
State Urban Development Corporation commented when queried as to
whether Lefrak could force the city to shift sites, "Lefrak had no p olitical
credit in the Lindsay administration . . . although I would believe it in the
Wagner administration. "25
One person who did have influence, though, was Queens Borough
President, Mario Cariello, and his influence was much greater than would
have normally been the case. For although the borough presidents had
been denied their initial power of veto over sites by the Mayor' s new inter-
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departmental committee for site selection, there was still the vote in
the Board of Estimate. The administration, recognizing the impossibility
of getting the scatter-site and vest-pocket programs approved on a piece
by piece basis with each borough president exercising his usual "courtesy
veto" over all projects in his borough via the gentleman' s agreement that
borough presidents have among themselves in the Board of Estimate, had
initially used the strategy of making the sites a "package" city-wide issue.
This gave it the hope of putting together enough votes to put all the sites
through because at least some borough presidents would accept something
they didn't like if each borough had its share. The aim, in other words,
was to create "widespread responsibility" or "hardship. "26
A high Lindsay administration official, on promise of anonymity,
discussed some of the political implications of that time. First, they
"knew the sites had to get passed by 1967 because of the 1969 election. "
Secondly, that "Lindsay came in as mayor with no political allies on the
Board. For example, if Badillo was for something then (Controller)
Procacino was against it. " Because they didn't have the votes of the con-
troller or the President of City Council Frank O'Connor, they needed to
have the votes of four of the Borough Presidents. "We had Badillo (the
Bronx), Sutton' s vote for was important (Manhattan), the Staten Island
Borough President was against, we had Brooklyn, and Cariello was with
us in private if we gave him a veto over sites. "27
Thus, the voting lineup for the total scatter-site program out-
side ghetto areas and the vest pocket program for slum areas was:
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FOR AGAINST
Mayor 4 Controller 4
Brooklyn Borough President 2 City Council President 4
Manhattan Borough President 2 Staten Island Borough
Bronx Borough President 2 President 2
10 10
As long as no one switched, the Queens Borough President held
the swing 2 votes. Since Controller Procacino and Staten Island Borough
President Robert Connor were (and still are) ideological conservatives
and would not switch their votes, the only possible weak point was the City
Council President, and if that vote held then Cariello retained his lever-
age. Thus, this official believes that "Lefrak made a deal with Queens
Deputy Borough President Sidney Leviss, the City Council President, and
Rosenthal (the Congressman for Forest Hills and Corona). "28
In addition, another very informed person states that there was
a meeting between the Borough President and Congressman Rosenthal -
a meeting of which a partial tape recording reportedly exists - at which
the Congressman argued that "my good friend, Sam Lefrak, who has built
so much housing in the City, deserves a high school. ,,29
On the City administration side, there were three people who
made the political deals for the mayor: Deputy Mayor Bob Price, Bob
Sweet, executive assistant to the Mayor, and Wyn Kamarski, the Board
of Estimate coordinator. According to my information, the housing of-
ficials in the City had convinced Deputy Mayor Price that there would have
to be a political price paid in order to get the scatter-site housing through.
But they also warned him against dealing personally with Sam Lefrak,
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since Lefrak, a person capable of great exaggeration, had started to
brag that "he had Price in his hip pocket. "30 So, a deal was made, part
of which may or may not have included giving Borough President Cariello
the judgeship to which he was subsequently appointed.
However, as Don Elliott and others said, one should be wary
about ascribing a single motive for the Borough President' s actions; and,
in fact, there was a great deal of community pressure over a larger geo-
graphical area in favor of getting a new high school. According to Don
Elliott, "There were literally hundreds of groups meeting for six weeks
for the school, "31 so that there was this very real political pressure
which the Borough President faced from the parents.
But there was a larger political context in which all of this was
taking place. There was also a basic power conflict between the Mayor
and the other elected officials, a conflict in which the Corona issue can
be seen as only one case in a larger issue. Part can be ascribed to po-
litical differences, since the rest of the Board of Estimate and most of
the City Council were either Democrats or conservative Republicans, and
part can be ascribed to a resentment against an exercise of mayoral power
that took away the prerogatives that had long been associated with their
respective offices. For the new City charter, setting up a strong mayorial
system, had taken full effect on January 1, 1963. In this first instance of
a divided city administration the new mayor was using his powers to the
fullest. There was open feuding between Lindsay and the Democratic Presi-
dent of City Council, Frank O' Connor, who in the fall of 1966 was running
against Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the gubernatorial race.
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The feud got so strong that Lindsay and O' Connor ultimately held a meet-
ing of reconciliation, and each was then stating publicly that there was no
reason why they should not cooperate with each other.
The members of the City Council, reportedly tired of being con-
sidered a "rubber stamp" through twenty years of Democratic rule,
were upset over a series of instances in which the administration had by-
passed it, such as 1) implementing his new super-agency reorganization
of city government by executive order before the council' s legislative ap-
proval, 2) going directly to the state legislature for a broad tax program,
,32
3) setting up "Little City Halls" with "funds on hand" after they had
eliminated them from Lindsay's proposed budget, 4) creating a civilian-
dominated police review board before the Council could debate the various
proposals it had pending (a board eventually killed by public referendum
after Lindsay campaigned extensively for it in the fall of 1966), and 5) by
using many more 6xecutive orders (31) than Mayor Wagner had. The
Times quotes one influential councilman as summarizing the views of his
colleagues by saying:
John Lindsay keeps saying in public and in private,
'I am the Mayor' and yet he doesn't seem to believe
that the Council, the legislative arm of city govern-
ment, has a role to fill too. We promised him full
cooperation before he took office. And he' s gotten
it when he's ome to us, but unfortunately he s done
it too little. A
For elaboration of this and the other political conflicts, see the book by
Lindsay' s press agent for 1966, Woody Klein, Lindsay' s Promise: The
Dream that Failed (New York: Macmillan, 1970). Also see Nat Hentoff,
A Poliical Life: The Education of John V. Lindsay (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969).
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On the other side of governmental operation, with the more
powerful Board of Estimate, things were even worse. As mentioned
earlier, the City Council President and Controller were not happy with
the mayor. On the same October 27th that the Times reported the Coun-
cil' s unhappiness, it also reported that the five borough presidents had
met at lunch in order to combine to defeat the mayor on a number of
issues. One was the symbolic act of refusing to authorize the rent for
office space for the mayor' s new Office of Staten Island Development,
the executive order for which had "omitted the Borough President' s
office from a list of eight city agencies cited as cooperating in the de-
velopment. "4 Another was the Corona housing site.
The Board of Estimate met and the results were printed in the
Times under a headline of "Mayor Defeated by Borough Heads, Lindsay
Loses on 3 Major Issues in Estimate Board. " In addition to the Staten
Island vote, which was carried when the Controller joined the Borough
Presidents during the previous day' s executive session - thereby forcing
the Mayor to withdraw the request, the Corona housing site was with-
drawn by the administration in favor of the high school; and Manhattan
Borough President Percy Sutton succeeded in exempting part of an area
from a proposed urban renewal project' s boundaries in Harlem, with the
Mayor being the only member of the Board to vote for including the area.
So, having announced seven months earlier that in the interests of the
whole city it would no longer give borough presidents an advance veto
over capital projects, the Lindsay administration was defeated on major
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issues that "concerned the planning and construction of physical im-
provements, an area in which borough presidents have traditionally
had a strong voice . . . (Moreover), yesterday' s actions indicate that
the organized will of the Borough Presidents remains a powerful force
in city government. ,5
Thus, the issue of the public housing project was not only de-
bated on the level of its own merits as a housing site and also as a part
of a broader, very controversial scatter-site policy, but it got attached
to the web of emotion over the process itself, an issue about which all the
elected officials were sensitive.
Given the problems they were creating for themselves, what was
the Lindsay administration trying to achieve during these negotiations
from June through October, inasmuch as they were bargaining from a
position of relative weakness with Borough President Cariello? Why did
it take almost five months for the city to accept a deal which moved the
housing site only blocks?
The city' s dilemma stemmed from the fact that the same of-
ficials who wanted scatter-site housing also wanted the new Queens high
school, because the high school was pivotal to the school integration plans
for the area. These plans were based on redrawing high school district
lines to incorporate students from the predominantly black neighborhoods,
such as Elmhurst, and this was not possible to implement in a manner
that would be educationally and politically successful while the existing
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Forest Hills and Newtown High Schools were so overcrowded. * Further-
more, just as the many parents in Forest Hills who had been trying for a
long time to convince the city to provide a new high school had been un-
successful, so too were these new administration officials in trying to
get the Board of Education' s bureaucracy to plan for the school. The fact
that the school system was now taking action in planning for the school was
desirable; the problem was how to get the high school without undesirable
side-effects while at the same time not publicly antagonizing the borough
president, whose vote was needed if the housing project was ever to be ap-
proved.
Efforts were made to find another acceptable school site. Eugenia
Flatow checked, and confirmed, that twelve acres was the planning standard
by the Board of Education for high schools in Queens at that time. She also
confirmed that the Department of Real Estate did not have any "hold" on
the disputed Lewis Avenue Corona site at that time. "The Department manu-
factured it later, " she said. 36 Unknown to most people, the time from
August 2 to September 9 was used in an abortive attempt to use part of
Flushing Meadows Park. The plan, to have a specialized high school for
the biological sciences with its recreation, a zoo, and an olympic sized
swimming pool in the park was unenthusiastically accepted by Parks Com-
missioner Tom Hoving (now director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art).
This would have saved all the homes in Corona, but the deal fell through.
* A similar redistricting to place Forest Hills High School white students
in the new Hillcrest High School two miles away when it opened in 1971 re-
sulted in several legal suits by parents.
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(This was what Borough President Cariello was referring to in his previ-
ously quoted statement, "It protects the Flushing Meadow-Corona Park
area . . . from the threat of encroachment . . . "7)
Apparently, either no one had the power or initiative to overrule
the officials in the Board of Education in such a way that the system would
continue to do the paper work processing needed to keep the school project
going. Either the size of the high school - 4, 000 pupils was the then stan-
dard - or the amount or location of the recreational space could have been
changed if more flexibility had existed in the school system. But this was
prevented by the use of prevailing rigid standards, oriented toward minimiz-
ing operating, administrative and overhead costs than towards the social
problems large schools created. The combination of the standards plus the
political pressure for a school on the Corona site proved insurmountable,
as they were mutually supportive of each other. Each side held a veto
power over the other, but whereas the housing advocates wanted a school,
the school people did not see it in their interest to also help change resi-
dential racial patterns. So the school system was willing to hold out for
what it considered to be the optimum physical plant, irrespective of other
consequences, either the Corona homeowners or the administration' s long
range social goals. Indeed, one of the administration officials involved in
the battle characterized Adrian Blumenfeld of the school system as being
"amoral. He will adopt any position because he has seen commissioners
come and go. " 38
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Finally, when the administration realized it had failed to find
another school site acceptable to Cariello and Blumenfeld, it agreed to take
the heat off Borough President Cariello by selecting the site for a school
if he would support some other site for the housing project. 39 This was
important for him because it gave assurance that the school really would
be processed by the system, since the administration controlled the votes
of the official Site Selection Board and could dominate the City Planning
Commission, which had capital budget authority along with the Bureau of
the Budget. The question was, what site would be good for the housing?
It had to be in an area which met the social and physical criteria for
scatter-site housing, including relatively good public services, and it had
to be a site large enough for the total number of units on a city wide basis
to still hold up.
To those who today complain about lack of planning, foresight and
concern about compatible physical scale of buildings, it may come as a
surprise to learn that the 108th Street site in Forest Hills was actually third
choice as an alternative site. The first choice, according to an official in-
volved in the process at the time, was eliminated because it was in the path
of a planned expressway. The second choice was "an all single family
home area where the project would clearly have been out of scale, and the
third choice was the Forest Hills site, but we did not think it real because
we heard that pilings had disappeared. "40 Indeed, that was the reason that
the administration' s housing policy makers had tried so hard for months to
avoid the Forest Hills site, for they wanted to avoid any of the problems
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that might occur with the poor subsoil, especially since, to the extent
possible, they wanted to keep the buildings as low as they could 4 1 and
still stay within federal cost limits.
Until the day of the October 27th Board of Estimate meeting, it was not
certain which of the sites would be accepted, but finally there was
enough agreement in principle for the decision to be announced. There
exists today an opinion among some, as expressed here by a New York
Times reporter whom I interviewed, that "the private agreement at the
Board of Estimate, which everyone will deny, was that the public housing
would never be built in Forest Hills because the site was unbuildable. "
Certainly the administration' s housing policy people did not agree to this,
but if this agreement did exist, or, even if it did not exist as a spoken
agreement but rather as an unspoken belief on the part of some people in-
volved because of the reports about any previous effort to build on the
site, the people who believed that nothing could be built were to be mis-
taken. The real issue was to be not whether anything could be built at all,
but rather what kinds of trade-offs would be necessary to get some housing
built.
CHAPTER IV - WINTER, 1966
THE PUBLIC HOUSING DEAL IS RATIFIED
Recently the Planning Commission held a series
of meetings on proposals to locate small, low-income
public housing in peripheral middle-income areas. Mayor
Lindsay' s administration, in response to the acute need
for low-income housing and the problems created by the
continuing building of solid, low-income neighborhoods,
has proposed an imaginative and forward-looking program . . .
What has been significant and alarming in the hear-
ings has been the outspoken dislike and fear of the poor, ex-
pressed not only by the average residents of the middle-income
areas but by their elected officials. Vituperative references to
the poor and to the importance of preserving class distinctions
were applauded.
In America we have prided ourselves on the erasing of
lines between classes. We have rejected the labeling of groups,
or the identifying of defined characteristics with any one group.
Delinquency and vandalism, at the hearings, were identified
with poverty. Both delinquency and vandalism are dramatically
present at Long Island debutante parties and in so-called better
suburbs. If we decide to live in a state of fear, then it is ir-
rational to fear only one economic class.
Is it possible that our anti-poverty programs, valuable
as they are, are labeling the classes in our society and sharpen-
ing lines between them? Are we having taught some new lessons
in interclass hostility and fear? If so, the foundations of the
system t he middle-income groups stated they wish to preserve
are frighteningly shaky.
The lamp beside the GoldenDoor shed ny light in the
Board of Estimate room these past few weeks.
- Elinor Guggenheimer, Commissioner,
New York City Planning Commission
Letter to the Editor, New York Times,
June 28, 1966
The announcement of an agreement on October 27 did not eliminate
these antagonisms. It merely changed their character by taking away the pub-
lic sanction of most elected officials. For, despite the widespread opposition
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by most of the local Queens politicians to the scatter- site proposals prior
to October 27, there was an implicit understanding that they acquiesced
in the agreement, as underscored by the borough president' s reading into
the record the names of the politicians present as he made his laudatory
remarks. The emphasis of the political rhetoric that day at the Board of
Estimate, of course, was that a badly needed high school site had been
found that would reduce school overcrowding. There was also a recog-
nition - remarkable in light of the statements made in the previous months -
that there was a need for low rent housing in middle income areas. But
then these officials could afford to be generous at a time when they were
getting a high school in return. Indeed, not only did Mr. Cariello thank
the various elected officials, "the Civic Associations of Queens, the Com-
munity Planning Boards, . . . and other community leaders who have
made repeated trips to City Hall to testify"for their "united cooperation, " 2
but so also did a staunch advocate of scatter-site housing, Manhattan
Borough President Percy Sutton, who said to the elected Queens state
and city representatives present, "I think this is indicative of what ought
to happen more often; elected, perhaps, to serve in one area, they are
serving the people in all of the areas and I think you are to be commended,
Gentlemen. ,,3
As described earlier, the public housing project was only one
item among several at this time that were in the middle of the disagree-
ment among politicians and planners over who would control the planning
process and in what policy directions it would go. Although the dispute
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would be focused on by a New York Times November 2 editorial, "Political
Football: Planning, " it was nevertheless fairly difficult for the average
citizen to really understand just what was going on. As in most planner
versus politician disputes, the public statements did not necessarily mean
what they seemed to if taken at face value.
On the one hand, the Times editorialized that
(T)he five Borough Presidents kicked the city' s
planning programs right off the field . . .
The issue, in the Borough Presidents' minds,
was to show the Mayor that they could still call the
signals, even if everyone went home with a broken leg.
The real issue is whether obstructionist tactics, moti-
vated by political self-interest, should be used against
critical priorities of city-wide importance . . .
Mr. Cariello opposed the inclusion of low-income
housing in a middle-income neighborhood in Queens. Mr.
Sutton hoped to keep a locally favored Harlem residential
project out of urban renewal or city planning boundaries.
Mr. Connor was merely continuing his campaign against
the Office of Staten Island Development set up by the
Mayor' s executive order to correct sordid and scandalous
land exploitation in Staten Island to which the Borough
President has been conspicuously unresponsive.
Each vote was a blow against long-overdue, care-
fully considered city planning policy, and against the city' s
future . . .
Still another Planning Commission report, on hous-
ing strategy, had urged the placement of small, scattered
low-income housing groups to avoid the massive ghettos of
the poor that are not only the source of the city's hard-
core slums but many of its hard-core problems. The Logue
report on Housing and Neighborhood Improvement last month
pinpointed all of these crises and called for a crash program
for large scale ghetto, and Harlem, renewal.
The Borough Presidents' argument that they can take
the planning responsibility for their own areas is not a valid
one. It is refuted by the record.
As things stand now, the score is city, nothing;
Borough Presidents, nothing; the people of New York,
nothing. It may have been a slick game of political football-
playing, but it set a record of sorts for fouls. 4
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On the other hand, Percy Sutton, the Borough President of Man-
hattan, in unusual sensitivity to a newspaper for a politician, responded
with a long letter, saying
. . . (Your editorial) passed beyond the realm
of fair comment and was, regrettably, permeated with
misleading and inaccurate material . . .
(C )oncerning the site for an integrated housing
project in Queens, . . . I voted with the Mayor, not
against him, as your editorial said, to approve a site
that the Mayor had advised was entirely satisfactory . . .
(C )oncerning a Mayor' s office for Staten Island,
my vote came after . . . receipt [at an executive session
of the Board of Estimate] of an opinion by a member of
the City Planning Commission that it, the City Planning
Commission, could, in a Staten Island office, perform as
effectively the tasks proposed for the new development
corporation office.
Thus, my vote was in support of a City Planning
Commission Office on Staten Island but against a pro-
liferation of agencies . .
I have neither statutory authority nor personal
desire to supplant the Mayor in planning or indeed in any
other way. Yet, together with other members of the
Board of Estimate, I have the statutory authority and re-
sponsibility to review, evaluate and vote upon planning
and other matters in accordance with my conscience and
judgment . . .
(A) study of my record will show that I have avoided
the partisan and the narrow in favor of an independent and
progressive approach to issues; and that I support what is
best for my borough and ny city without regard to personal
pride or public prejudice.
One of the problems here is that the Times mistakenly attempts to
impart the impression that there is an impartial planning solution to these
problems that is distinct from political and social values. For in none of
the three cases cited is there an engineering type of answer that can be
computed as simply as something like a road' s traffic capacity. Each of
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them deals with more complex issues that involve judgments on human
relationships, and in these situations every side to a dispute has a "po-
litical self-interest. " Indeed, the Times' view of what is of city-wide
importance is, in and of itself, part of what comprises political self-
interest in the support that a liberal mayor wants. 6 For one of the most
important powers in a city can be that of the news media, which can make
or break a particular issue by its handling of the coverage. It is not with-
out reason that New York magazine has consistently placed top officials of
the Times among its list of the ten most powerful people in the City. 7 The
ability of the newspaper to influence governmental attitudes and awareness
is considerable, as indeed, the frequent references to it in this paper show.
Another problem with the editorial is that it lumps all the borough
presidents together, but neglects to mention the more powerful members
of the Board, the Controller and President of City Council, without whom
even a unanimous vote of the Borough Presidents would have been to no
avail. Thus, by not accurately stating the political power realities, and
by not explaining the "gentleman" ways by which a Mayor introduces a
proposal after he has lost the closed door battle, the Times left the door
open for Mr. Sutton' s accurate defense that he was in favor of the low-
income housing project. The fact that it was true that Cariello had opposed
the original site was lost. Furthermore, Sutton' s stated reasons for his
other two votes, even if they may not have been the real reasons, only
serve to amplify how planning decisions, which have a physical objective
as the long run goal, in fact may be determined by one' s feelings about the
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validity of the process. Taken at face value, one can sympathize with
Sutton' s explanation on the urban renewal vote - his desire for equity
for housing developers in Harlem who had spent four years negotiating
with the city for the land which at his insistence was excluded from the
Harlem urban renewal area; and the choice of a City Planning Commis-
sion or Mayor' s office for Staten Island is again one of those judgmental
matters that could go either way, for successful planning would depend
on the political power relationships and judgments of the people who
would eventually be appointed to those jobs.
All this just serves to point out the complexity of the problem
facing anyone who tries to improve t he overall state of planning in a city.
No matter how valid the Times' arguments are about the overall failure
of planning by borough presidents (and from personal knowledge I certainly
agree with the Times' comment about Mr. Connor' s lack of concern about
land speculation in Staten Island), nevertheless the institutional process
proposed as a solution must be able to pass other tests as well; and each
case must draw a compromise between having all-inclusive power to
mandate physical change and keeping the doors open for participation by
interested parties. If one is going to make the attempt to completely by-
pass the existing political power structure, then one had best consider
carefully whether he can still obtain his objectives without needing the
support of those whom he has antagonized. Or, he must decide that the
issue involved is worth the sacrifice. In the particular cases cited above,
it is not at all clear that the judgments made by the Lindsay administration
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were accurate, or, if the conceptual judgment was correct, that the im-
plementation of the program was carried out well enough to have done
justice to the original political initiative and courage. Frederick O' R.
Hayes, Budget Bureau director during Lindsay' s first term, hit the nub
of the problem when he stated
(P)rogress has its problems, too . . . (Y)ou de-
sign a new program and it works logically but only if
you can find management talent to carry it through . . .
Management is a subtle and difficult skill. The
whole pattern in corporations and in much of government
has tended to create organization men, people who are
knowledgeable in rather specialized activities but who
do not have the capacity for real managerial analysis.
In fact, the training of professionals in nearly
every area is just not oriented in this direction . . . But
admittedly, people do come along who can design good
innovative programs. Okay, but knowing how to design
a program and running it are different things.
And then, there' s a third quality needed which is
just as rare . . . (Y )ou also need personnel with a cap-
acity for feedback - people with the sensitivity to evaluate
what is actually happening as a result of any given program
and who can use that information to sharpen or change the
structure. 8
In addition to all of this, Mr. Hayes added yet another condition in
commenting "It' s not much trouble getting first-rate youngsters, but it' s
harder to find the kind of people you need on the senior level - those who are
very bright at management and can also relate to other people. "9
Notwithstanding the unanimity which the transcript of the October 27
Board of Estimate meeting indicated, all was not calm with this part of the
scatter-site program. The Times reported that "several Queens leaders''lO
(unnamed) would oppose the plan, but I have not been able to fully determine
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who these people were. One source of confusion stems from the desire of
a number of the politicians involved to straddle both sides of the fence at
various times. An example of this is Assemblyman Herbert Miller, who
wrote in 1972 to the Times Magazine that he
. . . demand(ed) an immediate retraction of Walter
Goodman' s gratuitous but false statement . . . that I
offered 'no word of criticism' to the ' compromise'
proposal at the 1966 Board of Estimate meeting to rq-
locate a low income housing project in Forest Hills. -
Mr. Miller continued in his letter that the "documented facts" are that it
was assumed that the high school would go on 5 1/2 acres in Corona and
that the announcement about the housing project was "an addendum.
Hearing this,
I instinctively arose from my seat, rushed to the podium
and voiced my criticism of the city' s heavy handedness
in selecting Forest Hills as the new site without a public
hearing or consultation with leaders in the Forest Hills
community. I was assured that due process would follow. 12
But, as Mr. Goodman pointed out in refusing to issue a retraction,
not only did the executive assistant to the Mayor and the Queens Borough
President explicitly refer to the housing site as integral parts of their an-
nouncements, but also the acreage for the school site was never mentioned
at the Board, thereby allowing any mistaken assumptions on the details to
13
continue. As mentioned earlier, the Mayor' s representative had opened
the meeting by saying:
. . . we have concluded that Lewis Avenue [Corona]
is the only available site at which the entire high school
complex could be constructed and that there is another
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equally desirable site in the same area on which low
rent housing can be placed . . . a vacant parcel a few
blocks south of the Lewis Avenue site . . at 108th
Street, 62nd Drive, and 62nd Avenue. 14
Furthermore, rather than offering criticism, the transcript has Mr. Miller
stating:
I do want to defer to our great Borough President
Cariello. I feel now that we have assurances, finally
that the determination of the Board will be in favor of
a much-needed high school in the area of 100th Street
and Lewis Avenue and I am withdrawiyg any demands
at this time for any further hearings.
As to Mr. Miller' s 1972 implication that the due process that he
was assured would follow did not, one has to remember that a formal pro-
cess does not necessarily change a prior decision. Although in 1972 it was
to his political advantage to add this charge of procedural impropriety to
what had become an unpopular decision, the facts make it difficult to sup-
port this. As the following sequence of events shows, the letter of the law
was followed, although the spirit of community participation as it has come
to be practiced in subsequent years was clearly lacking.
There were two different procedures to be followed for legal ap-
proval of the sites. In the case of the high school, the Board of Education
had to request approval from the local advisory school board, the City' s
5-member Site Selection Board, and then the Mayor, whose ratification of
a Site Selection Board decision is routine. In the case of the housing pro-
ject, approval had to be requested by the Housing Authority from the City
Planning Commission and ratified by the Board of Estimate.
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Both the Planning Commission and Site Selection Board have to
hold public hearings, but the politics of getting approvals through the two
agencies are very different. Because the Site Selection Board is com-
posed of officials whose agencies will be involved in the many details of
implementation - the Director of the Budget Bureau, the Chairman of the
City Planning Commission, the Commissioner of the Real Estate Depart-
ment, the Borough President of the Borough under discussion, and the
Controller - there is usually a serious attempt to achieve consensus at
this basic stage of decision-making. However, an administration can
impose its will on a policy matter, since three of the five officials are
mayorial appointees. With the seven member City Planning Commission,
on the other hand, only a majority is needed, for none of the six part-
time commissioners have power of their own with which to continue any
opposition other than their power of rational argument to influence others.
Only the Chairman has such power. The route that the high school took
through this process, which was much slower than that for the housing
project, will be discussed in another chapter.
The Housing Authority, with the pressure of the Mayor' s hous-
ing officials and the possible loss of federal funds, moved very quickly -
incredibly quickly, in fact, for those familiar with the normal workings
of the bureaucracy in New York. On November 9th, thirteen days after
the political agreement had been announced at the Board of Estimate, the
Housing Authority submitted its official request. With the rules of the
Planning Commission requiring that there normally be two weeks advance
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notice of items for its public hearings, and with the few days advance
time needed for printing, the scheduling of November 30 as the date for
the public hearing meant that the agency was really pushing the item. It
would not have been surprising if opposition had not had a chance to get
organized, especially under the circumstances that there had been months
of work with Borough President Cariello, who said he had been working
with many community groups to achieve an acceptable solution.
But opposition there was, although this was forgotten by many
in 1971. The person it was addressed to, the Chairman of the Planning
Commission, was none other than Donald Elliott, who, as counsel to the
mayor, had been a part of the group instituting the policy. For during
the time between the Housing Authority' s application and the public hear-
ing there had been a major re-shuffle in the ten month old administration.
On November 23, 1966, Donald Elliott had been appointed Chairman of
the Planning Commission, Walter Washington came from Washington, D. C.
to become the Chairman of the Housing Authority, and Jay Nathan was ap-
pointed Administrator of the new Housing and Development Administration
superagency after Edward Logue had turned down the job several weeks
earlier. At his first public hearing Elliott heard the project "debated
heatedly for five and a half hours, ,6 with thirty speakers for the project,
twenty against, and fifty-nine other persons recorded in opposition. The
opposition of local residents, local civic associations, one State Assembly-
man, and a representative of the local Community Planning Board, was,
according to the report of the Planning Commission, based on contentions
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about the area' s problems which had been voiced in general about every
scatter-site project: overcrowding and inadequate school and trans-
portation facilities, a fear of increased crime from the new residents
("it would bring into the neighborhood 'people we just don' t want to
associate with. ' ")18 and objections specific to this site that foundation
costs would be excessive and that the land should be used for a park or
junior high school. Support from the project came from residents of the
local area, other sections of Queens, and a host of civil rights, religious,
and housing organizations, groups whose support of the project, based on
the summary by the Planning Commission, could be characterized as be-
ing based on generalities about the need for low-income housing in "sound"
neighborhoods.
Two days after the November 30 hearing, the Planning Commission
approved the project. From my experience at the Commission, it is obvi-
ous that this speed was to make the deadline for the next Board of Estimate
meeting, as the items for the Board' s meeting normally have to be pub-
lished in advance in The City Record, and the Commission' s normal pro-
cedure is to announce decisions at its next meeting two or three weeks
later. What makes the official report of the Commission noteworthy, in
addition to its speed, was the interpretation of it by the press. The Times
characterized the report as using "unusually blunt language' when the
Commission said:
Certain of the fears and anxieties expressed
by the residents of the community are based on a de-
sire for security, tranquility, and a better life.
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These goals are not unique for one class, but
are shared by all citizens. We believe they are
achievable, but only if we respond to the needs of the
less fortunate . . .
(We reject) the contention that the poor are
morally inferior, or that vandalis and delinquency
can be equated with income level.
The Commission rejected the general charges about the prob-
lems of the area by saying that "it was a strong and thriving community.
We are committed to maintaining and improving the viability of this area.
In our judgment, introduction of low income families will provide an ele-
ment of diversity which will enhance the community. "21 It discussed the
school situation at length, concluding that
. . . there will be sufficient school facilities . . .
after the construction of the New Queens High School
and the addition to Junior High School 157. The high
school being considered for the Lewis Avenue site
will be programmed in this year' s capital budget. 22
It also noted proposed grade level reorganization plans of the central
Board of Education would provide additional flexibility, as would the ability
to move some of the administrative offices out of rooms being used in
Public School 14 to get additional capacity if needed.
Notwithstanding these facts . . . we have recom-
mended the Housing Authority keep in close touch
with the Board of Education during the detailed
planning of this project so that provision can be
made within the housing development for facilities
for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten and fir and
second-grade children, if necessary . . .
It also denied - as it turned out, incorrectly - that the buildings for the
project would require expensive pilings, based on assurances from the
Housing Authority that the project could be built within federal cost limits:
"It is properly the Housing Authority' s responsibility to make this determi-
nation. "24
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What was this project that had been approved? It was for 828
apartment units, with a specified breakdown of apartment types by
number of bedrooms, to be "probably" built in seven buildings ranging
from 10 to 22 stories. Legally, what had been approved were two sep-
arable items passed upon simultaneously -
1) a plan calling for public housing, and
2) a specific project for 828 units, 30% to be designed for the
elderly, on the 8. 46 acre site bounded by Horace Harding
Expressway, Colonial Avenue, 62nd Drive, and 108th Street
in Queens.
Although this plan technically appears insignificant and is standard operat-
ing procedure for the city, as we shall see, it has a number of serious
consequences for the planning process.
Thus, as a result of the change in sites from Corona to 108th
Street, the project size increased by 63% from 507 units to 828 units. More
about the factors behind this change in project size will be discussed later.
As the item moved to the Board of Estimate the public' s under-
standing of the situation was not increased by the desire of Borough Presi-
dent Cariello to have his position remain ambiguous. He did not want to
provide the real political leadership and consciousness raising that might
be expected from someone who had five weeks earlier called the school
and housing deal "a victory for everything that is good and visionary" at
the Board of Estimate, or for that matter, from someone who was to speak
at the Board' s hearing later that week of the need for "brotherhood. " For
opposition to the housing project had continued after the Planning Commission' s
December 2 approval. A few days afterwards about 30 people picketed the
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Queens Borough Hall with such signs as "Parks and Schools Before
Population Explosion" and "Low Cost Housing at High Expense. "
Rather than trying to explain that, aside from the social purposes in-
volved, this was part of a package to provide their area a high school
and also not place anything in the Flushing Meadows park, Deputy
Borough President Sidney Leviss "met briefly with them and told them
that Borough President Mario J. Cariello had not yet decided what action
he would take at the Board of Estimate meeting. "25
On December 9, 1966, the Board of Estimate unanimously ap-
proved at its public hearing the Forest Hills public housing project.
The New York Times, after months of reporting opposition to scatter-
site housing in Queens, after its editorials and analysis articles on the
planning and politics of the issues, and after its article on the very
strong nature of the Planning Commission' s report of approval, never
reported this Board of E stimate decision and that the Queens Borough
President had in fact joined in the decision. Indeed, nothing that the
Board of Estimate discussed that day was carried in the Times, not
even the lengthy debate on the West Side Urban Renewal Project. That
means that only a sketchy summary of the hearing is possible.
*
There is, of course, the argument that what happened at the public
hearing is irrelevant because the decision was made earlier at executive
session. For the Board of Estimate, a municipal body unique in the
nation, "is, paradoxically, the most democratic and most anti-democratic
institution imaginable. "2 However, a study of this institution is beyond
the scope of this paper, and the public hearing at least gives some idea of
the citizen attitude even if it does not provide any insight into the elected
officiald motives.
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Because of the procedural process by which the items on the
agenda that most people are there to discuss are held until last so that
most of the hundreds of items can be disposed of quickly and because
of the time spent on the West Side Urban Renewal Project, the hearing
on the Forest Hills project did not start until late that Friday evening.
About one dozen people spoke in opposition, two dozen spoke in support,
and about a dozen people were listed as being on each respective side but
not speaking. The only elected official listed as attending the Board' s
hearing was City Councilman Arthur Katzman, registered as being in
opposition but not speaking. Of the people speaking in opposition, most
appear to have been local residents and representatives of local civic
associations except for Roger Starr, head of the Citizens Housing and
Planning Council of New York, who in a very interesting speech supported
the original project in Corona but opposed the Forest Hills site for a wide
variety of reasons. Jerry Birbach, who later led the fight against the
project, and the rabbis in opposition five years later, were not there. Of
the people speaking in support, they came from various pro-housing groups
around the city and Queens, including the city-wide Jewish and other re-
ligious groups, civil rights organizations, and a variety of local neighbor-
hood groups from generally black neighborhoods around the city. 27
It would be wrong to assume that all the speeches on either side
were either rhetoric or diatribes. For example, Roger Starr, in opposing
the project because one has to deal with "specific proposals" and not just
principles, noted that at times one might find himself "lined up with
racists . . . But unless you believe in guilt by association, I ask you to
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listen to my words and not look at my company. "28 On the other hand a
supporter representing the New York AFL-CIO,who was also a resident
of the area, noted that although he was sad that an overcrowded community
planning board meeting "of my neighbors" a week earlier had exhibited
"widespread discrimination and widespread evidence of racism, " that
nevertheless one had to "face up" to "the tremendous problems which
will result in the community" and the fact that he felt some of the ob-
jections to the project were "legitimate. " He went on to say that
. . . all of the social agencies of the city should be
put to work to prepare the community for the proper
and inevitable integration and the problems that will
take place. I think that if people can be told what the
problems are, we in the community can be prepared
to handle them. . . . I didn't ask for the low-cost
housing project to be in our area but it' s coming . . .
(There) are literally hundreds of decent human beings
in the community . . . (and) wg will do everything in
our power to make it succeed.
In any case the testimony was not sufficient to cause the officials
to postpone a decision until another meeting. Borough President Cariello
noted as the vote was taken after testimony had ended that although the late
hour (11 P. M. ) had caused many of the people who wanted to oppose the pro-
ject to leave, they "were permitted the opportunity to place a statement on
the record and some of them did so. "30 (One should remember that ortho-
dox Jews had to be home before sundown of that Friday evening.)
Mr. Cariello also made an eloquent statement that he "deplor(ed)
the references to religion and to race, " observed that non-residents of
Queens might misunderstand some of the statements and actions of the
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Queens residents, but that "all of these things must be understood within
the context" of a young borough which "has yet to begin to grow" in com-
parison to the other developed boroughs. He went on to say that "this is
not a religious or racial issue, " and cited as proof both the telegrams of
support for the project from three rabbis of congregations in the area
(Rabbis Jacob Polish, Joshua Derby, and Benjamin Bockser) and the many
telegrams and communications "against this low-income housing from
persons of all races and nationalities. " Concluding that "the predominant
issues here are that all of us must give ourselves in brotherhood and under-
standing so that all people will have the opportunity to live in housing that
will integrate all the communities in our city, " he voted for the project.*31
Since the Times did not report on the hearing, the New York
liberal and conservative communities missed the chance to read that beauti-
ful rhetoric; and on that ignominious note the political battle to get official
city approval for the Forest Hills project ended. The lack of newspaper
coverage was a prophetic way for this phase of the housing development to
end, for little was to be heard about it for the next five years as the govern-
mental system tried to implement what the political process had sanctioned.
*
Cariello several months later came out against any more scatter-site
public housing in Queens until it had a new "su ay, more paved streets
and improved sanitation and police services. "
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CHAPTER V - 1967 THROUGH 1970
THE HOUSING PROJECT QUIETLY GOES THROUGH
GOVERNMENTAL DESIGN AND FINANCIAL APPROVALS
Because the proposed housing site is situ-
ated at a prominent location visible to the great
number of people who pass on the Expressway;
because of the desirability of introducing archi-
tectural quality into this neighborhood; and be-
cause the project could serve as a demonstration
as to how a public housing development could pro-
vide aesthetic enhancement of a community; the
Commission recommends that the Housing Authority
exert every effort to design this development, both
the buildings and open 9paces with architectural
distinction and quality.
- Report of the City Planning Commission
approving the Forest Hills project,
December 2, 1966
'(G )ood design' is a hopelessly vague
criterion over which parades of expert witnesses
. . . (can) wrangle forever . . .
(The Forest Hills) decision . . . was not
judged important enough to warlant the apparatus
of special design studies ...
- Jonathan Barnett (former head of the New
York City Planning Department' s Urban
Design Group), Urban Design as Public Policy
For five years after its approval, the housing project wound its
way through the planning stages. Construction did not start until late 1971,
though this chapter will only cover the period through 1970. This length of
time is not too unusual for many public construction projects in New York
City. Therefore, this part of the process is going to be examined because
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1) virtually everyone interviewed agreed that because of the general
changes in social and political attitudes, the protests against the project
were much more effective than they would have been if construction had
started several years before the actual date of December 1971, and
2) some of the issues which split the liberal support during the later
protests grew out of decisions made in the disputes which caused the
time delay in the first place. This, of course, illustrates a classic
dilemma of the planning process: is the particular detail being disputed
important enough to be worth causing the time delay in the project, with
all the unforeseen changes that can happen in the future, or is it more
important to get things built? The way these disputes are resolved -
whether by one side withdrawing its objections or by innovative approaches
to a new solution - is one indication of the values held by the decision
makers. This is not to say that the participants should have foreseen all
that happened - for hindsight is a wonderful advantage - but rather to try
to illustrate certain points so that they might be instructive for us now.
A major issue of contention was the number of units to be built on
any one site. This was crucial, as most of the physical and some of the
social characteristics of any housing development are the result of de-
cisions on size of project, density, and bedroom distribution. (The last
item determines the age distribution of adults and the number of children,
and from that, the demand for school services, playground space, and to
a lesser extent, the level of maintenance problems. ) The other major de-
terminant for a development, the income level of the population group being
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built for and how much one can spend for construction, was in this case
not decided by market forces and the judgment of the developer but by
the local and federal regulations established for public housing. (One
should note the inter-connection between income and the physical de-
velopment - such things as a lack of nearby recreational facilities can
be minimized if a family can afford to go to the country during New York' s
hot summer, or an inability of residents to maintain internal surveillance
for security may be minimized by the ability to hire a doorman.)
According to a high level administration official:
Except for Joe Christian - and, by implication,
Walter Washington - there was never any acceptance
in the Housing Authority of the concept of small scatter-
site. We rammed it down their throats. (We were able
to pursue this concept) only with the backing of Hillman
in the feder 1 government and a manoeuver to raise the
cost limits."
In this particular case, how was the size decision reached? The
search for an alternate to the Corona site was limited by a need to "hold to the
(city-wide)numbers'This was not made any easier by the fact that the pro-
posed Corona project was, as far as I know, the largest of all the scatter-
site projects being proposed by the administration. As in most decisions of
this type, a decision on principle was made by top officials operating under
assumptions about the way certain details would be resolved.
When the site was substituted in Queens we
assumed a slight increase was necessary . . . There
was the political problem that (Bronx Borough Presi-
dent) Herman Badillo was in favor of the program only
if we didn't retreat on the number of total Queens
units, and at that time there was a problem with another
site. 4
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At the same time one top housing official signed off on this new site
after making a personal quid-pro-quo with a top Housing Authority of-
ficial that, in return for the site "being forced down the Authority' s
throat, " a capital budget amendment would be gotten if "that damned
Horse Creek" caused serious enough foundation problems to jeopardize
the concept of keeping the buildings as low as possible (though they were
still multi-story). 5
But in July, 1966, Jason Nathan had become the City Renewal
Commissioner, and during the fall, in the reshuffle that preceded the
official November announcement of his becoming head of the Housing
Development Administration, there was a shift in who had administration
responsibility for the details of Forest Hills. 6 What the former housing
official had expected to be a slight increase in number of units, an in-
crease that was acceptable to this official partly because of the knowledge
of the financing deal, became much more than that. For with a different
individual in charge, there was a different set of personal values that had
to contend with the philosophy of the Housing Authority; and what one per-
son might have considered unacceptable enough to press for a different
resolution was considered acceptable to another person. One can specu-
late, for example, that it might have been considered essential for the
Housing Authority to be willing to state publicly that the project could
have been built within federal limits, a consideration which then would
have superseded the prior official' s desire to keep the project size down
even if that meant using city funds.
-95-
With the need to increase the units for political reasons anyway,
and with larger Forest Hills site zoned such that it would allow a much
larger project, the philosophy of the Housing Authority in implementing
the site change decision became much more important. As stated by
Max Schreiber, Director of the Design Division of the Housing Authority,
Our procedure is to design as many units
as zoning will allow . . . We take into account
various aspects of the community and then submit the
project to city agencies, the City Planning Commis-
sion , the Board of Estimate, and then the federal
lending aggncy. If approved we go into architect
selection. '(emphasis added)
This design criterion is merely one of the facets of a policy to
build as many units as possible legally - to play a numbers game of pro-
duction, if you will. Another facet of this same outlook is to build large
projects rather than small ones because of the administrative effort re-
quired to get each project through the bureaucracy and because of the long
waiting list (150, 000 families) for public housing. These are certainly
understandable reasons. But it should be remembered that they have not
always been the philosophy of the New York Housing Authority. Some of
the Housing Authority' s old low-density projects almost resemble present
day planned unit developments, and they were built at a time when the
zoning envelope for New York City would have allowed a population of
50 million as compared to the present zoning envelope of 12 million.
This design philosophy also was an obstacle for the vest-pocket
housing units which the Lindsay administration people wanted to build in
the inner city areas. Unlike their vision of building one six-story building
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on a small lot in a block of existing 5-story tenements, the Housing
Authority refused to build less than 300 unit projects. Eventually this
conflict was resolved by a procedure of finding five or six sites close
to each other and letting them out to bid as one combined contract. 8
Thus, it was not the Housing Authority bureaucracy that was
trying to initiate these major changes in operations but otheir decision-
makers; consequently, the changing of the day-to-day decisions to
accommodate to these new policies could not be effected by the same
bureaucracy unless there had been a staff with new outlooks, either
through re-education or new personnel.
Despite this, an interesting point to ponder during all the sub-
sequent arguments that, on the one hand, unit construction costs for the
project were too high because of high fixed costs of land and foundations
and, on the other hand, that the project was too large, is that the Housing
Authority formal application was not for the full number of units allowed
under the R6 zoning, over 900, but for 828. The reason for this deviation,
according to Mr. Schreiber, was that "City Planning didn't like it, and
we acceded to their wishes. '9 What reasons the officials in the Planning
Department had for doing this are not known, but it illustrates that the
officials in the Planning Department were more aware than the personnel
in the Housing Authority of the inadequacy of accepting present zoning as
the criterion for how many units should be built. Zoning for many reasons
may be wrong, and, in any case, it certainly does not take into account the
social class considerations involved in something as complex as scatter-
site public housing.
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Following Housing Authority procedure, the next step after
Board of Estimate approval was to get approval from HUD in order to
receive a commitment for the federal financing. Since 1) an architect
would not be hired until after HUD approval, and 2) after he was hired,
the architect would not be shown the Housing Authority' s feasibility de-
sign studies, so "as not to influence him, " 0 one would have thought
that at this stage of generality the same proposal which the Board of
Estimate had approved would simply be sent over to HUD, rather than
change details. But for some reason - and I suspect it was because the
Authority was becoming increasingly worried about foundation costs -
this is not what happened.
The project, approved on December 9, 1966, was for 828 units
which the Housing Authority "envisaged" would be in seven buildings
(One of 22 stories, three of 12 stories, and three of 10 stories). But the
Development Program sent to HUD one month later had 848 units in six
buildings (two of 14 stories and four of 15 stories) plus a one-story com-
munity center. HUD eventually requested a letter that this did not conflict
with zoning, as this was not what had been approved by the City, and on
June 8, 1967, the City Planning Commission confirmed that the change
was "minor" and did not need official re-submission. I have my doubts
about whether 20 units are worth this kind of paperwork, despite the extra
cushion on cost they might represent. In any case, the development pro-
gram was approved by HUD on October 26, 1967; the site as selected by
the City was approved a week later on November 2 (not, it should be noted,
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until after internal HUD debate over the subsoil question); and the
formal legal documents for federal financing of the repayment of the
Housing Authority bonds were executed on November 9. These called
for a total development cost of $17, 155, 000 with a maximum annual
federal contribution to the Housing Authority of $1, 029, 300. Eleven
months had elapsed for federal approval of the project.
The difficulties of the architectural design process, subject to
all the cost constraints, further lengthened the planning period. On
November 27, 1967, Ulrich Franzen and Associates were appointed as
the architects. Ordinarily, there would not be too much significance as
to what firm was selected to design a public housing project, given the
notable lack of distinction in housing projects all over the country, but
that was not true here. For the selection of the Franzen firm was one
small consequence of a widely heralded move by the Lindsay adminis-
tration aimed at improving the design of both public and private buildings.
This was the formation in 1967 by mayorial executive order of the New
York City Urban Design Council, a task force of citizens and professionals
under the chairmanship of CBS head William S. Paley.
In accordance with this group' s recommendation, in some areas
of government there was actually a change in the administrative structure
and personnel involved in design review and specifications. The best ex-
ample was the creation of a new "Urban Design Group" in the City Planning
Department. This group, responsible for a number of planning innovations,
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had varying degrees of success depending on the personal interests and
influence of that small number of individuals and the extent to which they
were supported by the upper echelon of the Planning Department and the
Mayor' s office against traditional political and economic pressures. 12
But with the responsibilities for construction of
buildings scattered among several operating agencies - for example, the
Board of Education built all schools whereas the Department of Public
Works built buildings for a number of city agencies, including libraries,
police stations, and fire stations - there of necessity had to be a differ-
ent degree of implementation of this new "design initiative" across the
*
entire public works spectrum.
In the Housing Authority, which was itself responsible for the
construction of public housing, there were apparently no major changes
within the design division. Furthermore, of all city agencies, it alone
had the additional difficulty of having to meet detailed federal specifica-
tions for buildings, as well as having legally imposed federal cost limits
to work within. So clearly, changing the design philosophy of a system
dedicated to a "production philosophy, " one which had had an historical
mandate from federal guidelines that all non-essentials were an extrava-
gance, would not be a simple matter. As Tunney Lee once pointed out,
See also a 50 page report produced by the Urban Design Council in 1971
highly critical of the entire budget, site selection, and development process,
for the many city agencies. The report is described in "Architects Study
Says City Gets Poorest Design at Greatest Cost, " New York Times, Novem-
ber 23, 1971, pp. 1 and 45.
See Myerson and Banfiel ning, and the Public Interest,
pp. 93-94 for a discussion of the Public Housing Administration guidelines
during the 1940' s and early 1950' s and how they resulted in units without
closet doors or showers, and with exposed pipes, small rooms and concrete
floors.
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design is not going to be changed merely by the hiring of some good archi-
tects for individual buildings if the government personnel responsible for
the over-all policy determination of site selection, density, building speci-
fications, and supervision of the private architect all remain the same.
There may be a few successes, and there may be some smaller details on
which the new architect will win some victories - and these should not be
denigrated - but on a larger scale of values change will be a lot less cer-
tain over the long run.
After attempting to correct some of the reasons which the better
architectural firms gave as to why they did not accept city contracts (com-
putation of fees, delays over payment, etc. ), the administration attempted
to recruit these firms to start designing municipal buildings. This led to
Mayor Lindsay' s announcing on July 13, 1967 that five noted architects
would design six public housing projects. The hiring of Franzen, who had
both before and since won many architectural awards, was also a result
of this movement at the time.
In making the July 13 announcement, the issue of good architecture
was couched in terms of higher costs. Lindsay' s comment that better de-
signed buildings "may cost a little more, but we can stand the cost. Good
design is well worth it, ,69 is interesting because of the fact that the city
had nothing to do with paying the costs. The federal government did, and
there was no apparent agreement for them to raise their cost limits. The
only way for the city to back up its position was to say it would commit city
funds to pay for any "little" extra cost, but there was also no mention of
that.
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Walter Washington, Chairman of the Housing Authority, said,
"It is possible to get better design without raising costs too high, " but
then "he noted that the architects had been told they could not exceed
Federal costs regulations, which limit the cost of each apartment to
$20, 000. ",4 And although some blamed the increased costs of the city' s
middle-income housing built under the "good design" program on gen-
erally rising construction costs, one unnamed housing official said,
"Exposed concrete construction, which many of the better architects
use, adds $400 - $500 a room to the cost of construction and two months
to construction time. 15
In addition to the many above impediments to innovative design,
the architect was faced with the fact that - despite the Planning Com-
mission' s statement to the contrary - the Housing Authority preliminary
studies had indicated that there were subsoil problems. Mr. Schreiber' s
comment later that they did not take test borings at the time although they
knew they would be needed may be explained by several reasons - 1) be-
cause he believed at the time that "a private builder' s pilings were suc-
cessful but were abandoned because FHA did not approve the marketing of
middle-income housing on the site''16 and 2) although he did not say it, it
is my understanding that it is illegal for the city to take test borings before
it owns the property in question.
In order to make what follows more intelligible, the original cost
as approved by HUD and within which the architect would presumably be
required to design, is summarized below:
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Land $ 2,325,000
Administration 465, 000
Interest 500,000
Planning 803, 800
Construction and Equipment 12, 405, 000
$ 16,543,000
5% Contingency 612, 000
$ 17, 155, 000 17
It should be noted that the previously referred to federal cost
limit of $20, 300 per apartment unit applied to the total cost of the pro-
ject, including land and other costs, and not just construction of the
physical apartments (total cost of $17, 155, 000 divided by 846 units equals
$20, 277. 78). It also included any extra foundation costs that might be in-
curred over normal costs, as well as the "extra" for good design that
John Lindsay referred to. These details would later prove critical. The
low interest rate assumed should also be noted.
As events eventually transpired the design produced by Mr.
Franzen was considered too expensive by the Housing Authority and after
two years of work his firm was dismissed. The actual nature of the dis-
pute between Mr. Franzen and the Authority over the design is somewhat
confusing in its details, as the sides disagree not on the cost estimate for
Mr. Franzen' s eventual design, but rather on whether this cost was within
the dollar amount available for the project. In other words, the dispute,
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which has continued to the present day, is to some extent over what in-
structions and procedures were communicated between architect and
client. Complicating this essential aspect of the dispute is the con-
tention of the Housing Authority that it was the design philosophy of
Mr. Franzen which inevitably caused him to exceed the allowable dollar
limits.
These matters became dramatically public at the height of the
Forest Hills controversy in February, 1972, when Ada Louise Huxtable,
the architectural critic of the New York Times, wrote a full page article
on the project that was published prominantly on the front page of its
second section. The article, "Forest Hills: Innovation vs. Red Tape, "
highly praised Ulrich Franzen's rejected design and was very negative
about the design the Authority had accepted from the second architect,
Samuel Paul. 18 The appearance of the article certainly did not help the
Housing Authority in its beleaguered attempts at defense of the project at
the time. The article was responded to with letters from Simeon Golar,
Chairman of the Authority, and from Mr. Samuel Paul, letters which
were never printed by the Times. But the issues raised, I think, are
significant, especially when viewed in the larger context of how public
decisions are made and with what criteria. For at their heart is the
interplay between economics and social policy, especially as it is trans-
lated into reality by an individual architect who has his own conceptions
about the relations between physical design and social behavior. They
illustrate how problems of communication between different individuals
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involved at various times can lead to misinterpretation by the respective
parties and a subsequent hardening of positions.
Mr. Franzen, working within the density decisions made before
he was hired, made his initial presentation in May, 1968, of the work
done during the "Schematic Design Phase" (as it is defined on pages
6-7 of the Housing Authority document, "Architect' s Contract for Fed-
erally-aided Project"). As was specified in the contract, this work was
commenced only after the Housing Authority had provided the architect
a copy of the Development Program approved by HUD, receipt of which
Mr. Franzen had "acknowledged in writing.? 20 His plan
. . . consisted of apartments and community facili-
ties in rows of two-story structures clustered to
form a pedestrian street running through the site,
connected to three 17-story apartmt towers and
one 23-story tower for the elderly.
According to Mrs. Huxtable, the reaction of the design chief of
the Authority, Mr. Schreiber, was favorable, but that 1) the design
would need to be approved by the Authority' s Board of Directors because
"it was a departure from Housing Authority design policy" and 2) there
might be problems with the cost of "complex foundation work on a site
known to have poor conditions. " 22
What action the Board of Directors took is not known to me.
What is known is that Franzen presented his plan in a formal proposal
eight months later in January, 1969, supporting his design with a foundation-
engineering feasibility study, as required by his contract. His estimate for
H-
The original design for the Forest Hills scatter-site housing project, above, was done
by firm headed by Ulrich Franzen, right. It envisioned a variety of housing and low
buildings connected by a pedestrian street that would have joined the various areas.
The street was planned to create a neighborhood character and function by establishing a physical and visual link
PHOTOGRAPH An artist's rendering of the Forest
Hills project design by Samuel Paul Source: New York City
that was being constructed by the Housing Authority
Housing Authority in early 1972 Photo Unit
1 7: !
I t1k
Service Road - ong isLand
1 O
PHOTOGRAPH 11 Site plan of Samuel Paul's
design for the Forest Hills
public housing project
Source: New York City
Housing Authority
Photo Unit
(1 F1
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the cost was $13 million, which, it should be noted, is the total obtained
by adding the now two-year-old Development Program' s figures for con-
struction to the 5% contingency. Then, according to Mrs. Huxtable' s
version of the story, the minutes of the meeting show that the architect
was told that he was "almost $3 million over a $10, 284, 750 development
project figure of January, 1967. ,23 Franzen then "said that this was
the first he had heard of the figure, that he was working within statutory
limits, as instructed, and that much of the escalation resulted from rising
costs. A Housing Authority spokesman told Mr. Franzen that the full
amount of the statutory limit was not available. The architect stated he
had not been told this before. "24
Unfortunately, Mr. Golar' s letter of reply to the Huxtable
article only raises more questions. In it he states that the Development
Program which was given to Mr. Franzen clearly indicated that $12, 405, 000
was the budgeted construction cost, and that "the innovative design" pre-
sented in May, 1968, "exceeded the statutory limits established by the
Federal government to the extent of over one million dollars. Even if
money had not been a problem, the design incurably violated both the
Multiple Dwelling Law and the City' s Zoning Resolution. It was flatly and
immediately apparent that there was no way that the Franzen design could
be built. ,25 I have not resolved the contradiction between Golar' s $12. 4
million and the- $10. 28 million figure referred to in the Huxtable article.
There is a further question of how a competent architect' s design can be
"incurably" in violation of the governing codes. Disputes over costs of
buildings are common. Disputes over meeting the technical requirements
-109-
of basic housing laws are not, especially when the design has not reached
the zoning code' s upper density limit. It is hard to believe that an archi-
tect would persist from May 1968 to January 1969 with a design that was
in such basic disagreement with the codes, as Mr. Golar alleged.
However, Max Schreiber, the design chief of the Authority, said
in the Huxtable article and in the interview I had with him in 1972 that the
reason for Franzen' s eventual firing was "economics completely. " 26
When I asked him how this was the problem when Franzen stated that he
was within cost, Schreiber said, "Franzen interpreted Congressional cost
limits incorrectly. Both parties agreed on the actual costs of the build-
ings . . . . Franzen was given the chance to redesign, but he was ob-
stinate and refused to. " 27
Mr. Schreiber explained further that "We have to keep our build-
ings simple to come within cost limits. Brick is cheapest, so we still use
it, not concrete panels. " He continued,
Franzen was taken because he had a good reputation,
and we' re interested in good design. People like
Pei, etc. won' t work for us. We had Paul Rudolph
for a few jobs, but he was unsuccessful because of
high cost. He had to get extra city money. His de-
sign was like Franzen s - it had lots of breaks in the
walls. 28
This would appear to contradict Mr. Golar' s letter that "other
projects designed at the same time as the Forest Hills project were suc-
cessfully completed within cost limitations and now provide sorely needed
public housing projects. Except for Mr. Franzen, the project in Forest
Hills could have been built and occupied by now at a considerably lower cost
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than now results from design imposed delays. " 29 His statement also
ignores the fact that the majority of the 1966 scatter-site projects never
made it to the construction stage and were officially considered inactive
projects.
Whether or not "good design" inherently requires higher cost
is a matter of debate that will not be settled here. One' s conception of
good design may range from the large decision to use low rise walk-up
buildings instead of high rise elevator buildings all the way down to such
small details as the location of doorways in visual relation to the street;
and a successful housing development is obviously the combination of
many small and large design decisions coupled with the life-styles of the
future residents and the social character of the neighborhood. Even the
relative merit of Franzen' s design versus the one produced by Samuel
Paul is not the issue at this point of the paper, though that is obviously
important within its own context for the future liveability of the development.
Rather, what is at issue is the decision-making process with regard to the
economics of the project.
First, one wonders why the issue of the construction cost limit
dispute between the architect and the Housing Authority was not settled
fairly quickly by the agency that in fact had the final word, HUD. If the
May presentation had indicated that costs were going to be above the $12. 4
million figure, as the Golar letter states, let alone the $10. 3 million figure
in the Huxtable article, then there were seven months to straighten out that
issue before the formal schematic presentation of January, 1969. Even if
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project costs could not be estimated precisely enough until January to
know whether or not it would come in at the prescribed limit, certainly
by that time communication between the Authority and the architect
should have settled the economic guidelines. If the Authority was cor-
rect in its dollar estimates and in saying that Franzen refused to re-
design, what was it that took another nine months to negotiate before
Franzen was fired in September, 1969? Can it be ascribed simply to a
failure of the administration in the Authority to make a firm decision
quickly? I do not know; but since the terms of the architect' s contract
prevent him from proceeding from the Schematic Design Phase (Phase I)
to the Design Development Phase (Phase II) until a written agreement has
been worked out at a conference attended by a representative of HUD, said
agreement to be "the basis for a Memorandum of Understanding" 3 0
which the Housing Authority will give written notification to proceed, one
can only conclude that nothing was accomplished between January and
September, 1969. It is the contention of then Deputy Director for Program
Policy, and now Assistant General Manager of the Authority, James Mes-
sina, that the Authority could not get a definite answer from HUD during
all this time, a time when the Washington HUD office was in the process
of getting Congress to raise the national cost limit formula by about
$4, 000 per unit3 1 However, without further research, I am not able to say
what the position of HUD was on this matter or what their expectations
were about the probabilities of an imminent change in the cost limit stan-
dards.
A further opinion about the delays caused by HUD was expressed
by Mr. Schreiber, who said,
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HUD should review our material in broad
general aspects and not the nitty gritty aspects of
details (like the details of how elevator shafts are
built), which delays us one year or more. Archi-
tects find it very frustrating. 2
Were there other ways in which the economic problem could
have been solved? For with construction costs constantly rising, the
budget of January, 1967, got more out of date with each passing month.
It presumably would have been even more unrealistic after any new archi-
tect had taken the time to do his new Schematic Design Phase, though one
could always hope that by that time the federal guidelines would have
caught up. One strategy that could have been pursued, if it had been the
personnel in the Housing Authority who had been believers of the concept
of scatter-site housing with smaller and better design, would have been
to attack the political issues head on with the Mayor. He could have been
asked to commit the extra city money needed to bring about the "better
design" in this case and to reaffirm the city' s commitment to make
scatter-site housing a success. The technical people could have pointed
out that the foundation costs were the principal problem, and that these
were the direct result of the political deal that had chosen the site, and,
in addition, that the 846 units constituted a very significant number of
units in the housing pipeline (there were only 3, 377 public housing units
completed in 1969 and 1, 700 in 1970). 33
Yet, since it was the Mayor' s office which had initiated the
scatter-site policy, and not the Housing Authority, it should not even
have been necessary for Housing Authority people to do this. There
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should have been some degree of follow-up from the Mayor' s office or
the City Planning Department to see that the scatter-site projects kept
moving. For time lost over small amounts of money initially during
a period of inflation (and even the $1 million figure in Golar' s letter
represents only about 8% of the development program' s construction
cost, and 6% of total cost) frequently leads to greater losses later on.
In 1968 the education section of the City Planning Department had
a joint meeting with the Housing Authority, including Authority Chair-
man Albert Walsh, Joseph Christian and James Messina, and Adrian
Blumenfeld from the school system in an attempt to resolve school
issues in a half-dozen proposed public housing projects, including the
Forest Hills and Lindenwood, Queens, scatter-site projects. 3
But this level of Planning Department initiative did not ap-
parently extend to following the details on the design issues of housing
itself. The Planning Department' s housing section was not active at
that time, and the 1969 involvement of the newly formed Queens office
of the Department was minimal.
In August, 1969, a staff member of that office responsible for
Community Planning District 6 called James Messina at the Authority
and was informed that the designs were still schematic and were
"contrary to the zoning resolution, " that the Authority was being
"blamed for inefficiency, " and that Franzen would be dismissed. The
conclusion was that "the status of the project = zero, its future un-
known. " Nothing was apparently done to initiate any follow-up.
In October , the Chairman of Community Planning District 6,
Joe DeVoy, telephoned this staff member requesting "information about
the status and new plans for the project" because "the community wants
to review the plan. ' (That Mr. DeVoy was not dealing directly with the
Authority is indicative of the lines of communication involved. )
Two weeks later, this staff member again talked with Messina
and was informed that the new architect, Samuel Paul, was "working
diligently" and that preliminary drawings were expected in three
months. (Again, it should be noted that the Planning Department was not
dealing directly with the Authority' s Design Division. ) This planner
then informed DeVoy of this and "asked (him) to remind me after three
months for new info. "35 Clearly, there was no serious concern about
the situation from the Queens Office of the City Planning Department.
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Even more importantly, the longer the time delay, the more likely that
the project will die from either political opposition or bureaucratic in-
ertia. Obviously, this particular strategy would have had many political
problems, not the least of which were the Mayor' s running for re-
election in 1969 and consequent need for the Queens vote, and the ne-
cessity for any proposal like this having to go back before the Board of
Estimate. Another alternative would have been to combine the housing
with some other public facility which would not have had a legal limit on
costs and could have absorbed the extra costs for foundation pilings as
part of a bookkeeping transfer of expenses. Still another strategy could
have been consulting with the City Planning Department on the zoning
margin and to see whether the extra elderly units that could be added to
the high rise buildings of Franzen' s design would bring it back within the
per unit costs. For there is not really any difference, either for the in-
habitants or the surroundings, between a 17-story building or a 20-story
building. Such additional elderly units would not change the various pro-
jections of school needs, and, more importantly, would not have changed
the basic objective of the Franzen plan, which was, in Franzen' s official
January report to be "purposefully in opposition to the usual complete
segregation of spaces and activities. , 36
The important issue here is not whether any particular strategy
was rejected on political grounds, but whether anyone was trying to de-
The infamous failure of the City to make Queens streets passable for
up to a week after a 1969 snowstorm had already made that vote very
problematic.
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vise alternative ways of getting the development built quickly. Projects
just do not move in a bureaucracy if no one is pushing to find different
routes to achieve the objective when the first route is blocked. The City
of New York had been experiencing problems in meeting federal con-
struction cost limits for some time because they were not adjusted for
regional factors, so the problem here was not a surprise. As one ex-
ample, Eugenia Flatow said that she had worked on a manoeuver with the
original Corona site to write down the land acquisition costs to $1 by
having it declared an urban renewal area. 37 Whether or not such a
scheme would have worked in Forest Hills is unknown, but something
along those lines would certainly have made a big difference, since there
was a payment of $2, 325, 000 for land (equal to $267, 000 per acre or
$2, 747 per unit based on 846 units).
The City policy remained that all of the cost for public housing
must be paid for by the federal government, whereas it was all right for
the city to pay partial costs for other programs (urban renewal, highways,
sewers, etc. ) because that was what the federal government required in
order for the city to get the federal funds. The city had decided, as a
matter of local policy, that it wanted scatter-site public housing; it had
been a local political manoeuver that had moved the site from a location
with no subsoil problems to one that had them; and it had been local in-
itiative that had wanted better design. As nice as it would have been for
the federal government to pay for the consequences of all this, that was
not legal. So, in practical terms, if the city had wanted the housing badly
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enough, it could have considered its share of the extra costs as a way
of getting another 90-95% federal contribution for a local project im-
mediately, rather than losing more years over a very difficult housing
problem in the city. After all, there was nothing magical in the federal
formulas, and the city was spending money on subsidizing housing built
under other formulas.
Moreover, it is clear that to have a good track record of using
federal funds - which New York City does not have - and therefore to stand
a better chance of getting more, the bureaucracy must take risks and force
the issue. Perhaps this violates all rules of bureaucratic behavior and
only a young organization can do this before its members have become
overly concerned about things other than the prime goal. This might explain
why the New York State Urban Development Corporation plays this
brinkmanship game all the time, including even starting construction on
land to which it has not yet obtained formal title or for which it has not
yet received a federal commitment of 236 funds.
In any case, the fact remains that on September 5, 1969, the
Franzen firm was fired, and apparently not paid for some of its work
(the contract gives the Authority the right to terminate the contract on
three days notice, with the architect "entitled to receive just and equitable
compensation for any satisfactory work . . . " [emphasis added]). A
week later, on September 12, 1969, the firm of Samuel Paul was retained.
Whereas the Franzen firm had never worked for the Housing Authority be-
fore, Paul' s had, and it was described by Schreiber in 1972 as "a practi-
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cal office - knows cost, knows design. " 38 Although these are attributes
that are certainly important in getting projects actually built, what in fact
appears to be the most significant change was the way the project was
processed by the city and federal governments. Rather than negotiating
a new federal contract at the start of design and then holding the architect
to that fixed dollar figure, they simply made sure that he was designing
what they felt were the most economical buildings, let the project go to
bid, and then renegotiated the legal documents for the federal contribu-
tion at that time. This procedural (or attitude) change made all the differ-
ence, for just as other social and legal factors which were to make the
opposition to the project stronger changed during the two years that this
took, so too did the legal basis on which HUD could award subsidies. A
new law took effect in May of 1971. Since the HUD office no doubt knew
this was in the Congressional winds during 1970, I strongly suspect that
this was deliberate, and that what made the administrators in the system
willing to follow this procedure was their confidence in an architect who
was a known quantity and who was willing to eliminate what HUD and the
Authority felt were the more expensive aspects of his design.
The chronology of the process went as follows. In January, 1970,
Mr. Paul presented his Phase I design concept, which "envisioned three
23-story buildings, four 4-story and four 2-story 'townhouses, ' a com-
munity center and an early childhood center. "39 Ironically, this design
also included some low level buildings. Since Paul presumably knew
something of the history behind Franzen' s dealings with the Authority,
this would seem to imply that there was nothing drastically wrong with the
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idea of having some low rise buildings by spreading their higher per
unit costs throughout the total project cost. Indeed, Schreiber stated
that Paul' s low rise buildings were nice, but that they "cost $50, 000
per unit instead of our normal $30, 000 per unit. "40 Therefore, after
a series of design review meetings the architect, Housing Authority and
HUD agreed on April 14, 1970 to delete the eight low-rise buildings, but
to keep the same total number of units by adding them to the high rise
buildings. In other words, one could not average in some units of higher
cost into the whole project, one had to minimize all per unit costs.
So again, what was important was not so much the wishes of the
private architect but the directions taken by the officials responsible for
public policy, with economics again being the rationale. In this case, it
seems clear that part of the incentive to reduce the variety of housing
types came from officials at HUD. This took place after HUD had issued
national guidelines, as required by the 1968 Housing Act, that all public
housing for families should be constructed as low rise buildings, unless
it was determined to be economically infeasible. Thus, what had started
out as a social experiment to encourage a more diverse racial and econ-
omic distribution of people throughout the city as the "macro" decision,
ended up being decided at the "micro" level not with the participants in
the process debating the pros and cons of how a given physical design
would encourage or discourage social behavior patterns at the neighbor-
hood level, but rather by technical personnel concerned about minimizing
costs. The political choices as to priorities - varied housing types, com-
munity center, parking spaces, etc. - as well as whether a social experi-
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ment of this type was so sensitive that the foundation costs should be
borne for purposes of time alone, were never given to the social plan-
ners, let alone the citizenry of the neighborhood involved. Many of
that last group, indeed, by now were under the mistaken illusion that
the project was dead.
In fact, it seems fair to say that the choices about what kind
of scatter-site housing project to build were made in the same way that
many other decisions about city life have been made for this century -
on technical criteria. This theme is amplified by Lisa Peattie in her
article, "Reflection on Advocacy Planning, " in which she states that
whereas "planning" in ancient cities was done by individuals and small
social organizations like families, guilds, and the local church,
Our cities are more and more publicly man-
aged environments. Private actions take place
within a generally narrowing network of public inter-
vention, public policy, and public planning.
One way in which we have handled this trans-
formation has been by recasting questions of public
policy as problems for technical solution. 'Much of
the history of social progress in the twentieth century,
says Harvey Brooks, 'can be described in terms of
the transfer of wider and wider areas of public policy
from politics to expertise. Often the problems of po-
litical choice have become buried in debates among
experts over highly technical alternatives. ' .
In a rapidly changing world of pluralistic
goals, the casting of policy decisions into a techni-
cal framework makes possible an operating consensus
that is necessary to keep our cities running even as
well as they do.
But as a consequence, we have developed a set
of bureaucratic management institutions which yften
seem impersonal and alien to human feelings. 4
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After the April, 1970, agreement the processing of the project
went through the various approval stages with relative speed, as these
things go. After receiving two site plan studies, HUD approved one of
them on July 9, 1970, and authorized the Housing Authority to start the
Phase II Design Development Phase, which consisted of drawings detailed
enough to make firm cost estimates, scale plans of apartments and build-
ings, wall sections, detailed site plan, and a preliminary design of utility
services. Four months later, on November 20, 1970, HUD approved the
Phase II work and authorized the start of Phase III - Construction Docu-
ments (working drawings and specifications). 42
On paper, at least, there was now reason for the Authority to
be optimistic about the project as the end of 1970 approached. The pro-
cessing hurdles finally appeared to have been overcome.
CHAPTER VI - 1967 THROUGH 1970 -- THE ITALIANS OF CORONA
DEFEND THEIR HOMES WHILE PUBLIC HOUSING IN FOREST HILLS
IS FORGOTTEN
Be courteous and tactful as well as honest and diligent.
All your doings are publicly known, and must therefore
Be beyond complaint or criticism. Be absolutely impartial.
Always give a reason for refusing a plea; complainants
Like a kindly hearing even more than a successful
Plea. Preserve dignity but avoid inspiring fear.
Be an artist in words, that yo may be strong, for
The tongue is a sword . . . .
-Precepts for the Egyptian Civil
Service thousands of years ago.
Despite what social science may say, politics is
morality. Politics is the making of choices be-
tween good and bad, choices of priorities among
competing good things. Democracy appeals be-
cause its emphasis on method keeps private
moralities in check. But that doe not mean that
moral choice is not involved. . .
-Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism
While the housing project was being processed by the government
agencies amid relative calm, the proposal to build a high school in Corona
was being actively opposed by the residents. It is not my intention to write
a detailed history of the Corona dispute, for that would be a paper in itself.
Yet knowledge of it is essential to understand many of the attitudes in
Forest Hills about government, community power, and how the bargaining
process should or could work. It also explains how certain individuals who
were influential in the Forest Hills controversy first became familiar with
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each other and developed the working relationships of respect and trust
that are so important in negotiating a settlement to any dispute, especially
one which is being closely followed by the press and other politicians.
Other major events also happened during the late ' 60' s and early
'70' s which were important in forming people' s perceptions of racial in-
tegration, political motives, and ethnic consciousness. Their details are
not important for this paper because they intertwine with Forest Hills only
in the most general sense of providing the ethos within which the larger
community was moving.
In New York City the most notable event was the 1968 Ocean Hill-
Brownsville school decentralization dispute, and the long city-wide teachers
strike. First, it symbolized the ascendency of the concept of decentral-
ization and community control in large cities. Second, it led many to be-
lieve that there was a polarization between the blacks of the local school
board and the Jews of the heavily Jewish teachers union and to believe that
the city' s political leadership was more sensitive to demands for com-
munity control when the community involved was black, especially if there
was an implied threat of violence. Another event was the rise of the mili-
* A distinction must be made here between community control and concern
for the local community - meaning in this context the geographical concept
of a neighborhood - as a basis for local social activity which should be con-
sciously planned for. The idea that the local community should have com-
plete control, with a veto power over the will of the larger city, seems to
be fairly new, whereas a concern for the neighborhood as a functioning part
of the larger city has waxed and waned in a kind of cyclical pattern over the
years. For further discussion of the neighborhood and its planning, see the
chapter, "Neighborhood and Neighborhood Unit, " in Lewis Mumford' s book,
The Urban Prospect (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968),
p. 56-78.
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tant Jewish Defense League, with its slogan of "Never Again" and its
willingness to resort to violent action in what it termed the "self-defense"
of Jews. These two New York City issues basically revolved around ques-
tions of how people related to each other in social terms, and in this sense
they were easily translated into city-wide concerns without any particular
geographic, or neighborhood, boundaries.
Unlike the Forest Hills and Corona cases the above issues did
not involve the allocation of budget funds for specific capital improvements,
improvements closely linked to particular neighborhood locations. Further-
more, of all of the above issues, only Corona had been linked together with
the housing issue during the site-selection process, and its use for a school
would partially answer the objections to public housing because of lack of
school facilities. Corona is also significant to understanding the Forest
Hills experience because of 1) its proximity, 2) the tendency of many
people to ascribe the selection of the Forest Hills site to the political power
of a group of Italians, and 3) the envy and admiration which any group fight-
ing the city has for another neighborhood group that successfully elevated
its issue to one with which all the communities of the city could identify and
which then won major concessions from the government.
The Corona issue started with a factor common to most citizen-
government disputes. That is, the tenacity and depth of resentment on the
citizen' s part increases when he disagrees not only with the result of the
government' s decision but also feels that he was deliberately excluded (by
a "conspiracy"?) from the information that would have enabled him to par-
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ticipate meaningfully in the decision-making process. Then the legiti-
macy of the process itself becomes an issue as well. If this is joined
with something as threatening to the individual' s lifestyle as, say, con-
demnation of one' s home, then the combined shock effect may be just
enough to activate the one or two persons needed to work full time at
mobilizing a previously politically inactive neighborhood.
Such was the case in Corona, as the Italian homeowners came
to believe that they at best had been given a raw deal by the city and at
worst had been duped by the city as unwitting accomplices to the ex-
pansion plans of the nearby, and detested, Lefrak City. The essence of
their argument rests on the contention that 1) they were not informed
originally that changing the proposal for the nearly vacant site from use
as a housing project to a high school would require drastically enlarging
its boundaries, and 2) that after this fact was known, their attempts to
have alternate sites selected by the city were rebuffed by the official site
selection process because the decision had really been made in advance
behind closed doors, thereby constituting a denial of their right to legal
due process. Neither of these arguments touches directly on the philo-
sophical and political values involved at the heart of the matter; that is,
under what circumstances it is better to condemn people' s homes rather
than making alternative decisions that may involve more expense, differ-
ent land use relationships, different management procedures, or different
administrative structures. But issues of values are rarely accepted by
courts as grounds for overruling a city' s right of eminent domain. Issues
of process are.
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It is often proclaimed that the greatness of New York City is
its variety, its mixture of many groups of people and many types of
areas. Yet the evidence is that the staff of the City Planning Depart-
ment and all the various other agencies involved in reviewing a pro-
posed site, both in the Site Selection Board (described on pages 81-82 )
and the concurrent all agency conference applied city wide rules of
thumb without any attempt at variety based on the values and circum-
stances of the individual neighborhood and community of people involved.
Examination of internal staff memoranda and working documents during
the 1966-67 planning process reveals the result of this - every city agency
was concerned with protecting its own engineering or technical standards
that were based either on inspection of maps or minimizing the budgetary
cost of any item charged to itself. There was no articulation of what
type of people or community were involved, and no one questioned any
possible effects on neighborhood cohesion.
Concern about any possible relocation of residences or com-
mercial enterprises from the alternative sites was in terms of the
assessed valuations involved. Consequently, one argument against locat-
ing the school at the vacant eight and a half acre site at 108th Street and
Horace Harding Boulevard was that its assessed value of $1. 1 million
was one-half million dollars higher than the assessed value of the Board
of Education' s original 12. 6 acre site with 128 families to relocate. (A
counter argument was that the market value the city would have to pay for
condemnation would be roughly equal because of assessing practices. )
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Whether it was possible to relocate a family in the same neighborhood
or for homeowners to buy a new home nearby were not raised as
relevant issues. Indeed, how could they be when such items as the sizes
of families, how many units were rented or occupied by owners, and
whether units were in good or bad condition were details not mentioned
in the Department of Relocation' s report to the Site Selection Board' s
committee. 3 That would have required going out and meeting with each
individual family before a site had been approved or even scheduled for
a public hearing, or it would have required using Census of Housing block
statistics. But all that anyone involved in the Site Selection Board' s
workings or the all agency conference was interested in knowing was
the total number of units involved and the assessed valuations.
Before the deal announced at the Board of Estimate on October 27,1966,
the concern had been to have the overlap between the Board of Education
and the Housing Authority resolved. The decision to have the Authority
request instead 8 1/2 acres at 108th Street merely eliminated a vacant
site alternative for the school. Even the political agreement to give the
borough president and the Board of Education a school there did not neces-
sarily mean that decisions still could not have been made by the civil
service professionals to reduce the number of homes taken. But for all
the interest in technical details, no one at staff level was concerned
enough with the problems of the people on the site to challenge any of the
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myriad technical assumptions that had led to the derivation of this
*
particular site.
At an all agency conference on November 23, 1966, partici-
pants were told about the 12. 6 acres that "the same site was originally
scheduled for a New York City Housing Authority proposal . . . The
site for school purposes has not yet been formally approved by the Site
Selection Board, but has been tentatively selected. ,5 (My emphasis)
In keeping with the tradition that these all agency meetings deal with
only the professional technical aspects of the site in question, such matters
as sewer easements and ten foot street widenings were discussed. The City
Planning Department was concerned that the costs of relocating utilities
**
be determined and also about increasing the street widths around the
school' s perimeter from the existing 50 feet to 60 feet. The general
conclusion was that there were no major problems. This perhaps should
not be surprising, as most of the participants had an engineering back-
ground, including those from City Planning.
Although one city planner's August, 1966, memorandum in favor of
the 108th Street site for the school did point out that the Forest Hills
High School had a site of 9. 6 acres and that that had certainly been
satisfactory (albeit not perfect), he failed to continue the analysis to the
point of noting that the Forqst Hills High School had been built for
2, 800 students, not 4, 000.
** Consolidated Edison had a major substation across the street, and
as events transpired, ten major feeder cables had to be relocated, as
did a large sewer.
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But what is of more significance was the composition
of the conference. Agencies with physical and financial concerns - like
the Real Estate, Traffic, Water Resources, and Fire Departments, and
Budget Bureau - were considered relevant for detailed site planning and
were invited. Agencies with concerns that might be considered more
social, such as the Relocation Department (which would presumably have
as its self-interest the minimization of relocation) or the agency of the
city concerned with housing development (which might or might not have
argued that the destruction of sound housing in a viable community was
an item on the debit side) were not there. The impact of condemnation
on the people living there was apparently considered the domain of the
Site Selection Board as more of a political, not professional, issue; and
it can be argued that that is one of those divisions of responsibility that
are necessary in a large system if anything is to be done at all. So,
even though the chairmanship of the all agency conference was held by
the City Planning Department, it was not a forum where physical land
use and social policy conflicts could be resolved by the one agency that was
theoretically supposed to be concerned with the total spectrum. It only
arbitrated disputes of a technical nature.
However, the other side of the equation, the working committee
on schools of the Site Selection Board did not concern itself with such
trade-offs on social issues unless they were considered too politically
objectionable Lo tlhe Uorough president, and in tisl case they were not be-
cause he had made his political deal. The working committee on schools
was chaired by the Bureau of the Budget. Historically the capital facili-
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ties area of the Bureau had been dominated by engineers and has been
a driving force behind the setting of arbitrary city-wide standards, for
that made it easy to centrally process all departmental requests. With
its objective of minimizing dollar costs it had a maximum it would pay
for sites in high real estate value areas (typically Manhattan, which,
combined with the difficulties of relocation, resulted in smaller sites),
and it had a standard acreage for all other areas, regardless of how
low land prices were. The number of pupils in a school and its program
of requirements were also city-wide standards, and in this manner the
Bureau' s interests coincided with the rigidity of the Board of Education' s
School Planning division. Thus, the concern of the Bureau was not so
much the social cost of moving people but the expected dollar costs of
acquiring the dwelling units and businesses. Furthermore, the repre-
*
sentatives of the Controller and the Real E state Department certainly
could not be expected to redesign physical site plans by weighing social
values (technically, of course, no detailed site plan yet existed, only a
set of criteria). The only member of the committee who might be ex-
pected to was City Planning.
The operating principle of the Real Estate Department was to keep
immediate short run costs as low as possible, so it tended to follow
the lead of the Budget Bureau. Moreover, its guiding principle was
to keep as much land as possible on the tax rolls, so it opposed efforts
to retain city-owned land as a form of land banking, wishing instead to
auction it off.
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But the Planning Department also was specialized along
functional lines, and its representative on the committee came from
the Department' s education section. With the same objective of
getting a school built, with the need to meet with these same people
at committee meetings for other schools, and with a greater famili-
arity and possible acceptance of the same value structure which
created the standards for schools in the first place, it was unlikely
that the specialist school planner would consider the social character
of a neighborhoood as a part of his responsibility, let alone consider
it important enough to challenge either the efficiency assumptions
behind one school of 4, 000 students versus two schools of 2, 000 students
each or the drawing board simplicity of rectangular school sites bounded
on all four sides by streets. And, as past documents and my personal
conversations with some of the school planners involved confirmed,
they did not at that time.
The school sites committee of the Site Selection Board approved
the site by a unanimous 5-0 vote, meaning that the borough president' s
office was willing to withstand the political flack of the condemnation.
The committee' s internal report to the Site Selection Board described
the site as being about 50% vacant and the other half composed of pre-
dominantly one and two story buildings with 128 residences and five
*
A close degree of cooperation was thus required between the educational
and engineering sections of the Planning Department if there was to be any
possibility of changing the direction of policy that was otherwise undertaken
under the operating consensus of the Site Selection Board and all agency
conference.
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businesses. It concluded that this was a site that "needed a minimum
of demolition and tenant relocation. ,6 It was stated that alternate sites,
including an almost completely vacant six acre one, would have required
the use of park land for athletic fields (which was implicitly rejected) or
would have involved more expense and relocation.
Between the time of the committee report and the Site Selec-
tion Board' s public hearing in March, 1967, a small square block of
0. 4 acres with 59 dwelling units in a six story building was eliminated
from the corner of the proposed site, possibly due to citizen pressure
but just as likely for economic reasons.
As the irate residents were to suspect, the March 20, 1967,
hearing was indeed only a formality. No one in the formal school site
selection process had articulated - and possibly no one even knew or
cared about - the social factors or community land use values which the
local Italian community cared about. The bureaucracy agreed with the
Italians' contention that the high school was to provide additional pupil
seats for the new housing that had been and was being built, but the
social question of why the provision of public services for the new resi-
dents should force the removal of the old was not addressed seriously.
For the career officials of the city it was a process that had been gone
through many times, even though in other cases it frequently had the
justification of removal of sub-standard housing. That it had been aided
by the borough president this time only made it that much easier for most
to accept, and those who might have otherwise opposed it did not for they
felt they had gotten the public housing in return.
.24
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But a couple of the Corona residents whose homes were affected
were not about to sit back quietly once they did become aware of what was
happening, and through their determination, their fellow residents were
organized into action.
As was admitted by the organization formed to oppose the con-
demnation, "The Corona Fighting 69, " the president of their local home-
owners association stated his approval of the use of the site for a high
school instead of public housing7 when that was suggested at the June 15,
1966, City Planning Commission hearing at which hundreds of Queens
residents opposed low-income housing. This is indicative of the level
of misunderstanding at the time, as nothing is as contrary to the natural
self-interest of a group of homeowners as their endorsing their own
condemnation. Their explanation of this is that it came as an impromptu
response to the proposal made at the meeting by others. They are quick
to point out that the high school idea was initiated not by "the Corona
community" but by "the Parents Coordinating Committee of Forest
Hills - Rego Park, . . . in conjunction with Lefrak City. "8 They also
point out that it was assumed by their association' s leadership that
"the site" meant one with the same boundaries as those listed on the
agenda for the public housing project. The error was compounded by
the dynamics of how neighborhood organizations work and how information
is communicated (as described on pp. 58 -60 ); and it illustrates the pit-
falls that can occur when public agencies let private word of mouth re-
place the lengthy communication job in which they should deal directly
125
-133-
with the actual people and groups involved, and when rhetoric replaces
*
all details at a public hearing.
The danger in this fragmentary communication process is that
it lets the mistaken understanding of one or two people be multiplied
when they were asked about it by their neighbors. For there was an
inherent willingness of people to trust the word of their own leaders
rather than the word of an outsider from a private organization, no
matter how much closer the ties of that stranger were to what was really
happening in the city government. This is the only way that I can ex-
plain what would otherwise appear to be an inconsistency in the different
versions of how the Corona residents found out that the site for the high
school was not just the vacant land but included their homes.
On the one hand there are my earlier interview accounts of how
a few public housing proponents tried warning them not to support the
**
high school by distributing leaflets and speaking at a local meeting, at-
* I have been unable to find public reference to any details of the high
school in question in the generally accepted modes of formal government-
public communication in the six months following Adrian Blumenfeld' s
May letter to the Planning Commission. Neither his letter, nor news-
paper accounts of the various public hearings during the summer and fall,
nor any transcripts that I have been able to locate mention the actual size
of the site for the school, nor its boundaries. (This includes a complete
transcript of the October Board of Estimate hearing at which the deal was
announced, the Planning Commission' s discussion of the school issue in
its formal report approving the public housing project for Forest Hills on
December 2, 1966, and very incomplete portions of the transcript of the
December 9, 1966, Board of Estimate hearing. )
** Because the people were outsiders and already known as advocates of
what was on its face unpopular to many people at the meetings, the serious-
ness of their warnings was not checked out. This is somewhat analagous
to the situation described by Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield in Poli-
tics, Planning and the Public Interest on page 262 where only the political
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tempts which were unsuccessful by the housing proponents' own ad-
mission. On the other hand there are the claims by the residents,
mentioned in a few of the sybsequent press accounts, that the first
indication of a change in the Board of Education' s site plans from 5. 1
acres to 12. 6 acres came in a mid-November letter to the local school
board; and that even after that no one bothered to inform the home-
owners in question about the change. According to the brief filed by the
Corona residents' lawyer at the March Site Selection Board public hear-
ing, even up to the day of the local community school board' s public
hearing on December 13, 1966,
. . . the property owners involved had still not been
informed that the earlier site had beg expanded to
embrace 65 additional homes! . . .
His brief went on to describe how groups from outside Corona
appeared with statements dealing
. . . exclusively with the need for a high school in
the area. There was no argument or discussion with
respect to whether the site in question was the only
available one. No mentio Ywas made of the possibility
of reducing the site . . .
Because the property owners at the hearing were now "con-
fused" by this new development, they could only
(continued)
advice of those who could be trusted was taken by the supporters of public
housing, which by definition excluded the advice of those closer to the
actual people in positions of political power, for their motives or support
of the cause was not clear. Consequently, the advice of these latter per-
sons was not listened to when given and also not sought out by public hous-
ing advocates in Chicago.
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. . . voice their shock. The Chairman of the [school]
Planning Board recognized the unfortunate development
and stated publicly that under the circumstances no fair
hearing could be held. Another hearing was proposed
but none ever eventuated. The Board proceededl o a
vote and a 5 to 2 approval of the site was given.
A further elaboration of the attitudes about the school versus
the public housing for Corona came in an exchange between Borough
President Cariello and Mr. Piazza, the former head of the local civic
association, on June 19, 1967. Mr. Piazza said:
Up until December 14, when we found out that some-
body lied to us, that homes would be involved, that
is when we created an uproar. Had we known this,
President Cariello, we would have tan the project
instead of the school. (My emphasis)
Mr. Piazza proceeded to remind him of a December 6, 1966
conference in Borough Hall with some of Cariello' s staff, including the
chief engineer, at which they had been assured that the strongest efforts
would be made to make sure that their homes would not be affected by
the school. 14 (This was just a few days before the Board of Estimate
formally approved public housing for the Forest Hills site and the local
community school board gave its advisory approval of the high school on
the Corona site. )
For months everyone had been referring to "a high school for
the site, " both verbally and in written public documents, and that was
all the elaboration that was ever given. The charitable conclusion is
that it apparently did not occur to anyone to ask how big a school was
planned, or, if they knew, to ask how a 4, 000 seat high school building
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with its recreation facilities was to fit on a little over five acres. It
was certainly not in the interest of supporters of the new high school
to raise such potential obstacles. The uncharitable conclusion is that
the Borough President' s office deliberately withheld information and/or
gave the affected Italian residents a misleading impression in its meet-
ings with them.
It is also clear that central city officials knew these details
from the very beginning. But the planning professionals of the City
Planning Department and the Board of Education, who both left community
relations to the borough president, failed to mention these details at either
the public hearings or in the Planning Commission' s official public report
(issued after every formal decision) as facts which the public should know.
From these facts - if they had been mentioned - someone else reading
the report might perhaps have made the connection and realized the homes
might be in danger. But this was, after all, true of the level of most of
the discussion on the housing projects as well. Virtually no one asked
about sizes and implications for future success. One only supported or
rejected principles. Whether the details were consistent with the imple-
mentation of those principles was of concern to very few.
Once the Corona homeowners recognized the threat as real,
however, they started mobilizing, first to contest the choice of their homes
during the official site iselection process as it proceeded during the months
after December, 1966, and later to oppose the city with court suits and
public demonstrations. They worked together in promoting events like
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raffles and bingo games to raise over $27, 000 in four years to finance
buses, clerical expenses, and the hiring of a young Queens lawyer,
Mario Cuomo. A list of alternative sites was formulated with the assist-
ance of a large property owner in Queens and a former head of the Real
Estate Board of New York City, Edward Tynan, who also owned seven
houses and a Cabana Club within the boundaries of the proposed site. 15
Although they attempted to use such planning criteria as trans-
portation, acquisition cost, and, most importantly, the absence of resi-
dential relocation, the fact remained that none of their proposed sites,
except for Corona Flushing-Meadow Park, met the 12 acre requirement,
nor did they attempt to argue why this 12 acre assumption was wrong
other than that it meant taking their homes. So in a sense one merely
had a replay of the staff discussions that had occurred in the summer of
1966 when the city officials favoring the public housing project for the
Corona location had tried to find an alternative site for the high school.
Perhaps this was the appropriate situation in which a professional
advocate planner working with the community could have made some dif-
ference by formulating an educational and physical alternative to the
Board of Education' s conception of what a high school should be (an ap-
proach, one remembers, that had been started with some initial success
by Eugenia Flatow with the idea of a special school for the biological
sciences). That might have raised the technical decisions to the level
of visible political decisions, but that was never articulated beyond point-
ing out that the Board of Education had no detailed plans either. Rather,
In late 1966 the Cabana Club was just starting to be constructed, despite
efforts by the Borough President' s office to convince the builder not to pro-
ceed.
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the process tended to remain at the level of a struggle based on political
power and the influence of the parties involved. In that respect the
homeowners could not win at the local level. There were too many
groups wanting a school at any cost, groups which did not feel them-
selves to be a part of the Italian portion of Corona community and there-
fore did not feel caught among conflicting needs.
As we have seen, the formal site selection process for schools
was more complicated than that for public housing. -It involved more city
agencies - each with their own specialized objectives - and more public
hearings. This was partly because a decision to build a new school, es-
pecially a high school, represented a much greater commitment of
municipal resources. It was also because people have historically been
so concerned about schools that there were local and central institutions
not subject to mayoral appointment that had initial say over educational
decisions. (1968 school decentralization in New York and the election
of local community school boards further increased this independence
from mayoral input. ) With schools being a highly desired service and
an important factor in a family' s decision about moving to a new resi-
dential area, they are usually of much greater interest to politicians,
*
See David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Vintage Books,
1969), for a comprehensive look at the politics and bureaucracy of the
New York school system, including the methods and power of Adrian
Blumenfeld: "Blumenfeld and his associates could make it sound so tech-
nical that they had much freedom to maneuver. Parent groups throughout
the city, for example, report that Blumenfeld often told them they would
not get their school if they did not accept the site he designated. " (p. 411)
The book has numerous examples of the difficulties civil rights groups,
parents, and other government agencies had in trying to deal with Blumen-
feld' s School Planning and Research Division, including many charges of
deception, inaccurate data, and refusal to pursue policies for racial integration
of schools.
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real estate developers, and city planners than other equally large munici-
pal capital investments, such as sewage treatment plants, which are less
visible to the public.
With so much at stake, the question of motives became an im-
portant factor in the complex equation of variables that determine human
emotions. How important motives can be was recognized by Banfield and
Wilson in describing the difference between old-style ward politicians and
new style "good government" politicians:
The difference seems to be not so much in the
effect produced as in the motives leading to the pro-
duction of it. The motives that produced the faults of
the old-style administration were reprehensible, and
this made the faults readily identifiable as such, . . .
even by those who committed them. The faults of the
new style of administration arise from motives that
are respectable, often even admirable, and th refore
they are not usually regarded as faults at all. 17
One of their examples is appropriate. It also attests to how much
attitudes towards urban renewal have changed since the book' s publication
in 1962.
[IIf a downtown merchant, by promising
election support to a mayor who "does things for the
city, " initiates a vast urban renewal project, he may
enrich himself and impoverish others more than any
businessman ever did by carrying a black bag to a boss' s
back room; but urban renewal rarely shocks anyone' s
sensibilities, for the intention of the merchant is good
("in the public interest, " as he would say) even though
the economic consequences of his actions may be no dif-
ferent . . . from those of the actio of the "boodlers"
whom Lincoln Steffens excoriated.
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So, over the years what might have been unrelated events ap-
peared to some of the Corona participants as evidence that the interests
of real estate developer Sam Lefrak and the government were the same and
that there was a conspiracy against them. They believed that no builder
could construct such a large development as Lefrak City without the im-
plicit approval of the government. They argued that if Lefrak City,
Forest Hills, and Rego Park needed a school, it should be built on some
of Lefrak' s land that was vacant at that time in 1966. A statement made
at a local community school board meeting in late 1966 that "We can make
it a high rise [ school]. But first I'll have to show this to Mr. Lefrak, "
was cited as one example of the Lefrak influence by "The Fighting 69" of
Corona, headed by Lillian Manasseri and Ralph Dellacona. More well-
known reasons were the history of the Lefrak organization' s support of
opposition to public housing and its promotional advertisements during
1966-67 that listed a future high school next door as an additional amenity
for prospective renters. His company' s ability to advertise the existence
of a public library and post office within Lefrak City also angered some
of the Italians, for these facilities had been located within the older
Corona area before the respective governmental agencies had moved them
to the newer, more populous, complex. 19
Later, as their struggle continued in 1970, some of the Italians
believed that a political quid-pro-quo had occurred when Anthony Atlas
was appointed the head of the city' s Traffic Violations Bureau, which
then rented one floor of space in Lefrak City' s office building for its main
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office. The tie-in, they claimed, was that Elena Atlas was active in
the Forest Hills-Rego Park Parents Coordinating Committee which
was a major lobbying group supporting the city in its selection of the
Corona site for the school. Other allegations included one that the
head of the local Corona Taxpayers Association was appointed to a high
paying city job for which he was educationally unqualified just after he
supported acceptance of the city' s first compromise offer when others
favored holding out for more. 20
The proof of a deal between Lefrak, Borough Hall, and the
Planning Section of the Board of Education is beyond the scope of this
paper. But the way official government actions and public hearings
were held themselves further contributed to the affected residents' be-
lief that the government was not even interested in listening to their
position, rather than encouraging a belief that they had lost a difficult
decision before a fair jury. The same issue comes up again in the
Forest Hills dispute, and there are some interesting similarities.
The point that must be recognized is that psychologically, once
people' s suspicions of "improper" motives are aroused they are diffi-
cult to dissuade without a long constant performance of good faith effort.
Blue-collar people whose lifelong contact with government has been
filling out bureaucratic tax and license forms and talking with low-level
clerks, see government as a large powerful entity whose mysterious
high-level inner workings can only be guessed at. The Italian residents
of Corona believed that officials of the Board of Education were obliged,
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either legally or at least out of a sense of fair play, to inform them
that their homes were being considered for a site before formally re-
questing approval of it from the community school board. The fact
that it did not, combined with the history of the previous six months,
aroused suspicions that approval was a fait accompli and that any public
hearings would only be a formality.
That they were wrong about the Board' s legal obligation did
not invalidate their feelings about public hearings. The public assump-
tion for years had been that city hearings were not a forum for intelli-
gent dialogue with officials prior to a decision, in contrast to what is
shown by the transcript of the typical federal public hearing, in which
there is usually a fair level of calm give and take. Rather they were
a place where one could only try to show that the number of persons in
opposition to a proposal was greater than had been expected, which
might cause decision makers to reverse themselves.
My own experience indicated that this was not always true, but
it was the pattern. But perhaps worst of all, it was impossible for the
citizen to tell whether or not that was the case for his particular item at
the time of his hearing, so he assumed the worst. That, of course,
simply increased the incentive for emotional tirades of frustration rather
than encouraging intelligent discussion of the matters at hand; and since
stenographic transcripts of New York City hearings are typed into English
only for an exorbitant fee, there is a high probability that one will not be
held accountable for what one says. Thus, the process encouraged bring-
ing out the worst tendencies of people rather than the best.
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But suspicions had been raised high enough in December, 1966,
for the homeowners to hire a lawyer, and the educational process of
learning about the legal intricacies of the governmental system began.
At the Site Selection Board' s public hearing of March 20, 1967, Mr.
Cuomo submitted a 30 page brief describing the social characteristics
of the community that would be broken up by the city' s action, and he
pleaded for consideration of these factors by the experts. He noted
that the Board of Education could only be expected to preserve its own
interests by trying to get schools exactly as it wanted, that it was its
own expert as to what was the proper school, and urged the Site Selec-
tion Board' s members to accept their responsibility of weighing the
larger overall interest of the city, namely the preservation of com-
munities while providing school facilities also.
The hearing, however, only confirmed the suspicions, for, as
they described it later:
. . . That hearing was a sham and patently so. Only
one of the five Board members who were required to
attend was actually present . . . . Nevertheless, a
decision was rendered only 5 1/2 minutes after the
conclusion of the hearing without so much as a quick
review of the memoranda and documentation that had
been placed in evidence. It was ineluctably ear
that the decision had been made in advance.
So, they threatened to sue and stepped up their lobbying efforts.
The city, apparently acting on legal advice, agreed to have another Site
Selection Board public hearing; and the borough president' s office now
reacted to the pressure and tried to suggest alternative sites to get itself
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out of the uncomfortable political situation that it had misjudged when
earlier supporting the condemnation. But by this time what might have
been the most viable alternative, the vacant 8 1/2 acres at 108th Street,
which did not even require future approval for street changes because
it was already mapped as a superblock, was committed to the Housing
Authority. So at a special meeting of the school sites working com-
mittee on July 20, 1967, most of his proposed alternatives were elimi-
nated because Adrian Blumenfeld said they were too small for either a
school building or athletic field. The other two alternatives suggested
by the borough president would have created a split site by combining
either the northern half (6. 8 acres) or the southern half (6. 9 acres) of
the Corona site with 7. 9 acres of a partially vacant industrial area
several blocks away. The idea was to put the school building on the
residentially zoned portion and the athletic fields on the industrial land.
This received more serious staff consideration but was rejected, and
the original Corona site was reconfirmed at the Site Selection Board
public hearing on July 24, by a 3 to 2 vote.
Yet even there the process only further inflamed passions. The
borough president, knowing that the 3 votes of the mayoral appointees
made his vote meaningless, was able to look good to his constituents by
saying that he had presented plans in the executive session that would
have saved many homes and still provided all the requested facilities.
The problem of failure to meet technical specifications - irrespective of
how reasonable these specifications were - was not mentioned and thus
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gave further impetus to the residents' claims that there were alterna-
tives. Also overlooked was the failure of the borough president to
commit himself to oppose the official closings of the streets when the
matter would subsequently come up to the Board of Estimate. That
was the only place where he could exercise his political power effectively
and would have signified that he was serious about his opposition. But
these items could easily be overlooked while passions rose against the
attitude of the mayor' s appointees, for, according to the "Fighting 69, "
Upon the recording of the vote petitioners' attorney
requested a description of the reasons for the ma-
jority decision and was told by two members of the
majority that he was2 ntitled to no explanation and
would receive none.
Whether or not the rejection of the borough president' s split
site scheme was justified is a judgment that is not going to be resolved
in this paper. Certainly a public explanation of some of the objections
that the planners had would have brought out into the open the technical
complications and therefore the underlying values behind the technical
decisions of the specialists involved at the working committee level.
Adrian Blumenfeld opposed having a split site, and his power at the
Board of Education was such that that alone would have been enough to
kill the proposal. Further elaboration of the school system' s position
came in 1970, when an official told New York Times reporter Murray
Schumach that the partly vacant, and reportedly for sale, Hagen in-
dustrial property (referred to by some as a "junkyard") could not be
used for a recreation area because it would require students to cross
a street to get to it. 23 Schumach, incidentally, also pursued the matter
with the previously mentioned real estate operator and owner of the
cabana club on the school site, Edward Tynan. Tynan said that Lefrak
had an option on the property but that this could not be proven for a news-
paper story because it was a handshake agreement. 24 So this is another
piece of the jigsaw puzzle whose influence on any of the respective parties
remains unknown.
Also revealing are some of the positions of other city agencies
who also were consulted by the working committee on the new alternative
schemes proposed by the borough president' s office. The Fire Depart-
ment opposed the proposed recreational area because it would close a
through street (98th Street) leading to Lefrak City, even though there
were two roughly parallel streets on either side which would have added
at most 800 feet to the response route from a fire station eight blocks
away. The mapping section of the City Planning Department also opposed
the street closing for the same reason. This policy for a part of Corona
which had a modified street system ran counter to what the Plan for New
York City later cited as one of the attributes of areas in Corona - that
the lack of a grid system prevented through traffic from filtering through
residential areas and made them more pleasant. But this was not sur-
prising, for the head of the mapping section was a long-time official who
had a reputation as an advocate of very wide grid-iron streets in resi-
dential areas, and this was probably one of the reasons why New York
City did not accept the planned unit development concept until the late
sixties.
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Most important, though, were the opinions of the Planning
*
Department' s school section head, for with Don Elliott having been a
major participant in the October 27th agreement, only a strong argu-
ment from a professional planner on his staff could have convinced him
to oppose Adrian Blumenfeld and the other city agencies. Her opinion
was that it was a "new, viable and expanding industrial area" which
provided 224+ jobs and which did not "impinge seriously on the resi-
dential areas surrounding it. "?25 But she felt it was undesirable to
place an athletic field "within" this industrial area and viewed the sep-
aration of the field from the school building as a detriment, as was the
expected higher cost of the industrial land than the residential land at
the Lewis Avenue site. (The term "within" may be misleading, since
it would have taken a large part of the industrial zone and been bounded
by industry on only one side - with a junior high school and homes on
the other three sides. The twelve acre residentially zoned original
school site also was bounded by an industrial zone on one side. ) In
effect she was implying that the jobs were more important than the
effects of residential condemnation, a position which would have stimu-
lated an interesting dialogue if it had been stated publicly to the resi-
dents, but it never was.
A few other words about underlying philosophies and assumptions
appear in order. First, which agency takes the initiative in raising an
issue in inter-agency disputes is important because it is a prima facie
indicator of who is not satisfied with the current relationships and be-
cause other agencies' reactions are to some degree prejudiced by their
This was no longer Dick Bader, who had been involved in the 1966 meetings.
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preconceived ideas about what the first agency' s motives are. Because
it was the borough president' s office that raised the objection to con-
demnation of the homes, it was that much easier for the planners and
budget officials to categorize the problem as political rather than
technical. Accordingly, there was no apparent effort to investigate the
arguments that Mr. Cuomo made in his testimony. The staff analysis
of the new sites was made at the last minute only when it was clear that
a new public hearing had been won by Cuomo' s legal efforts, and the
staff memoranda listed only the costs associated with the proposed
alternate sites without listing also the costs associated with the original
Corona site. Second, the engineering preciseness and beauty of long
straight lines, preferably streets, as boundaries for sites that should
approximate a rectangle as closely as possible was accepted without
question. The Housing Authority in its original request for 5 1/2 acres
in Corona knew that it was proposing something unpopular and that resi-
dential condemnation would be an albatross around the neck of any pro-
posed housing project. Accordingly, its site boundaries zig-zagged in
a saw toothed pattern so as to avoid as many homes as possible on the
irregularly built block-front. School officials had no such constraint,
and they opted for regularly shaped sites. The operating principle was
based on what the standards called for, and the inventiveness and flexi-
bility of the later architectural stage of the process to adapt to anything
but the norm was ignored.
-149-
The July 24, 1967, Site Selection Board reaffirmation of its
earlier decision on the Corona school site marked, for all practical
purposes, the end of involvement by city agencies in that phase of
planning. It also was the last chance that the citizens had to reverse
the decision under normal procedures, and they knew it. So the legal
and political strategy became one of delaying tactics to stop the con-
demnation process. As Planning Commission Chairman Donald Elliott
recalled years later, "Cuomo came in and said, 'I'll hold you up for
three years. We said, 'C' est la vie, ' and he did. ,,26
During the next two months of 1967 both sides parried for po-
sition. The absurdity and ambiguity of a City Charter paragraph re-
quiring a Board of Estimate hearing before the Mayor could start con-
demnation of real property or initiation of a capital project without
giving the Board the power to vote after the hearing was held became
all too clear. On the one hand the citizens capitalized on procedural
errors of the city by saying they would prevent a fair hearing. At the
same time they tried to show that the hearing was meaningless by
forcing Mayor Lindsay to retract his statement that the Board could
vote on the items. On the other hand, the city took the position that
discussion about the merits of the site was irrelevant because the hearing
concerned the authorization to go ahead with a construction project. In
any event the Mayor signed the papers to start the condemnation pro-
ceedings, and the citizens sued for a new hearing.
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After two years of legal battles the courts refused to order a
new hearing. Adding insult to injury was the city' s legal argument that
a second hearing was unnecessary because the Corona residents had
implicitly approved the project by not appearing in opposition when the
Board of Estimate had approved in the capital budget the need for a new
high school in Queens. (The official capital budget title of the project
was "New Queens High School. ") The Corona residents tried to counter
by saying that no site had been specified then, so that there had been no
reason for them to oppose it. In the fall of 1969 the city officially took
ownership of the Corona homes and started billing the residents for rent.
Although the situation then appeared hopeless despite years of
political and legal efforts, the struggle was revitalized with the appearance
in the spring of 1970 of the first politician who would support the home-
owners and make their fight his major cause. That politician was Vito
Battista, a conservative State Assemblyman from Brooklyn who in the
summer of 1966 had opposed the city' s entire public housing program as
a waste of middle class money (ref. p. 48 ). Described as a "neanderthal"
by a couple of the people who were later involved in mediation efforts in
Forest Hills, he was nevertheless a showman with a dramatic flair who
was able to lead people in street demonstrations and to attract audiences
with his enthusiasm, good humor, and rhetorical exaggeration. All of
these things made his "street theater" more interesting for visual cover-
age by the media.
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The opportunity for a formal political forum came with the
need by the city to legally demap the streets that criss-crossed the
site. A technical matter that takes place after detailed plans for a
project are ready and after the city has taken title to the property
(so that it is not denying the right of legal access to a property owner
against his will), this would normally attract no public notice. But,
as opponents of interstate highways going through central city areas
discovered, it is in the manipulation of such technicalities that local
politicians have the greatest leveraging ability, for there is no more
basic right of a locality, dating back to English Common law, than
control over the location of public rights of way. This action in-
volved the approval of the City Planning Commission, instead of just
its Chairman, and the entire Board of Estimate, instead of just Mayor
Lindsay, and therefore required another round of public hearings.
The effort spent on legal delays over the intervening years
was not in vain, for what had been won was a new set of personalities
in the government who, at a minimum, were going to take more time
to listen to the complaints of a local community before reaffirming the
continuation of a project that was well along the pipeline. That fact in
itself meant more delay, and thus, as so many times happens in these
cases, delay itself became an issue and gave the opponents of the pro-
ject that much more of a weapon. More time also meant more potential
media coverage and the opportunity to try to escalate the issue from
purely local to city-wide significance by having it become symbolic
enough for politicians in other parts of the city to start expressing an
144
-152-
opinion on it. Finally, the delay of several years and the expansion
of the number of people interested in it increased both the probability
of errors in the accuracy of the information on which the public and
politicians would make their decisions and the likelihood that the focus
of decision-makers would be toward the wider implications of how such
a symbolic change would affect other possible city-community conflicts.
The Planning Commission hearing was held August 12, 1970.
Initial New York Times coverage of the matter was on the front page of
its second section. It quoted the director of the office for school con-
struction, Hugh McLaren, as saying that plans for the school were com-
plete and could not be revised because that would mean more delay and
higher costs. The article by Martin Tolchin (a reporter later to be
noted for his series against the use of consultant contracts by the city)
also had the misleading thrust of saying that no one knew how the site
had been selected because all the local political figures had been opposed
to it. 27
With this auspicious beginning the dispute escalated for the next
four months. Suits to prevent the eviction of the residents from their
homes were filed, there were frequent charges that Lindsay was biased
against Italians, and demonstrations and picketing of city hall continued.
Counter-protests were begun by the many parents and teachers of the
existing Forest Hills High School, who argued that their school was on
triple sessions and that nothing should be changed because they needed
a new school immediately. This effort was supported by Councilman
145
-153-
Katzman and State Senator Gold, which led to charges by the Corona
group that these politicians were guilty of exploiting a neighborhood
they did not represent for one that they did, and if Forest Hills needed
a school so much it should be placed within their districts. 28
During this time, a countervailing issue occupying much more
of the Planning Commission' s staff time was the $600 million plus that
was going to be requested by the Board of Education for its 1971-72
construction program. Commission Chairman Elliott was most con-
cerned about the failure of the Board of Education to move its projects
through the pipeline quickly even after construction funds had been ap-
proved and the rapidly increasing costs of schools, which he ascribed
to inflation. Controller Beame' s office, however, charged that the in-
creasing costs of schools were due to extravagant architecture, and in
a number of cases was urging that building plans for schools that had
jumped in cost be revised before construction contracts were issued.
The problem that it was taking the city an average of seven years to build
a high school and the increase in costs of the new Queens High School
from $16 million to $28 million were thus seen as a part of the larger
problem of the need to get schools built quickly. But the thrust of some
persons toward standardizing school architectural plans as a way to
achieve speed only increased the pressure for rigid city-wide standards
on the already fairly rigid Board of Education rather than going toward
the direction of flexibility of school sizes and standards. Indeed, the
Board of Education took the position that its delays were caused by its
problems with clearing sites, relocating tenants, and resolving com-
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munity conflicts; yet at the same time its planning officials continued
in insisting on rigid standards, such as the necessity for the athletic
field in the proposed Corona high school to be contiguous with the build-
ing.
With such problems as extra cost and delay for a needed
school and with assurances from the staff that none of the eleven al-
ternative sites suggested by the opposition were feasible, the Planning
Commission approved the street closings by a 6-1 vote (the dissenter
was Beverly Spatt), and the matter went to the Board of Estimate.
Some of the staff were influenced by the desire of the Chairman to have
administration policy approved by the Commission rather than by an
unwillingness to privately disagree with the values and standards upon
which the School Board' s proposal was based. This will be discussed
further later in this chapter and in the concluding chapter.
But while such speculation about the values and performance
of professional planners is interesting, in fact it is unlikely that any in-
dividual staff planner would have made any difference to the Commission
vote unless he had also convinced Chairman Donald Elliott, and what
efforts were made toward that end failed. One of the Commissioners,
who must remain anonymous, said that the Commission response to
Corona must be viewed in its historical context as a time when "the gap
between the Commission and staff was widening" because Elliott wanted
it that way. "Staff work was done for Elliott, not us. " He con-
tinued that the Planning Commission was frequently "diverted from the
significant issues" on a given matter by misplaced emphasis in the heat
of battle. 29
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This was made possible by the structure of the Commission,
in which the Chairman has complete control over staff in his dual role
as Director of the Planning Department and in which the six part time
Commissioners did not have even a single assistant who could help
them keep track of the numerous items that come up. These planning
matters are frequently in legal and technical language as amendments
to the zoning ordinance or capital budget. Their real purpose is often
obscure without a staff explanation. The Chairman is able to control
the flow of information through such techniques as not having any
minutes kept of the weekly executive sessions of the Commission, his
ability to control the agenda, and his ability to render any staff person
ineffective in the future if that individual is too indiscrete with Com-
missioners, either collectively at executive session or individually.
Thus, the discussion and disposition of an item by the Com-
mission is dependent on whether it has been "flagged" by the staff,
which the Chairman controls, or whether it happens to have evoked the
interest of a particular Commissioner, who decides to pursue a line of
questioning because of a "pet" concern which might or might not be in
any way relevant to what the real issues of an item are. Luck, as I
learned during my two years there, has a great deal of importance in
this, especially as to which group of Commissioners would be present
at any particular time for any meeting, as all had outside jobs.
With regard to the particulars of how Corona was treated by the
Commission, one Commissioner recalled two items. As to suspicions
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voiced by some that Elliott had pushed the item through the Commission,
he remembers that when the people were protesting Elliott "told us that
it was just an effort to get more condemnation money. " Also, that "at
one of the public hearings Vito Battista came with his people - it was out
of order and out of context - and he got up and made an impassioned plea
for the people and homes, and that made it appear more trivial" and gave
the Commissioners no reason to doubt Elliott' s explanation of the situ-
ation. 30 The theatrics of the protest, in other words, made it seem less
serious to these officials, most of whom tried to believe that they acted
on the merits of an issue and not on its popularity or unpopularity.
In addition, it was true that economics was one matter of con-
cern to the protestors. The city' s offer of market value to homeowners
was not enough to enable them to purchase an equivalent dwelling unit in
the same neighborhood and was of no help to renters, a dozen of whom had
left for higher rents in other neighborhoods by December 1. 31 The fact
that a significant proportion of the families were retired and owned their
homes free and clear of any mortgage meant that transition to renter
status anywhere would be difficult. The suggestion by a city worker that
the solution to one homeowner' s problem was to move to an apartment
and to send their elderly mother, who was living with them, to a home
for the elderly only further infuriated this family because of their sense
of family cohesiveness. 32 One can only guess how much less resistance
there would have been in general if the city policy was not to minimize
costs by paying market value for a unit that is not voluntarily on the mar-
ket, but rather to pay replacement value for what it would cost to find a
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roughly similar living unit. For the market value of these old single
family homes, many of them with no mortgage, was not enough for
people to buy another home in the current market, and the significant
percentage of retired families meant there was no income coming in
to start new mortgage payments. But to give people replacement value
rather than market value not only would probably require new legis-
lation, but it would also be the type of issue that decision-makers would
look at only as a city-wide issue in its own right rather than as a part
of another local dispute, and no one forced the issue in those terms.
That the high school site was a matter of high administration
policy was reaffirmed on September 21, 1970, when Mayor Lindsay
sent a letter to two local Queens politicians saying that "a thorough
review" by the Board of Education and Planning Commission had pro-
duced no change. 33 What was more revealing of the values involved,
however, was the statement that the Board of Education review "had
elicited no new information concerning sites superior to the one
adopted. '4 For the inherent issue was the balancing of conflicting
values, not whether a school site of equal merit was available. By
keeping all the same standards as before - both physical and financial -
one was really saying that they were more important. For example,
by fighting for the site size needed for athletic fields the school board
in effect felt that the physical education program's need for a football
and baseball field was worth the extra years of existing overcrowding
in classrooms the struggle was causing.
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To add to this political donnybrook, Battista called for
intervention by Governor Rockefeller, who, mindful that he was up
for re-election in a few months, released an announcement through
a personal representative attending a Corona rally on September 4th
that the state would investigate. The report was issued in late October
by the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal by its Com-
missioner Charles Urstadt, and it did nothing to alleviate the widening
rift between Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller. I think a fair
summary of the report would be to say that it was an excellent socio-
economic analysis of the effect of displacement on the affected house-
holds, but a cop-out on the real issues that were involved with trying
to find an alternative site for the school. Its many tables of character-
istics of the households and their dwelling units were compiled from
interviews with all of the affected families and are as complete a pic-
ture as one could want. Its much heralded conclusion that there were
alternative sites (the nearby industrial area, the Flushing Meadows
park, or the public housing site at 108th street) available for the school,
however, was very incomplete and shows the problem of making planning
decisions solely by visual inspection. The technical reasons the city had
not selected those sites were not mentioned, for there was apparently no
discussion between the city' s planners and the state' s. What few differ-
ent values the state did recognize were involved were simply dismissed
by saying they were not important.
The report stated that the land at 108th Street in Forest Hills
was the site of "a dormant public housing project;" that "although no
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borings have been taken" no unusual structural problems in building a
school were expected "judging by the high rise apartments in the im-
mediate neighborhood;" and that the "anticipated objections" from
the city would be based on the fact that it was only eight blocks north
of the existing Forest Hills High School. 35 This affirmation that the
housing project was dead was made at just that point in time when in
fact design progress was accelerating, with HUD' s having approved
Phase I designs 3 months earlier and with Phase II designs virtually
complete. The other two assertions were also erroneous, and the of-
ficial city reaction was stated by Don Elliott, who publicly dismissed
it as a "political maneuver. "36
On November 13, 1970, the Board of Estimate unanimously
approved the street closings for the school after a "raucous and bitter
three-hour hearing that was marked by repeated charges of ethnic dis-
crimination, " as the many supporters of a new school argued against
any change and the Corona residents argued for a school, but not at the
expense of homes.
In an exchange with Adrian Blumenfeld, director of
school planning and research, who said that all other
suggested sites were too small for an adequate high
school and full athletic fields, Mr. Battista roared:
'What kind of amateur plan is this? You've been
talking about a three-story school. Build a six-story
school then on a smaller site. '38
Thus was cleared the last legal obstacle to the demolition of the homes,
barring judicial interference.
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Yet the lesson of the Corona story was to be that even at
this late a time, there can be a juncture of circumstances which can
convince a high government official to suddenly reverse the entire
direction of events even when there appears no hope left. It is a
classic case that proved once again that an individual can make a
difference and that group action, while necessary to publicize an
issue and influence individuals enough for them to reconsider a po-
sition is not necessarily the strategy to use to successfully resolve
the issue. For pressure does not necessarily convince a decision
maker that there exists a way to reconcile both sides and still satisfy
the original need for a public facility.
In this case the catalyst for a re-opening of the case was
popular writer and columnist Jimmy Breslin, who had run for City
Council President the previous year on a ticket with Norman Mailer
for Mayor, advocating that New York City become a 51st state.
Breslin lived in Forest Hills, became sympathetic to their cause and
*
deeply impressed by their lawyer, Mario Cuomo, while attending a
See Jimmy Breslin' s preface to the book by Mario Cuomo, Forest
Hills Diary: The Crisis of Low-Income Housing (New York: Random
House, 1974), p. x - xii, for his description of how he went expecting
to find no "heavyweights, " heard Cuomo speaking - "I had not heard
anyone speak like this in years," - and remembered Congressman
Hugh Carey telling him
About somebody he had wanted to run on a ticket
with . . . ' a genius nobody knows about . . . a
law professor at St. John' s. Brilliant sonofa-
bitch. Mario Cuomo. I begged him to run with
me. Nobody knows him. . . But I just couldn' t
talk him into running. '
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November meeting being held in the building of the Corona Volunteer
Ambulance Corps, and, most importantly, had access to Deputy Mayor
Richard Aurelio. He was able to convince Aurelio to meet with Cuomo
in an effort to restudy the situation as Cuomo was preparing once again
(for what he said would be the 29th time3 9 ) to go to court in a last ditch
effort to block the imminent eviction of the Corona residents. Liberal
Village Voice columnist Jack Newfield also wrote about the case after
discussing it with John Lindsay, Richard Aurelio, and other mayoral
staff, and he also urged the city to reverse itself.
Negotiations went on during the last two weeks of November,
and a proposed compromise was announced on December 1 by Mayor
Lindsay, who described it as an example of "compassion with progress. '40
It is clear that much of the success was due to the personal respect which
Cuomo gained from Aurelio and others as being a man of integrity who was
both reasonable to deal with and could make a lucid presentation support-
ing his own position. In other words, the personalities were as important
as the issues.
The meetings held between Aurelio and Cuomo in November
accidentally set off the chain of events leading to the rise of opposition
to the Forest Hills public housing project. In my interviews with both
of these men there was general agreement on what had happened. Cuomo
had suggested the vacant land at 108th Street as an alternate high school
site. Aurelio telephoned Housing Authority Chairman Simeon Golar,
who responded that "108th Street was all ready to go, and you can't touch
it. ''4 With that they went on to discuss other proposals.
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Afterwards Cuomo reported this to the Italian residents in ex-
plaining why that idea had not worked out. The Long Island Press then
included this in an article. A community meeting was called a few weeks
later about the now pending housing project, and it was the surprisingly
large turnout which led the opponents of the project to realize how much
company they had and to continue the effort.
The compromise offered by the city was a delicate interweaving
of physical site design technicalities, political alliances, engineering
capabilities, and legal difficulties. As shown on the enclosed maps, it
reduced the size of, and relocated, the football field and track so that it
would not require the demolition of existing houses, and it introduced a
cul-de-sac street within the existing mapped street to satisfy the school
planners' desire for access and street boundaries. These 31 homes
were to be returned to the owners. To make up for the lost acreage, a
three-acre athletic field was to be built in Flushing Meadow-Corona park
at 111th Street and Corona Avenue, which was about 1/4 mile from the
Forest Hills public housing site and 1/2 mile from the Corona school
site. 42 In an attempt to satisfy the united front of the residents, who
had been previously unwilling to accept suggested partial solutions, 43 and
to avoid the problems of redesign of the school building, the city said
that each of the 28 families with houses remaining on the building site
could choose to either accept the condemnation offer or to have the city
physically move the building to a nearby vacant lot.
In fact, the reason the vacant lot was available was itself a
commentary on the values of the architectural process. It was in city
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ownership because it had been a part of the site selected for the school.
But on February 2, 1968, Adrian Blumenfeld officially indicated that
that square block of about one acre "may be deleted from the site with-
out undue interference with design and function of the school building
and athletic facility. ' '44 Thus, at the same time as the residents were
in the middle of their 3 year legal struggle, the bureaucracy had willingly
given up a significant parcel of land occupied by only one house while
sticking to its standard "H" building design, which oriented the build-
ing' s bulk toward the row of houses along 102nd Street rather than de-
signing it to occupy a maximum amount of already vacant land.
The decision was precedent-setting in that it was the first
time that the city agreed to restore property taken by eminent domain
to the original owners. This, of course, meant no competitive bidding,
and it required the State to pass enabling legislation, which was one of
the reasons why the lobbying which Cuomo and Breslin did with the
various State Assemblymen and Senators was so important. Indeed,
it was because it was so precedent-setting that for a number of people
the symbolic nature of the issue was what counted, irrespective of the
details of the case. George Zandalezini, a powerful and much feared
chief engineer in charge of the Bureau' s capital budget examiners*
(typically engineers), opposed any compromise on the grounds that
giving in to a citizen' s group could eventually bring the city' s entire
capital construction program to a halt. 45
* As contrasted with the program planners brought into the Bureau under
the regime of Director of the Budget Frederick O' R. Hayes.
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Further compounding the difficulties were the reactions of
the Corona residents and the members of the Board of Estimate. Be-
cause Cuomo had been negotiating secretly and because of a previous
dispute over tactics which had led some of the Corona residents to re-
place Cuomo with another lawyer, there was some resentment and con-
fusion among the residents over whether to accept or reject what Lindsay
had announced in his press conference. They did not know such things
as whose homes fell into which category, what the timing would be, what
would happen to people who had already accepted a condemnation settle-
ment, whether a favorite tree could be moved with the house, whether
each house was structurally capable of withstanding a move, etc. So
they adopted a cautious wait and see attitude. The Board of Estimate
members, however, were immediately infuriated, and issued extremely
strong statements charging deception by the Lindsay administration on
telling them two weeks earlier that there was no alternative but to con-
demn the houses. Their lack of confidence in administration assurances
was manifested over the next several weeks in the Board' s rejection of
other unrelated but controversial administration proposals.
Responding to the heavy political flak from the Board of Esti-
mate members who said this was no way to run a government, the Times
reported that Deputy Mayor Aurelio' s reaction was that the November 13,
1970 decision
. . . was sound at the time, and that it was not until
a week later that the key to the compromise - the idea
of moving the houses rather than razing them - was
introduce d.
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'Believe me, no one ever thought of that
until 10 days ago, ' Mr. Aurelio declared. 'It' s
a great idea and it would have been a great idea
if Mr. Garelik [City Council President] or Mr.
Beame [Controller] or anyone had thought of it
six months or a year ago. But no one did until
the last minute.
. . . Moving the houses, the Deputy 6Mayor
added, was the idea of Mario Cuomo.
In fact, unbeknownst to either Aurelio or Cuomo, the idea had
been thought of six months earlier by a staff person in the Queens Office
of the City Planning Department. While on a subway ride home with the
Counsel for the Department, Norman Marcus, he had discussed this and
such associated issues as whether the old hand-built homes could with-
stand the strain of being jacked up for moving. This individual, re-
*
sponsible at the time for Community Boards 4 and 6, said, however,
that the idea "was never mentioned downtown" because there was "no
opportunity to" in a meaningful way. He and the Queens office had
nothing to do with any of the decisions regarding Corona, he said, ex-
plaining that
It was a very highly charged political issue close to
Don Elliott and Ed Robin. They wanted to have their
fingers on it and dealt only with downtown people . . .
Irwin Fructman [from the main office] went with
Elliott to look at all eleven sites . . . Don and Ed
wanted only one kind of answer . . .
Unfortunately, Corona was an issue where the politics
were irrational. Elliott was - I guess the best word
is 'principled' - and his rule 4 as never go back on a
site once it had been selected.
This was not the person covering those areas in October, 1969, who
spoke to Board 6 Chairman DeVoy about the status of the public housing
project but was the person later to be telephoned by a Housing Authority
staff person for DeVoy' s telephone number, as will be described later.
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Whether or not the Queens Planning Office should have tried
to make itself a more visible and active force in decisions regarding
Corona (or Forest Hills, for that matter) is an important question,
the answer to which rests on one' s basic philosophy about what planning
is and how it is determined within a structured organization and the body
politic in general, and will be discussed in the last chapter.
In any event, as 1970 drew to a close it looked as if a success-
ful resolution to the Corona situation might have been found. There
were many details still being worked out. City engineers and even
horticultural experts were examining the properties in questian, and
work had begun on the legal documents to be presented to the State
Legislature for its approval. But a portent of future difficulties was
in the air. Assemblyman Battista was going around the neighborhood
with a sound truck trying to convince the residents that a better deal
could be obtained by holding out. The Brooklyn Borough President also
seemed to hold out more hope to people who did not know whether to
trust the city' s word now by his saying publicly that the whole thing
should be looked at again. The issue reappeared in the press on De-
cember 24, with Aurelio reaffirming that the government had gone as
far as it would. Cuomo agreed and "said it would be 'cruel and morally
indefensible' to upset the Corona compromise without having a better plan
to offer. " 48
Two separate statements during December summed up Bres-
lin' s and Cuomo' s conclusions about the governmental process. Breslin
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said the compromise was "a matter of getting the government to sit
still and realize how much wrong had been done. "49 The lesson which
Cuomo drew from it, as stated in the Times, was that "The apparatus
of city government has shown in the Corona case that it 'has the potential
for producing the most outrageous kind of blunders' and that something
like an ombudsman is needed to prevent similar situations elsewhere. "50
Little did anyone suspect that the Corona saga was far from
over, and that the following year was to bring the other half of the origi-
nal package, the Forest Hills housing project, into much greater promi-
nence than Corona had ever had.
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CHAPTER VII - DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES
IN NEW YORK CITY AND QUEENS
Brooklyn College is only two miles south
of our neighborhood; yet in a visit to an urban
sociology class, I found the usual racial miscon-
ceptions being expressed by otherwise bright stu-
dents. Jerry Krase, class teacher and neighbor,
invited me to tell his students about our neighbor-
hood. As soon as they heard the phrase "racially
mixed, " a picture sprang into their minds. Jerry
discovered what that picture was like when they
handed in their reports. A few of the braver stu-
dents had ventured into our blocks and were amazed
to find clean streets, beautifully kept houses and
gardens. But one student handed in a paper full of
phrases like "broken glass, " "garbage piled along
sidewalks, " "abandoned cars. " Jerry asked him
if he had ever visited our community. The student
confessed, "No, I described what I thought it would
be like.
- Robert Thomason
"Racial Hope in Brooklyn,
Christian Century, May 9, 1973
In Chapter II we saw how quantitative population changes and
physical development patterns combined to create a land use pattern un-
satisfactory for future needs and how the resulting scarcity of vacant
land created conflict between city agencies trying to respond to pent-up
demands for their services. In this chapter we shall give a broad over-
view of the changing characteristics of the city' s population and its hous-
ing stock to better understand the context from which citizen perceptions
and government policies were generated. Although the formal census
material was in many cases not available at the times that decisions were
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being made, many of the trends were known to knowledgeable city
officials from other statistical indicators as well as being evident to
the citizen, even if the latter could only characterize these changes
from his own observations of his daily environment.
As in most large American cities, New York City during the
sixties had a significant increase in its minority population, although
the city did run counter to the national trend in one respect - its total
population did not decline but remained constant. Because Census
Bureau categories are not mutually exclusive, it is possible only to
approximate the number of Puerto Ricans and blacks. Analysis of the
1970 census for New York City showed they increased by about one
million and that there was a net out- migration of one million non-
Spanish speaking whites. Detailed examination showed that the "old
segregated housing patterns were intensified" with "minority areas
[ growing] to two to three times their former size in Brooklyn, the Bronx
and Queens, " and that even "[w] here census tracts had a mixed popu-
lation it was very frequently a case of minority groups having expanded
rapidly into old white areas . . . on the fringe of long-established black
and Puerto Rican sections. "2 Since there was an additional geographical
shift in population because of new construction on vacant land, predomi-
nantly in outlying areas of the city (Staten Island, Queens, Co-op City
in the Bronx, etc. ), and since most of these new housing developments
became overwhelmingly white occupied, the extent of white flight from
the areas of minority concentration was even greater than the 1 to 1 change
in total population would indicate by itself.
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Occurring simultaneously were dramatic increases in the
territorial extent of the city' s poverty areas and the proportion of
people in these areas on welfare. From 1965 to 1971 the city-wide
welfare rolls tripled. An average of 1 in 6 New Yorkers was receiv-
ing public assistance, with the concentrations in poverty areas being
much higher, according to data from the New York City Human Re-
sources administration. For example, Hunts Point in the Bronx had
44% of its 175, 000 population on welfare; Bedford-Stuyvesant and Browns-
ville in Brooklyn and Morrisania, South Bronx, and Tremont in the Bronx
all had 35 to 50%; and Central Harlem and East Harlem in Manhattan had
over 31% on welfare. 3 During the same six years housing abandonment
emerged for the first time in New York' s history as a problem of seri-
ous magnitude. The frequent geographical coincidence between these
problems and the residential patterns of minority settlement further
complicated any proposed solutions, as perceptions about cause and
effect were influenced by emotions about the "new" evil of drug ad-
diction, fear of violent crime, and racial stereotypes.
The consequences of housing abandonment that are of particu-
lar interest to this paper have two widely divergent themes. On the one
hand, its highly visible effects on neighborhoods had a psychological
effect on both the residents who had left them, by showing just how much
a block they knew years before could change for the worst, and on people
living in as yet unaffected areas of the city by increasing their fears that
such a phenomenon could happen to them if vigilance were not maintained
against allowing any change in the area that would start any kind of "down-
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ward slide. " Its conspicuousness was heightened by an association
with burned out and boarded up tenements and storefronts (fire and false
alarm rates skyrocketed so high that fire engine companies in these lo-
calities were averaging 20 runs per day, year after year ), trash littered
streets and sidewalks, and drug addicts. The wail of police and fire
sirens became so commonplace that people no longer even bothered to
look up in curiosity to see where they were going, 5 and even visiting
mayors who had inner city problems of their own came back from bus
tours of these many mile square areas in shock, likening what they had
seen to World War II bombed-out London.
On the other hand the abandonment of sound housing (estimated
by economist Dr. Frank Kristof. of the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation at 105, 000 units from 1960 through 19706) increased
the dimensions of an already serious housing problem. From 1963
through 1970 there was a steady decline in new housing completions (in-
cluding conversions), while housing losses from demolition, mergers,
and abandonment were on a generally upward trend, with the result that
beginning in 1967 there was a net loss of units in the city each year.
Private construction in the late sixties was limited by such traditional
market factors as rising costs and variations in mortgage money supply
throughout the country as well as by such New York City factors as par-
ticularly high housing construction and development costs and the psycho-
logical deterrent to new construction posed by the city' s much debated
rent control law (the fear being that it could be extended in some form to
cover more units, as was eventually done under the rent stabilization
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program). Additional pressure to build all forms of subsidized housing
units developed as a result of about 50, 000 new household formations
while the total population remained virtually constant during the decade,
thus keeping the housing vacancy rate low. But for a whole variety of
reasons the combined total of city, state, and federally subsidized units
built each year during the last half of the decade did not increase, al-
though there were dramatic changes in the mix. Public housing com-
pletions hit a 23 year low in 1970 with a total of 1, 700 units, a miniscule
figure when compared with the Housing Authority' s waiting list of 150, 000
families. 8
A result of all this as the sixties drew to a close was a renewed
attractiveness of larger housing developments of all types to city officials.
The pendulum had shifted from a public emphasis by the Lindsay adminis-
tration on good design, though this was by no means forgotten, to a major
push for new construction. The total number of units produced again be-
came a simple measure of immediate success. This shift toward a pro-
duction philosophy strengthened, and was in turn reinforced by, the willing-
ness of officials to accept the argument that it was better to have large
*
"Large" is a relative concept closely linked to the time periods it is
being used in, as its meaning is in terms of what people consider to be
the realistic alternatives to what is being built at that particular time.
Over time spans of many years what was once considered small might be
considered unacceptably large at another time. This becomes particularly
important when the time span in which these values can change becomes
shorter than the time span required to bring a physical development to
completion from the beginning of the planning process.
In terms of day to day decision-making, "large" can represent
the direction in which policy makers are going in terms of what is con-
sidered acceptable, and in the short run there tends to be a very fine line
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developments than small ones because it took just as much time and
effort to get each through the administrative and political system. It
interlocked with the problem of rising costs by encouraging local of-
ficials to try to spread the overhead costs of one project over as many
units as possible and to try to devise strategies that would get around
processing delays. Among the results of all this in practical terms for
the Housing Authority was a greater willingness to build new buildings
on the open space of existing public housing projects, the demise of the
vest-pocket program in the Model Cities areas with its emphasis on
smaller projects and individual buildings - including walk-up units, and
* (continued)
between "larger" and "large. " The issue of direction is whether the
working hypothesis is to get as many dwelling units as you can into a
single development, with the limit being imposed by someone else ob-
jecting (such as local neighborhood, the zoning authorities, or a market-
ing analyst who says there is not a sufficient demand) or whether the
objective is to try to make the development as small as can be managed
within the restrictions of the economics involved (for such reasons as
aesthetics, social impact, a desire to utilize smaller sites, etc. ).
However, one must be careful to distinguish between large de-
velopments with greater land requirements and large individual buildings
(usually meaning high in New York). While the pressures to go larger
may be the same for both cases, the planning considerations of the physical
and social consequences are not. They may range from effects of high-
speed elevators on maintenance costs, security, and an increased vulnera-
bility to power failures and strikes of maintenance men on the ability of
people to get to upper level apartments to such other effects as the social
interactions among residents and neighbors, the provision of automobile
parking space versus recreational space, and so forth.
One must also be careful to distinguish the policy on planned
projects, which is where most basic decisions are made, from what is
currently being constructed at any point in time, for the long lead times
and the general unwillingness to reverse previously made commitments can
make visual appearances very deceiving.
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the announcement in January, 1971, by Housing Authority Chairman
Simeon Golar that he could start construction on a record 14, 000 units
that year as long as there was cooperation from the federal government
in the availability of funds. 9
A third trend was the changing nature of the racial composition
of the public schools, which was taking place faster than the rate of over-
all change in population.
Several factors combined to account for the change. Along with
a gradual decline in total births from 1956 to 1971 went an absolute and
proportional increase in the number of births of non-whites and Puerto-
Ricans, according to the New York City Department of Health statistics
shown below. (It should be noted that they also have definitional problems
with the category "Puerto Rican, " as only children whose mothers were
actually born in Puerto Rico are listed as such. Others are listed in the
"white" category, which may result in some undercount. )
The percentages shown are more meaningful when compared to
the Health Department' s calculations that the city' s total population in
1970 was 67% white, 23% non-white, and 10% Puerto Rican. 10 With such
a large absolute level of whites in the city, the reason that the shift in
birth proportions had a disproportionate effect was that a significant num-
ber of white children were enrolled in the virtually all white non-public
schools, especially Catholic and Jewish. With a slowly declining enroll-
ment in past years, the number of students in private schools dipped
just below 400, 000 in 1971. When this was combined with the migration
TABLE 8
Births in New York City, by Race
Total White Non-white Puerto Rican
1956 151 850  103 800 28, 700 19 400
100 U 68% 19% 13%
1965 147, 940 83, 300 40, 300 24, 300
100% 56% 27% 24%
1970 139,230 71,700 43,200 24 200
100% 52% 31% 17%
1971 123, 700 64 200 38,700 20 850
100% 62% 31%1
Source: New York City Health Department,
as cited by the New York Times
May 29, 1973, pp. 1 and 22
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of whites out of the city, the result for the public school system was
that as enrollment rose by 200, 000 in the 15 years between 1957-1972
to a total of 1, 146, 000, the number of white students declined by
170, 00 2and the student composition, according to the Board of Edu-
cation, changed as follows:
TABLE 9
New York City Public School Enrollment, by Race
Whites (incl. Orientals
and Hispanics other than
Puerto Ricans) Blacks Puerto Ricans
1957 68% 18% 14%
1960 63 21.5 15.5
1965 52 28 20
1970 43* 34 23
*
1971 42 35 23
*
5 percentage points in these 2 years were composed of
Orientals and Hispanics other than Puerto Ricans.
Source: New York City Board of Ed.,
as cited by the New York Times
May 29, 1973, p. 22
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What effect did all this have on the area of Queens that we are
concerned with? In Community Planning Board 6, with Forest Hills and
Rego Park, population went from about 80, 000 in 1950 to about 103, 000
in 1960 to 119, 000 in 1970, 13 with much of the increase coming from old
Jewish areas, such as the lower East Side. In Planning Board 4, which
includes Corona and Lefrak City, the population went from about 70, 000
in 1950 to about 75, 000 in 1960 to 108, 000 in 1970. 14
During 1971 and 1972 many different perceptions developed
about the racial and ethnic character of the area. Whether or not one
believed there were blacks residing there was used as an argument for
or against the proposition that racial prejudice was a significant reason
for the opposition to the public housing. Nathan Glazer, for example,
in his January 2, 1972, article on Forest Hills argued that
There is a simple explanation commonly
given for this migration into Forest Hills and
similar parts of New York City: the blacks. But
it is the wrong explanation. There .are blacks in
Forest Hills. In a development such as Lefrak
City, built by a large corporate builder which se-
lects its tenants by impersonal bureaucratic methods,
there are substantial numbers of them, as well as
Orientals, In ians, and others (I speak from visual
inspection). 1
This type of logic about "impersonal bureaucratic methods" would seem
naive to those connected with civil rights groups, who were well aware
that the Lefrak organization had in August, 1970, been the subject of the
first U. S. Justice Department suit in the country for violation of the
1968 Fair Housing Act in its many thousands of Brooklyn apartment units
and had signed a consent degree on January 28, 1971. 16
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At this date, several years later, it is possible to at least
settle the factual question with the availability of the detailed 1970 cen-
sus tract data, though not the question of whether it is valid to say that
Lefrak City is a part of what people consider to be Forest Hills. Com-
munity District 6' s population of 119, 019 was 97. 15% white, 0. 59%
Negro (or 712), and 2. 4% other non-white (or 2, 670) . The Puerto
Rican population, which is included within the previous three racial
categories, was close to 1%.18 At a smaller scale within District 6,
census tract 717, which covered most of the new highrise buildings
four blocks west of the public housing site, had 2. 0% of its 9, 712 people
classified as Negro (or 193) and 3. 3% (or 320) as other non-white. 19
Lefrak City, located immediately north across the Expressway in Com-
munity District 4, comprised all of census tract 455. Its 11, 501 popu-
lation was 8. 6% Negro (or 989) and 9. 2% other non-white (or 1, 053). 20
This was above the overall figure for Community District 4, whose
107, 961 total in 1970 broke down to 91. 81% white, 3. 14% Negro** (or
3, 395), and 5. 04% other non-white (or 5, 443). 21 The overall Puerto
Rican population in District 4 was about 2. 5%. 22
*
For those not familiar with New York and the relative reputations of
different parts of the city as being "white areas " the southernmost part
of Staten Island - Community Board 4 - had 1. 40% of its 56, 533 people
classified as Negro, and Community Board 3 covering the most rapidly
growing part of the Island had 2. 60/o of its 102, 211 people listed as Negro.
Bay Ridge and Bensonhurst in Brooklyn, Community Districts 10 and 11
respectively, had a Negro population of 0. 17% and 0. 39%.
**
Up from a 1% figure in the 1960 census.
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But the situation in the Forest Hills public schools was not
identical with the residential racial (and therefore economic) patterns,
and this was one of the hidden factors underlying the controversy. The
local school district line was drawn far south to take in portions of
Jamaica with heavy minority concentration (see map, next page). Bus-
ing of black students to white areas was also a common practice and,
of course, a portion of the Jewish students in the Forest Hills area
went to private schools. The net result was that in 1971-72, of the
27, 500 elementary and junior high public school students in all of local
School District 28, which encompassed Forest Hills, 16, 500 (or 60%)
were Black, Hispanic, and other non-whites, and 11, 000 (or 40%) were
whites of European descent. 23 It is also clear that in the relevant time
period the percentage of minorities in those schools within the smaller
Community Planning District 6 was a large multiple of the number of
minorities living in the immediate neighborhoods. Data available for
1972-73 for each school show the percentage of minority enrollment to
range from 24% to 42%. 24 The two high schools, which were under the
jurisdiction of the central school board rather than the local ones, had
a similar situation. Forest Hills High School had a 20% minority en-
rollment, and Newtown High School in Corona had a 41% minority student
body. 25 All of these minority percentages of school enrollment were
well above those cited by the Housing Authority in its 1966 application
for approval of the Forest Hills housing.
Furthermore, the passions created by the widespread busing at
this time were by no means one-sided and limited to the white neighbor-
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Maps for: Public School Enrollment
Elementary and Jr. High Schools - 1971-72
Births in 1971
Shown by Health Districts
Forest Hills is in the northern part of School
District 28. The District' s northern boundary is the
Long Island Expressway, except for a small rectangular
extension that covers about half of Lefrak City. Except
for this addition, the northern portion of District 28 is
essentially co-terminus with the eastern, northern, and
western boundaries of Community Planning District 6.
For purposes of comparison, a map of the racial
distribution of births is also shown.
Source: New York Times
May 29, 1973, p. 22
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hoods. At City Planning Commission capital budget hearings for Queens
schools held in December, 1971, many blacks expressed the same kinds
of fears for their children as white parents typically used in their oppo-
sition to school integration:
Relating stories about black children whose
safety they said had been threatened in "hostile" white
communities, speaker after speaker asked that the
children of South Jamaica and southeast Queens be
given more of their own schools rather than "being
sent up to integrate northern Queens. "26
A few other items will complete this statistical picture, and to
give a sense of perspective, the figures for all of New York City are also
shown, as well as those for Queens (see following table).
The median income data confirmed the popular image of the
Forest Hills - Rego Park area as a more wealthy part of the city. The
high percentage of units occupied by renters in District 6 shows that while
there may have remained a significant number of single family home-
owners in the area around the Forest Hills high school, for the area as
a whole the traditional reputation was no longer valid. District 4, even
with its rapid population increase, had a higher proportion of homeowners,
though still below the Queens average. However, the proportion of elderly
in District 6 is surprisingly high for an area of such rapid growth, one
that was supposedly especially attractive to a young mobile Jewish popu-
lation, especially since the low number of persons living in group quarters
would seem to rule out the explanation of nursing homes. Furthermore,
notwithstanding such developments as Lefrak City, the somewhat higher
TABLE 10
Selected 1970 Census Data
Queens Queens New York Borough
Community Community City of Queens
District 6 District 4
median family $ 13, 881 11, 370 9, 682 11, 554
income
median income
of unrelated in-
dividuals 14+
years old $ 5, 944 5, 216 4, 050 4, 064
% of population
aged 65 and over 16. 9% 11. 3% 12.0% 12.4%
% of housing units
occupied by
renters 82. 6% 75. 4% 74. 3% 57. 0%
number of families
with income below
federal poverty level 1, 260 1, 548 236, 507 30, 161
number of unrglated
individuals 14 with
income below federal
poverty level 2, 805 2, 849 266, 053 47, 520
Source: New York City Planning Commission,
Community Planning District Profiles,
Parts I and II - May, 1973
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proportion of ownership in District 4 and its reputation as an older
area would have led one to suspect a higher number of elderly, yet
its percentage of elderly is below the average in both the entire city
and Queens.
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CHAPTER VIII - THE HOUSING PROJECT BECOMES AN ISSUE
(I)t is precisely because the experts con-
fine themselves to projections based on facts that
their predictions are vulnerable. For history is
shaped as much by intangibles as by hard facts . . .
(T )he experts . . . had no way of knowing where
or how human hopes or fears would be suddenly
created into vast surges of energy that would trans-
form political, economic, and social institutions . . .
The most important factor in the complex
equation of the future is the way the human mind re-
sponds to crisis. Arnold Toynbee' s A Study of History
makes the point that the greatest of all historical forces
are set in motion when people decide to pit themselves
against serious challenge. Human experience is not
a closed circle. It is full of magnificent detours and
sudden departures from predicted destinations . . .
The way the human mind will respond to any
given situation is the kind of intangible that can become
the dominant reality of tomorrow.
- Norman Cousins, editor
Saturday Review/World
I still get heckled and screamed at in middle-
class white areas because of my plans to scatter public
housing in those neighborhoods, and for oth r reasons,
but it isn' t as intense and violent as it was.l
-Mayor John Lindsay
September, 1967
The organization and leadership of the anti-public housing move-
ment that was to bring Forest Hills into prominence by the end of 1971 had
its genesis in the period of December, 1970-January, 1971. It was not as
if there had been no opposition in the preceding years, for there had. But
it had been individualistic enough and unorganized enough so that its im-
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pact was fragmentary and virtually unknown to anyone not intimately
involved. For example, in November, 1967, the Queens Civic Con-
ference had vowed continued opposition after HUD approved the project
that month, 3 while at the same time Housing Authority official Joseph
Christian said he expected construction to start in about one year when
architectural designs were completed. 4 Discussion in subsequent years
indicates that a year later some people in the community had been led
to believe the project was going nowhere because of reports of economic
problems from architect Franzen. 5 There is also an unsubstantiated
rumor that some Forest Hills residents had gone to Washington, D. C.
and been assured by someone in the federal government that the project
was dead. 6 Otherwise little is known about this period. Of course,
there was no reason for people to spend a lot of time organizing oppo-
sition if they believed the project to be defunct for all practical purposes.
Once that belief became widespread the Housing Authority, when it hired
a new architect, also just as easily could have felt there was no reason
to stir things up needlessly by announcing the project was moving once
again, preferring instead to just get construction started before oppo-
sition could again be aroused.
For the Housing Authority had not been unaware of the latent
opposition. By November, 1967, the percentage of elderly units in the
project had been raised from the original thirty percent to a contemplated
forty to forty-five percent. 7 In March, 1968, an agreement with the
Board of Education to sign a ten year lease to pay for early childhood
space in the project was reported to top Planning Department official
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Edward Robin as being a decision which Housing Authority, school
system, and Planning Department officials agreed "would soothe
some of the tensions within the community caused by the project. "8
Indeed, as will be described in more detail later, the Authority was
especially sensitive about the Forest Hills situation, more so than
with many other projects. Nevertheless, such events as the need for
Community Planning Board 6 Chairman Joseph DeVoy to call the City
Planning Department in late 1969 because he did not know the name of
the architect after two years of architectural work had been done and
the very mystery about these years themselves all indicate the lack of
widespread communication about the project.
In looking backward at such controversial issues as the Forest
Hills project, there is a tendency to analyze them only in terms of broad
social issues with the assumption that the original participants consciously
understood the abstract issues. We forget that some movements start
not because of informed leadership, but rather because some citizens
meet.to discuss something on which they have fragmentary and incomplete
information, and therefore act out of a more emotional basis. Further-
more, for those not experienced in community organizing, it may be hard
to realize 1) how many neighborhood meetings are taking place all the
time - on everything ranging from a traffic light at a school intersection
to a protest against a new gasoline station to demands for better police
protection, 2) how large a network of personal contacts must be main-
tained by any individual if he is to keep track of what both a myriad of
L80
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government agencies and community groups are talking about at any one
time, let alone what the history and context of any issue is, and 3) that
there is no inevitability about any item catching on as a public issue
beyond a small locality, no matter how obvious it might seem years
later.
It is unclear whether opposition arose initially just out of a con-
cern with the public housing alone and then was later joined by people
who wanted the high school moved from the Corona site or whether a few
people saw in it a chance to kill two birds with one stone. I say this be-
cause of the way that the first opposition meetings were held after the
Corona discussions between Aurelio and Cuomo had brought to people' s
attention that the public housing project was not dead, a fact reaffirmed
in January with its inclusion in a list of public housing projects on which
Simeon Golar intended to break ground to meet his goal of starting a
record 14, 000 units in 1971.
The earliest local anti-project meeting of a public nature that
I have been able to trace was held in January, 1971. It was reportedly
called by Assemblyman Herbert Miller, who was at the same time in-
volved with Assemblyman Vito Battista in trying to win a complete
victory for the Corona homeowners rather than accept the compromise
offered by the city. It was at this meeting that Jerry Birbach first
emerged. He was a 42 year old Manhattan real estate dealer who lived
in a $41, 000 home four blocks south of the housing site, a corpulent per-
son with a booming voice who was 11 months later to be a household name
in New York as the acknowledged leader of the opposition movement. 9
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But he was not a leader at this gathering. Here he was a spectator
standing in the rear of a meeting hall.
The meeting was an example of how the course of future events
is not always changed by forethought but by chance and the passions of
the moment. As was stated by Birbach in a newspaper interview in
November, 1971, 10 and confirmed to me by a Housing Authority staff
person who anonymously attended the meeting because he lived relatively
nearby, Birbach was reluctant to get involved as a protest leader but
eventually agreed to do so. It came about as people debated with Miller
what to do about the project. According to the man from the Authority,
"Herb was inept. '11 People from Corona and elsewhere were arguing
that if one was to oppose the project effectively that one had to become
active with things like baby carriage parades and other such visible
tactics. Birbach asked some questions about the particulars and Miller
replied negatively, saying that he was going to fight the project through
channels. In the words of the Authority official, "It was clear that
Miller was only going to make a political ploy of it. ,,12 As Birbach put
it, he [ Birbach] was listening to "a politician 'make a political circus'
of the anti-project campaign. ,13 After Miller indicated he would not
do what Birbach suggested, people in the room turned to Birbach and
said they would join him if he would carry through. 4 A week later
there was a second meeting held, using the headquarters of the Con-
servative party, 15 and eventually Birbach took a leadership role in the
movement, setting up the Forest Hills Residents Association over the
next couple of months.
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The first demonstration to make the New York Times was the
"inoisy" interruption of a February 3rd meeting which Queens Borough
President Sidney Leviss was holding with City Planning Commission
Chairman Donald Elliott and the several hundred members of all fourteen
Queens Community Planning Boards to prepare for the public hearings
on the Plan for New York City that the Commission was going to hold in
each community district. (This was the first time, incidentally, that
the Commission was ever going to have meetings in the "outer" Boroughs
rather than in City Hall in lower Manhattan. )
Three aspects of the demonstration are of interest: what was
said by whom, the manner in which the protest was carried out, and the
political undertones existing between the borough president and the Com-
munity Boards.
The strategy was obviously one of confrontation politics. The
hundred protestors wanted not only to demonstrate outside the meeting,
with placards saying "Lindsay, you are killing our neighborhood" and
"Your dollars will be paying for a housing project - We need a school,?
but also to get into the meeting. After being told by the borough presi-
dent' s Coordinator of Community Boards that only "friends" were
welcome, which they were not, it was agreed to let four persons in as
observers, but twelve pushed their way in.
One of the dissidents, who wanted a high school
on the site . . . was Mrs. Sherrie Birbach, who inter-
rupted the meeting with a shouted, 'What about our
school?' . . . [She] was rebuked by [Borough Presi-
dent] Leviss, who remarked, 'You people allowed in as
observers will not be permitted to speak. '16
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In a subsequent discussion, "Jerry Koenig, who described him-
self as president of the Fairview Tenants Association, spoke for the
dissidents, 'We were promised a school on the site, ' he said. 'We
don't know who' s on our planning board. We want representation on
the Board. '7 The newspaper article then went on to point out that of
the 14 members on Board 6, only four were present, including Anthony
Atlas, head of the city' s Traffic Violations Bureau, but did not give any
indication of their reaction to the demonstration.
If one takes these comments at face value, one would have to
ask who promised them a school on the site, and can they really have
been as ignorant as they tried to portray themselves. Some probably
were. A certain degree of vagueness about the kind of school the pro-
testors wanted for the site - some said a high school, some an inter-
mediate or junior high school - might have added to the misunderstanding
and rumors that could have developed among those not familiar with the
details. For since 1968-69, the capital budget had indeed included
authorization for a new intermediate school (IS 241) to be built in the
general vicinity of CommunityPlanning District 4 or the northern part of
District 6 because of the overcrowding in the existing intermediate and
junior high schools. A site for this school, to be built by the Educational
Construction Fund, *18 had remained undetermined for the following two
and one-half years. It is possible that some of these people concerned
about the intermediate school had at some time been led to believe that
this would be an appropriate site for that particular school.
*
The ECF is an autonomous New York City public agency authorized
to construct educational buildings in conjunction with revenue producing
facilities: industrial, commercial, or residential.
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But it strains credulity to believe the people who said they had
been promised a high school on the site, unless they were trying to re-
fer to something prior to 1966. There had been too many local school
and civic organizations involved in communication with city officials
throughout 1970 on the status of the high school for Corona and there had
been too much publicity over the Corona compromise proposed two months
earlier for such ignorance to be so complete.
Secondly, Mrs. Sherrie Birbach was the wife of Jerry Birbach,
who had earlier indicated an interest in creating a more effective oppo-
sition to the public housing and who, in fact, was not new to the leader-
ship of an organization. In the files of the City Planning Department I
found an obscure February, 1967, letter from him as the President of
B'nai B' rith Benevolence Lodge 2267, stating his opposition to the con-
demnation of Corona homes for a new high school:
. . . I personally spoke to Mr. Piazza, who I
know to be very active in civic affairs in that community
and was shocked to learn that his home is included in the
69 homes to be condemned.
Our membership feels that this is an unnecessary
action, since there is plenty of vacant land in the sur-
rounding area that could be utilized without anyone suffer-
ing . . . I personally know this part of Corona. This (sic)
residents are community minded and take an active inter-
est in local organizations. 19
The letter went on to say that the VFW Post which Mr. Piazza headed had
given "large donations to a newly formed Temple in Rego Park, " a new
ambulance to the Corona Community Ambulance Corps., and $15, 000 to
the Corona Boys Club, and it concluded by saying that "we feel that other
land, such as the old World Fair grounds, can be used for the satisfaction
of all concerned. "20 There was no mention of the public housing site's
vacant land in Forest Hills in that letter.
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Thus, what is more likely is that the high school was seen
in early 1971 as a good issue to oppose the housing project with, both
because it was a needed facility and because there was already a mea-
sure of support for moving the school off the Corona site. However,
it is interesting that in its reporting of this February 3 demonstration
against the public housing the Times article failed to mention the Corona
school situation as bearing any relation to the "promised" school for the
site, despite its direct reference to Mrs. Birbach wanting a "high school.
It is also noteworthy that there was no mention of any local politician be-
ing present in support of the protestors.
Another important shift in the politics of the planning process
that was taking place during these months was also in evidence that same
February 3rd evening. That was the growing mood of independence of
the Community Boards, a change that was showing up in scattered in-
stances throughout the city. The Boards, one for each Community
Planning District, were each a body of not more than fifty citizens, all
appointed by the borough president. They were officially advisory to
their respective borough president, with some limited legal powers of
an advisory review over matters before the City Planning Commission.
*
For example, during the previous year, while I was working for the
Staten Island office of the City Planning Department, the Staten Island
Community Boards attempted to set up an executive council composed
of the board chairmen to coordinate information and activities among
themselves. The Staten Island Borough President tried to block this
move in several not so subtle ways and finally attempted to remove the
chairman who had initiated the idea of an executive council from his
Board membership.
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But in reality they had increasing powers of influence as they became
an institutional vehicle through which the city government, in particular
the City Planning Department, could deal directly with local neighbor-
hoods in some kind of structured forum in a city of eight million people.
In the case of Borough President Sidney Leviss, the Queens
Boards were dealing with a man who, as I observed once at an executive
session of the Board of Estimate, could be overzealous in defending the
prerogatives of the borough president, both as an institution and as it
related to his personal authority. Although preaching the cause of com-
munity control and decentralization could be popular, it had different
meanings to different people. With some it could mean giving more of
the Mayor' s power to the borough president, and not necessarily to the
"local" Community Board. There was open disagreement in February
between Leviss and the Boards over whether or not they could hold pub-
lic hearings on anything before the borough president had officially re-
ferred a subject to them. The definition that the boards were "advisory"
to him rather than "political" also implied in his view that once a borough
president had exercised his power voting on a given matter in the Board
of Estimate the item was no longer subject to formal discussion by a Com-
munity Board. Thus, the question of control of the Boards was a very
real one.
Public indications of this split came at that February 3rd meet-
ing, when the borough president criticized one of the Boards for holding
* I say "local" because one must remember that many boards encompassed
areas with populations ranging from 100, 000 to 200, 000 and thus we re equivalent
to the population of a small city.
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a public hearing on a proposed interborough truckway before plans were
complete. "A community board spokesman responded, to applause, that
the hearing had been held because 'Too often the public never gets to
say anything before a project is a fait accompli. '21 Later on in Febru-
ary this conflict continued as Community Board 4 wanted to hold a public
hearing on the issue of the high school site in Corona, reportedly for the
purpose of censuring the borough president for voting to approve the site. 22
In such an atmosphere, and with the need to maintain "political
etiquette" with the sensitive Leviss, who had reportedly done a lot of the
legwork to arrange the 1966 political site selection deal as Deputy Borough
President, it is likely that even if there were a local Queens politician
who supported the protestors at that time, he would have stayed away from
being physically present at such an outward show of disrespect for the
Borough President as the February 3rd meeting. Furthermore, though
the protestors may not have realized it at the time, the protest was more
likely to achieve public and Community Planning Board support if it did
not have anyone from a conventional political background supporting it
initially, for then it would lose both its image as a spontaneous citizen
protest and its ability to appear to be gaining momentum over the long
drive ahead as people joined it. For if there was any lesson learned by
the people in the area from the nearby Corona struggle, which so many
of the Forest Hills-Rego Park parents were reminded of daily as long
as their children attended the overcrowded high schools in the area, it
was that anyone preparing to do battle with the city had to be prepared
for a long struggle and that publicity was essential to keep the momentum
going.
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Although the protests continued during February, including
the picketing of a dinner near Forest Hills honoring Deputy Mayor
Aurelio, the situation regarding Corona was in the spotlight as it con-
tinued to deteriorate, and the city bureaucracy had itself to blame as
much as the political opposition. In January Assemblymen Battista
and Miller had co-filed a bill in the State Legislature to counter the
city' s bill introduced by Assemblyman Lisa. Whereas the Lisa bill
was tailored to the particular circumstances in its wording of which
owners would have title returned and which could accept either an out-
right condemnation award or could accept the return of title to a house
that would be physically relocated onto a nearby lot, the Battista-Miller
bill was much more general. It would have applied to all sites selected
by the city for any public facility. It would have required the city to
return title to the original owners of all the land selected for a site
whenever any portion of the originally selected site was not going to be
used for the original purpose for which the site had been selected.
This would obviously have been a legal straitjacket for the city, not
only in Corona but in general, for it was not unusual for the city to
auction leftover pieces of land after a facility had been finished.
Battista made it clear that that was his general intention. The
stated objectives were first to have all the Corona homes left as they
were and the high school built on the Forest Hills site and second to re-
duce the amount of residential condemnation by the city in the site se-
lection process for all city developments. Battista and Miller told the
press that they had sent a telegram to Governor Rockefeller reminding
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him of the Urstadt report' s recommendations for another site for the
high school. 23 The net loss in this, aside from time, would have
been the public housing units, which - as we saw earlier - had been
misjudged in the Urstadt report, but this was not important to either
Battista or Miller. They saw that as a good result rather than as one
which would have also had to be taken into the equation by finding some
other place for the housing units if the high school was moved to Forest
Hills. Battista, after all, had called for the taxation of public housing
a year earlier when he had been the Conservative Party' s candidate
for city controller.
All of this was happening at a time when residents of the homes
were debating with each other whether or not to accept the city's offer,
and a public relations battle was going on as each side proclaimed that
a majority of the residents would support them when the time came.
What was really going on was a war of nerves over political strategy and
this was acknowledged on January 18th when
Mr. Lisa said the situation was particularly
delicate because homeowners were to begin negoti-
ations with the city on the compromise this week,
and rumors are circulating that they can get more
if they hold out. He accused Mr. Battista and Mr.
Miller of 'headline hunting, ' but Mr. Battista in-
sists they have the community' s best interests at
heart. 24
With friends arguing with friends in Corona, with reports of
violence and threats of violence circulating in the area, and just a couple
of days after the new group of Forest Hills protestors had aroused atten-
tion at the borough president' s meeting, the city government produced
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what can only be termed its most spectacular example of incompetence.
Its move demonstrated just how insensitive lower level officials could
be in implementing higher level policy decisions. In a story that made
the front page of the Times it was reported that the Corporation Counsel' s
office had sent a letter to the affected Corona residents that in effect in-
validated the Aurelio Corona compromise. The letter, by stating that
only the owner-occupied homes were protected under the compromise,
eliminated about one-quarter of the structures in question, among them
even those occupied by the children or parents of the title holder. It set
a ten-day deadline for the owners to notify the city of the acceptance or
rejection of the compromise, while also stating that any agreement de-
pended on approval of pending legislation by the state, copies of which
were not available but would be in a few days. 25 Why there was such a
short deadline when the state legislation might not be passed for months,
I do not know, nor do I know whether the lawyers were aware of just how
many of the houses were occupied by long term renters. But in any case,
the letter certainly caused consternation, confusion, and distrust in
Corona.
The unfortunate part of it all was that it had been a mistake, and
the people responsible for the letter were not perceptive enough to realize
it even when a tip-off for trouble was an inquiry from the press. The
reporter who wrote the story related how he had called the city when he
discovered the letter and received confirmation of it by the writer, an
assistant Corporation Counsel. Verifying the letter' s effect, the lawyer
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said, "Dick Aurelio will probably have to make some special arrange-
ments. "26 The reporter then called Deputy Mayor Aurelio, who could
not believe that the letter said what it did until it was read to him
verbatim. 27
On February 8th there was a follow-up story in which Aurelio
blasted the letter as being "just stupidity, " and he stated that he would
not have allowed it to go out had he seen it. He said it was "one of those
things that happen in a bureaucracy, "28 and that the original deal still
stood. Such a furor over credibility had been created that Mayor Lind-
say took the rare step of commenting on a current political issue on his
weekly television program, reaffirming that the original compromise
offer would still stand for all the homes.
The denials by the city did not get a prominent position in the
Times, and some damage had been done. Furthermore, although it was
a humane decision by Aurelio, it was a backhanded victory in that it
showed once again that sometimes one can get "justice" only by going to
the top. It further demonstrated the valuable role the press can play by
bringing attention to a situation when the regular government channels in
the field failed to communicate an obvious mistake to the top. Unfortu-
nately, it also demonstrated the irrelevancy of the Queens office of the
City Planning Department to the whole process, an irrelevancy due to
self-imposed non-involvement. 29
Press coverage of the Forest Hills housing issue continued two
weeks later in the February 21 Sunday New York Times with an obscurely
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placed, but moderately sized, "background" article that accurately
summarized the history of the scatter-site program. It pointed out that
all of the scatter-site projects had had some community opposition,
from middle income blacks as well as whites. Commenting on the "giant"
Forest Hills project "in the works" since 1966, it observed that "[ i] n
fact, its original site was perhaps more controversial than its present
one .. 30
Aside from its historical value as a contemporary source of
what people were saying then, as well as what they were not saying, the
article was important by its mere presence. With so many local dis-
putes taking place all the time, it was rather unusual for the Times to
run an article of this type, which was not reporting a specific daily news
event, such a short time after any community activity had started. The
fact that it did, for whatever reason, showed that the issue was con-
sidered newsworthy at an early stage, and that in itself was a help to
anyone trying to affect any change through mass political action. Un-
fortunately, in view of the influence of the press, later articles were not
always as accurate as this one.
It is always difficult to know whether people are expressing the
real reasons for their feelings. But since the ones people express pub-
licly form the first basis for communication between the protagonists,
they are important. The bluntest expression of all that was reported in
the Times was that of Assemblyman Miller, who appeared to continue
shifting from a position of trying to find any alternate high school site
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to outright opposition to any public housing in Forst Hills by saying,
"This whole project is . . . a disservice to the people who live here
and to the ones who'll be brought in. "31
But in general the reasons given for opposition were along
more conventional lines: "overcrowded neighborhood, inadequate schools,
and expensive pilings needed because of an underground river, " 32 and the
Housing Authority response was also traditional in its tone: that 40% of
the units would be for the elderly, that a children' s center would be in-
cluded with 7 classrooms, and that the school problem would be solved
because the new Corona high school was scheduled to be open when the
housing was completed in mid-1973, a little over two years away. As
for the criticism of the foundation cost, "a Housing Authority spokesman
said, 'The Housing Authority is a responsible public agency, and we are
not about to build on unsound soil or ground. This business of an under-
ground stream is nonsense. ' 33
While this appeared straightforward, in fact the Authority' s
defense contained the seeds of its own destruction. It relied on a press
spokesman who either felt that it looked bad to admit that a citizen ob-
jection might be valid or who had just gotten hasty summaries of the
details from a line official in his agency. But by so doing, it made its
rebuttal to Assemblyman Miller's accusation of political manipulation
by the Mayor that much less believable to the average citizen. For
Miller was charging that the Lindsay campaign people had told residents
during the 1969 election that the project would not be built in order to help
secure their votes. Since the Queens and Jewish vote had been acknowl-
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edged by political commentators as critical to Lindsay' s re-election, this
had an air of plausibility to some. The Authority' s defense, that the de-
lay was because the project had to be redesigned in 1969 when the original
design proved too expensive, relied on people to trust the credibility of
government officials rather than explaining that the heart of the difficulty
was the very subsoil problem that people meant when referring to an
underground stream. But they had already denied this problem. Further,
the high school explanation was at face value irrelevant to those working
against the Corona compromise and at its best could only be taken with
skepticism by the others, who knew that their Corona neighbors were
split over the compromise and knew that in any case the Housing Authority
had no influence over whatever the city government was doing with the
school issue. Moreover, the Board of Education' s track record in
meeting its schedules was no better than the Housing Authority' s.
As to the critical issue of acceptance of low-income families in
a middle-income neighborhood, the Times said that "neither side is
willing to mention [it] publicly, but concede privately that it is very real.
A president of a civic association accused the city of raising the issue of
ttunwanted poor families" as a way of "trying to shame the community into
accepting something it doesn't want. " The comment of Housing Authority
Chairman Simeon Golar on this - whether because he was trying to be
diplomatic or because he took the opposition too lightly is hard to tell -
was that he liked the support the project was getting in Queens and that
"There t s always some opposition, but we expect this project to be a solid,
integral part of the community in every way. "35
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As frequently happens in community-government conflicts,
there was a period of no particularly dramatic events over the next
couple of months. There were some demonstrations and meetings but
most of the press coverage was limited to local newspapers. There
was a new organization formed to fight the project, the Forest Hills
Residents Association, with Jerry Birbach and Jerry Koenig as co-
chairmen. At a February City Council meeting on the education section
of the capital budget, one councilman accused Assemblyman Miller of
being against the housing project because there would be blacks in it.
Miller countered by using the rationale of the wish of the community for
a school. Also, the City Council approved the Aurelio-Cuomo Corona
compromise while the state enabling legislation was still pending.
During this time, while opposition was continuing to form, it
is clear that the most serious concern of the Housing Authority was its
failure to maintain its ambitious production schedule of 14, 000 units, as
mentioned in Chapter VII. This objective had become the primary goal
of Chairman Golar, who not only had gone out on the limb by publicly
making the prediction in the first place, but had also said, when asked
in March how the lagging program could possibly make it, "It may be
I'11 personally have to take command . . . [I' m] egotistical enough to
believe that my being here makes a difference. " 36
The emphasis was now on the economic aspects of the pro-
duction function, and the constraint of the federal cost limits. For the
immediate short run of that year, the solutions were seen as the raising
of these limits, the possible use of city capital budget funds if the federal
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limits were not raised high enough, and a much greater use of turn-
key construction, a policy which the regional office of HUD had been
strongly urging the Housing Authority to pursue. (Indeed, the Housing
Authority had recently signed its first contract with the Lefrak or-
ganization to build 638 turn-key units in some ghetto areas, and Sam
Lefrak was talking about building 50, 000 more such units over the next
ten years for the city. )37 In the longer run, the planning policy was to
reverse the downward trend of project sizes. "We cannot afford the
luxury of playing with pretty little vest-pocket plans which will net us
45 or 50 units or maybe 100 or 200, " said Mr. Golar. 38
There were two directions in physical design logically possible
as a result of this policy shift - increasing building height while keeping
land requirements relatively constant or increasing land area require-
ments with relatively low buildings. The choice, as Mr. Golar had indi-
cated a month earlier, was the former.
'The pendulum has swung back' to construc-
tion of high rise apartment buildings, which the Housing
Authority de-emphasized in the last few years in the in-
terests of good design and lower crime levels. Mr.
Golar said recent studies of housing projects showed
that the height of an individual building was not neces-
sarily a factor in the crime level . . . and that many
high-rise buildings were actually safer thn ow-rise
buildings if they were designed properly.
I have some questions about the accuracy of these statements. The
studies referred to were done by Oscar Newman and were later published
as the book Defensible Space. While they do indicate that crime could be
reduced in high-rise buildings with changes in details of their design, it
seems clear to me that they indicate that larger design decisions, as well
as socio-economic characteristics of tenants and neighbors, are more im-
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It should be briefly noted that the effects of such a decision
are more far reaching than might appear at first glance. Because sites
for public housing require political approval and because the level of
community input into the planning process was in the process of dramati-
cally increasing during this period of years, such features as high rise
buildings and larger sized projects create more negative features for a
proposal to overcome, especially in the outer areas of the city where some
vacant land exists and where even privately developed market rate hous-
ing is opposed when it involves a change from the predominant type of
low-rise structure. For the goal of scatter-site housing it adds another
strike against what is already unpopular, just as some condemnation of
homes is deemed politically possible for "good" facilities and impossible
for locally "undesirable" facilities. Thus, any such proposed project
may be killed entirely. And even if it is not, the consequence of any ob-
stacles, whether rational or irrational perceptions on the part of any
local citizenry, is to add time to the site approval process, and that
time is money. For the federal cost limits on public housing may be
considered a step function over time, just as social security benefits
are. They are raised by Congress only occasionally and are a belated
response to an inflation which goes on continuously. Thus, speed through
the political process is just as important as overcoming the delays caused
* (continued)
portant. For example, ". . . it is not only large size [of projects], but
large size in combination with higher buildings that contributes to a more
criminally active situation. It seems that one can still maintain high den-
sity (size) and not encounter higher crime rates, as long as building height
remains low." 40
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by bureaucratic red tape in the federal review process; and if one is
committed to try to obtain sites in middle-class areas, including even
those areas which are currently experiencing private development
rather than waiting until only the left-over sites are available, then
one must be willing to compromise on the goal of maximum units per
site.
The long lead times required before construction could start,
however, meant that many of the projects which the Housing Authority
was counting on for its 14, 000 unit goal did not reflect the shift in policy.
Twenty-one of the forty-nine projects which the Authority had listed for
1971 starts had less than 200 units, 41 and many of the others were in the
200' s and 300' s. In contrast the Forest Hills project with its 840 units
was one of the largest and was much further along in the pipeline than
most of the other projects. For not only did a majority of the 49 projects
still need formal federal financing approval as of late March, but a signifi-
cant number also were lacking either a preliminary program reservation
for funds by HUD or were still awaiting site approval from the New York
City Board of Estimate. 42
By May 1, with the year one-third over, the Authority had
started only 1, 000 units. But in the last week of April there were several
developments which gave cause for new optimism in the Authority' s
efforts to surmount its economic problems of construction costs that were
by now rising by as much as 1% per month and an operating budget that had
a $14 million yearly deficit. Among them were permission to piggyback
99
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federal model cities funds on top of standard public housing funds to
bring several hundred units back within federal cost limits. The most
significant actions were the raising of the federal construction cost per
room limit by about one-third as a result of a change in the law by
Congress the previous year, a second announcement that HUD regional
administrator William Green was exercising his legally permissible dis-
cretion to allow New York City to exceed the new limit by 5%, and a third
announcement by Green that HUD had "reserved" enough money for
12, 294 units not yet under construction (assuming, of course, that the
city could get that many ready for financing within the limits). 43 At the-
same time Simeon Golar announced that construction of the Forest Hills
project was imminent, with solicitation of bids expected by the end of
May and ground breaking by July. 44
By now, however, the opposition had taken hold over a wider
range of persons. For example, the Boards for Community Planning
Districts 3 (two miles north of the project) and 6 had already voted
against the project and Board 4 was debating it. In addition, an esti-
mated 1, 000 persons at the Forest Hills High School heard Assemblyman
Miller speak on April 29 about his bill that would require voter approval
of public housing. 45 This was an item of particular interest at that time
because the United States Supreme Court had three days earlier upheld
the constitutionality of such a law in California in James vs. Valtierra,
based on that state' s long history of public referenda (one justice not
participating, three justices dissenting). 46
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The response of the Housing Authority to the opposition was
premised on the fact that the project had its legal approvals and was
therefore assumed to be a fait accompli. So the posture ultimately
adopted by the Authority was one of explanation and justification,
rather than bargaining. Within the Authority itself Forest Hills was
seen prior to 1971 to be in need of special treatment, by irregular pro-
cedures, unlike those used with other scatter-site projects in Queens,
including some which had also received their legal approvals.
An example for comparison is Latimer Gardens in nearby
Flushing. It was occupied in early 1971, was hailed by Simeon Golar
as an example of a successful project, and was cited by Mario Cuomo
as part of his justification for reducing the size of the Forest Hills pro-
ject in his compromise report to the Mayor in 1972.
An explanation of how the Authority did or did not deal with the
local people requires some understanding of its division of responsibili-
ties. It did not have staff "project directors" responsible for the co-
ordination of a project from start to finish. Consequently, there was no
one person who had complete knowledge of the Forest Hills project' s
complex political, economic, and design history who could talk to com-
munity groups as an official who, though subject to higher authority, was
nevertheless responsible for knowing all the facets of a job. Rather,
there were several offices involved, including the program policy office
and the design division. Another was a small understaffed office which
was first called the Intergroup Relations office in the late sixties and was
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reorganized as the Community Affairs office. On paper this office had
the responsibility to communicate with citizen organizations prior to the
opening of a new project.
However, this was considered to be just a third priority item
among the responsibilities of that office in 1969. At that time the primary
job of the single staff person who covered all of Queens was the continual
monitoring in the field of the racial distribution of all projects, working
in a liaison capacity between the managers of projects and the tenant se-
lection office in the Authority' s central headquarters. With the objective
of keeping projects racially integrated, they were working in a very sensi-
tive area, as civil rights legislation and litigation had made it illegal for
the tenant selection office to refer to race in any way, though the Inter-
group Relations office could. A second priority was the investigation of
any complaints of problems of an interracial nature, both among tenants
and Authority employees.
The instructions given in early 1969 to the newly hired staff
person for Queens, however, did not place Forest Hills in that third cate-
gory of responsibilities, as were the Latimer Gardens project and a pro-
ject in Arverne on the far easterly ocean side of Queens. Rather he was
told that their office was not handling the Forest Hills project, that it was
"a touchy situation - a Jewish problem and was to be dealt with at the
highest level of the Authority, using Jewish staff. ,,48 What this meant,
according to a knowledgeable official, was that Forest Hills was to be
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handled by the "front office - by Joe Christian, "*49 the then general
manager, and a person whose involvement in the original scatter-site
discussions and the Forest Hills site selection issue went back to 1966.
At least part of the reason for this had to do with the internal
politics and questions of trust that are important in any large bureaucracy
in which staff and modus operandi have been inbred for many years and in
which the introduction of any outsider is viewed with suspicion. In this
case the then head of the Community Affairs office was a person who had
been brought in from the Urban League to reorganize what had been a
group of departments (Intergroup Relations, Community Services, etc.).
Not only was he "suspect, " but the very office involved, Intergroup
Relations, had itself been an upsetting influence within some of the or-
ganization. Furthermore, this official was black. There is some reason
to suspect that the top officials of the Authority, now headed by Albert
Walsh, who had succeeded Walter Washington as chairman, believed that the send.
ing of a man from an office with a "black image" might simply exacerbate
a delicate situation. This was in addition to any desire to keep control
of the Forest Hills situation with one or two trusted people at the top, 50
just as the site selection deal of 1966 was worked out at the top level of
the city administration, with only one or two people in the Housing
Authority knowing what happened. (A present-day high official who had
been involved with the planning details of the Forest Hills project as a
*
He was not Jewish, but saying that the Authority wanted to use Jewish
staff for a Jewish problem was a way of assuaging the feelings of an office
which was being told it could not handle something that was ostensibly with-
in its jurisdiction.
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staff person since its inception in 1966, for example, admitted that he
did not know the details of the 1966 site deal, but believed the stories
that the Lindsay people had moved it to Forest Hills because Jews
51
would object less than Corona Italians. This is another example of
what happens over long periods of time when a bureaucracy operates
under self-imposed restrictions of information. )
Precisely how high up the decision not to deal with the various
Forest Hills community groups originated is not not known. One con-
temporary high official in the Authority said that they did not go out to
talk with communities with the scatter-site projects because they were
restricted by "City Hall, " in contrast to what took place with their
projects in model city areas, in which he claimed the Authority had dealt
successfully with the communities. Also, although general manager
Christian apparently had some contacts with some of the rabbis and
others in the area who supported the project from its inception, it cannot
be assumed from this that he made the policy decision regarding how much
community contact the Authority would have. A person who worked at one
time with both Joe Christian and Albert Walsh stated that the personalities
of Albert Walsh and Simeon Golar were so assertive that they insisted on
making all policy decisions. Joe Christian was characterized by this per-
son as "a very capable staff person, but not a leader of men" when
working under these aggressive persons. 52
Yet another viewpoint about community participation was ex-
pressed by a former staff person in the Authority. He said that it was
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not surprising that the work with communities in which new projects
were underway was made a third priority of the Community Affairs
office in 1969. "The Housing Authority had never dealt with communi-
ties, because it was assumed that all communities would oppose a pro-
ject. So we build it anyway, and then deal with it" after people realize
they just have to live with it. 53
So, from 1969 to January 1971 the Community Affairs office
person covering Queens had nothing to do with the Forest Hills project
other than routine internal matters like occasionally checking with his
contact person who had the data sheets on the current condition of pend-
ing projects. He did, by comparison, spend an estimated two months on
the Latimer Gardens development. People there also were initially op-
posed to the project, but over time there became a "grudging acceptance"
of it and a desire among the neighborhood leadership to get "their people"
in as they were convinced of the reality of the project. This was en-
couraged by the staff person's going to many meetings and literally go-
ing door to door trying to get local people to apply for units in that
particular project by handing out pre-application forms. People would
then mail these back to be put on the list to receive regular application
forms.
To be fair in this comparison, some of the differences between
the Latimer Gardens area and Forest Hills should be noted. It was an
area of more mixed land uses, without the exclusive residential image
* Who later became the high official referred to on the previous page.
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of Forest Hills, since it was next to the downtown business and com-
mercial area of Flushing at the end of the subway line and also next
to land zoned and used for light and heavy industry. Secondly, although
the entire Community Planning District 7 area was overwhelmingly white-
middle class, located just four blocks away from Latimer Gardens was
the Bland Houses project. Bland Houses was described by one of the
Authority staff as one of the best public housing developments in the city,
one which had been well integrated (60% white - 40% black) for years. 55
So the prospect of another project was not exactly the same new phe-
nomenon to that neighborhood as it was to the Forest Hills-Rego Park
area. Also, Latimer Gardens had half as many units as the 840 unit
Forest Hills project and had a physical design for 10 stories rather than
24.
While on the topic of the distribution of pre-application forms
for new housing projects, a few additional words are in order about the
tenant selection process. The pre-application procedure was used be-
cause formal application lists for any new project were compiled only
in the last four months prior to the opening of a building. This was due
to the complexity involved in trying to select fairly from a long waiting
list of people meeting both income eligibility requirements and one or
more categories of priority ranking5 6 (such as emergency relocatees,
persons moved for federal or city construction projects, veterans, people
in 1970 who had been living in "welfare hotels, " persons moved off the
site of the housing project being opened, and so forth*). On the tenant
This list is not in the order of relative priorities in which the Authority
ranks these categories.
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side -of the equation, the Authority gave all of its applicants the right
to indicate the borough in which they wished to live, but not the right
to select any particular project. In the case of a completely new pro-
ject, however, people could express a preference for that particular
project, but again the final decision was up to the Authority. Some of
the effect of this policy, as a result of people' s preferences to stay at
least relatively near familiar territory and/or jobs, may be seen in the
following tables, which indicate less inter-borough migration associated
with public housing than might otherwise have been expected.
Thus, searching out people in an area to whom pre-application
forms could be given was the technique by which it was legally possible
for the Authority to have the new projects racially integrated in these
white areas when they opened, given the rising number of minority ap-
plicants on the list in general who met the priority requirements and the
low rate of turnover in the Authority' s occupied developments. The
Authority' s tenant selection office could not know or consider the race
of any individual applicant, but it and the Community Affairs office could
and did make educated guesses based on an applicant' s address. Com-
bining this with a new top priority category for a new project - applicants
already living in the neighborhood - gave the Authority more flexibility.
By deliberately searching for these low-income people in particular
neighborhoods - a form of affirmative marketing action, if you will -
both the Authority' s face to face visibility was increased and local citi-
zens had more of a stake in seeing that the project would meet some of
their needs and not only those of blacks and people on public assistance as
the stereotyped view would have it.
TABLE 11
Applicants (Households) for Public Housing
in New York City by Borough of Residence, 1967
Borough of
Residence Number Percent
Manhattan 22, 101 29. 8
Brooklyn 27, 880 37. 5
Bronx 17, 970 24. 2
Queens 5, 050 6. 8
Staten Island 1, 080 1. 5
Out of New York Citya 180 0. 2
TOTAL 74,261 100.0
aResidents of New York
for admission.
City who are servicemen can qualify
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer,
Table VII-4
op. cit.
TABLE 12
Applicants (Households) for Public Housing
in New York City by Borough of Choice, 1967
Borough of
Choice Number Percent
Manhattan 23, 379 36. 9
Brooklyn 25, 287 34. 1
Bronx 13,292 17.9
Queens 6, 734 9. 1
Staten Island 1, 327 1. 7
Any 242 0.3
TOTAL 74, 261 100. 0
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer, op. cit.
Table VII-5
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TABLE 13
Percentage Distribution of Applicants for Public Housing
by Borough of Residence and Borough of Choice, 1967
Borough of ---------------- Borough of Residence----------------
Choice Manhattan Brooklyn Bronx Queens Staten Island
Manhattan 91. 6 6.2 27.7 6.5 1.9
Brooklyn 1. 8 86.9 1.7 6.1 0.0
Bronx 3.9 1.4 66.3 2.4 0.9
Queens 2. 3 4.7 3. 7 83.4 1.9
Staten Island 0.3 0.5 0.3 0. 3 94.4
Any 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.9
TOTAL 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Margaret Webb Latimer, op. cit.
Table VII-7
TABLE 14
Percentage Distribution of Public Housing Tenants by Previous
Borough and Current Borough, 1968
Current ----------------- Previous Borough -----------------
Borough Manhattan Brooklyn Bronx Queens Staten Island
Manhattan 71. 2 4. 7 12. 8 4. 5 1. 1
Brooklyn 8.4 84.6 4.4 11. 1 0.9
Bronx 13.3 2.6 77.7 5.4 0.3
Queens 6.4 7.0 4.2 77.6 1. 3
Staten Island 0.7 1. 1 0.9 1.4 96.4
TOTAL 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
Source: Margaret Webb
Table VI-61
Latimer, op. cit.
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Some of the consequences of all this for the Forest Hills
controversy were that
1. The Housing Authority could, if it wanted to, ensure a
significant percentage of white occupants. The number of low income
whites in Community Districts 4 and 6 (Table 10 ) show that the people
were there if the Authority sought to find them, and certainly there
were enough in Queens as a whole. This was reinforced by the patterns
of borough selection by applicants (Table 13), which, when combined with
the racial characteristics of the boroughs, had resulted in Queens and
Richmond having the highest percentage of whites in public housing
(Table 6 ).
2. To the extent that minorities were admitted into the Forest
Hills project, although minority percentages were low in Queens the
absolute numbers were high enough in comparison to the impact of one
individual project on the entire waiting list that most of the minorities
would come from Queens itself and not the rest of the city (Table 7).
Whether the Authority wished to accomplish these occupancy
patterns, whether it could politically afford to say so if it did, and
whether anyone would believe the Authority if it did say so, were ques-
tions of a different nature.
In any case as the Latimer Gardens project was constructed in
1970 there was relative calm around the Forest Hills project. No one
Up until May 20, 1971, 1, 062 pre-applications had been received by the
Authority for the Forest Hills project. A breakdown by postal zip-cot in-
dicated that only 222 of these were submitted by neighborhood people.
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I have talked to disagreed that the prevalent belief in the area was that
the project was dead, just as were a majority of the 1966-67 scatter-
site projects (later to be categorized by the Authority as being on
"official hold" status). Passage of time, the belief that the land was
unbuildable, and other factors all contributed to the attitude. In such an
atmosphere it would be easy to suspect that the demonstrations in Feb-
ruary and rising opposition in March and April caught the Housing Authority
by surprise, and that the prescription for success would be to have had the
Authority aware earlier of the neighborhood meetings that were taking
place in early 1971, especially in January and February. In fact, such
was not the case. One of the ironies of the Forest Hills saga is that the
Community Affairs office' s Queens person was living a mile north of the
area in Elmhurst, heard about the first meeting, and went to it. But his
involvement was not that of a representative of the Housing Authority, for
he did not tell anyone that he was from the Authority. Instead it was as
an "interested neighbor. ,,58
Memoranda about these meetings were sent from the Community
Affairs office to the Chairman' s office from the very beginning and con-
tinued for months as this staff member kept going to the local meetings
as a detached observer. The local citizenry did not ask the Authority to
send a spokesman to any meeting for more information about the project,
and the Authority made no attempt to utilize their inside knowledge of the
meetings to initiate a contact with the opposition in an attempt to defuse
the situation before it got worse. The basic rationale behind the lack of
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action appears to have been a belief that the Forest Hills case would go
the same way as Latimer Gardens did: namely, that as the inevitability
of the project became clear to the people there would be a shift toward
trying to make the best of it and get some local people in as tenants,
and that that would inevitably calm the situation.
Another important factor was the change of personnel that by
this time had occurred in the Authority and the fact that any involvement
by the Authority in the community would clearly have been a change of
policy that would require both someone to advocate it and someone at the
top to approve it. Simeon Golar had become chairman of the Authority
in January, 1970, and had brought with him from the Human Relations
Commission, where he had been chairman for nine months, Val Coleman
as his director of public information. Golar, a black, was the first chair-
man of the Authority to have himself grown up in public housing, and he
was active in Liberal Party politics. The leadership of the Community
Affairs Office had also changed, with the politically appropriate appoint-
ment, considering the Housing Authority' s changing ethnic constituency,
of a Puerto Rican woman. She reportedly had good contacts with her
own ethnic community but has been described as a meek administrator.
With lack of a clear signal from above, the Community Affairs office
remained passive, and the viewpoint of Val Coleman that there should be
no direct response with the opposition because the protest would die won
the day. 59 Part of that general feeling was also due to a belief that the
protest was merely a traditional-type of local political opposition to
Mayor Lindsay rather than a more basic fear of public housing, as the
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original meeting in January had been called by a politician, Democrat-
Conservative Assemblyman Miller, and the second meeting had been
held at the local Conservative Party club. To help keep a local anti-
Lindsay squabble from escalating into city-wide visibility an effort was
made by the Public Information Office, through its contacts, to keep
media coverage at a minimum, especially out of that part of the Times
that circulated in Manhattan and off of television. 60 (This may partially
explain why many of the Sunday Times articles were carried only in its
limited circulation Brooklyn-Queens section, even after earlier articles
had been carried for the entire city. )
In early spring of 1971 there was a sudden shift of direction by
the Authority. The exact timing of events may not be quite precise, but
sometime in late March or April the Authority was for the first time
asked to send a spokesman to a meeting at the Rego Park Jewish Com-
munity Center, a meeting which was being held under the auspices of the
local office of the Mayor' s Urban Action Task Force. The decision was
made to send general manager Joe Christian. According to one informed
person, Christian "came back shaken" after being shouted down by the
audience and ordered the Community Affairs office to get their man out
there. 61
The initial contacts made by the Queens representative of the
Community Affairs office in April were with the people who had supported
the project in 1966, especially several rabbis from Forest Hills whom
Joe Christian had met with in 1966-67. The other Queens groups which
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supported the project were generally included within an umbrella or-
ganization, the Queens Council for Better Housing and Community De-
velopment. Its membership of over twenty liberal religious, political,
and civil rights groups included various Queens branches of the NAACP,
a variety of church supported social organizations, the Americans for
Democratic Action, the Liberal Party, the Urban League, etc. A policy
decision was made by the Housing Authority to rely on Queens people,
especially this Queens Council, to organize and generate the primary
support for the project rather than bring in Manhattan people from the
city-wide offices of liberal and civil rights groups. The Community
Affairs person was to act as a liaison with them and was to make con-
tacts of his own among local institutional leaders, like rabbis and school
principals. 62
This decision to rely on Queens people for local support (keep-
ing in mind the different ranges which "local" can mean - the immediate
neighborhood, the community planning district with its 100, 000 plus
population, or the city with eight million people) was certainly one of
several legitimate strategies to choose. All, of course, would have had
problems - some of which could have been foreseen at the time and could
have been mitigated and others which can be seen only in hindsight. In
the latter category are such things as the positions which certain "lib-
eral" politicians took (both pro and con), positions which would have
been very difficult to predict in advance, and the entire change of politi-
cal atmosphere occasioned by Lindsay' s entry into the Presidential
primaries in early 1972.
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At this point, perhaps, I should mention the comment by a
Housing Authority official who said, in reaction to my probing into
details of meetings and community input, that the problem with this
approach is that it assumes the objections to the housing project were
rational. His view was that many of the arguments against the project
were "irrational"* and that "the whole Forest Hills thing is not one
you can find logic in; it' s all emotional. " He said that to talk about
what would have happened if there had been community involvement is
ridiculous because the Forest Hills people simply "on principle did
not want black public housing. "63 My problem with this position is
that one should know that a part of any controversial new thing like
scatter-site housing is going to involve some degree of "emotional
irrationality" and lack of government credibility. The question is how
to best deal with that so it does not become predominant and how to best
help that portion of a community which is "rational" to surface and
provide leadership.
One of the problems was that the liberal Queens Council was
not in general from Forest Hills. Another problem was the failure of
The particular item cited was a charge made by some rabbis in late
1971 that the Housing Authority was deliberately placing all scatter-
site projects in Jewish areas as a deliberate effort to destroy those
areas. Both he and one of the Planning Commission members were
not able to convince the rabbi each spoke to that the charge was false
on its face, as a look at the list of locations of projects I think shows
fairly easily.
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communication and coordination to take place between the different
government agencies to the degree necessary to compensate for the
Queens Council' s lack of input into the Forest Hills' community struc-
ture. Furthermore, the Queens Council had been a supporter of other
public housing projects in previous years. So not only were they viewed
with suspicion by local residents as a group of liberals who supported
the project as a principle rather than out of any knowledge of the particu-
lars of the neighborhood, but their meetings were usually held amongst
their own membership and other announced supporters. Thus, it was a
case of the convinced talking to the convinced outside of Forest Hills,
except when they were trying to raise support inside Forest Hills by
such methods as distributing leaflets.
Within Forest Hills the Community Affairs person found that
people like school principals and other institutional leaders who were
not actively opposed to the project were nevertheless intimidated enough
by the widespread sense of community opposition as early as April and
May to prevent their speaking out publicly in support of the project. The
only people who were willing to take a public stand were some of the
clergy, but here again there were problems with just how much time and
real effort they were going to put into support of the project.
A case in point was that of Rabbi Bokser, Rabbi Derby, and
Rabbi Polish. They had been cited by Borough President Cariello in his
Board of Estimate speech of December, 1966, as rabbis who supported
the project when he attempted to show that charges of a black-Jewish
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split and no local support for the project were incorrect. Throughout
the long Forest Hills controversy they remained supporters of the pro-
ject. Even so there were problems with how far out on a limb they
would go to support the Authority because it had left them hanging before.
For during the year following approval of the Forest Hills project, Joseph
Christian had met with a small group of local people, including Rabbi
Bokser and Rabbi Derby, who made suggestions about provisions for the
elderly and additional social services. 64 It was agreed to include these
in the project' s program of requirements and also to have the architect
come back to this group for review of the architectural designs. Some-
where along the line the architectural review failed to happen, 65 possibly
being one of those things that got overlooked after the change to a new
architect in September, 1969. In the overall scheme of things for the
Housing Authority, of course, this was a small matter compared to the
larger economic issues it was trying to resolve at that time with HUD.
Yet for local people who had supported in principle the concept of build-
ing public housing in their community when it had been unpopular in 1966
but who were also concerned with the detailed merits of the proposed
project, the lack of follow-through by the Authority was hardly conducive
to encouraging enthusiastic support for the Authority when they were asked
for it in 1971.
Borough President Cariello, at the time of his affirmative vote, said:
I deeply deplore the references to religion and to race
and to a number of other extraneous and unnecessary
statements that were . . . raised during the course of
this hearing . . .
Now I want to say that this is not a religious or
social issue. I have before me telegrams from the three
Rabbis of the congregations in the area, . . . all in s
port of this resolution for the low-income housing . . . 66
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Another problem revolved around the Authority' s relation-
ships with the Community Planning Boards. At a time when they were
emerging as a politically legitimate (and in some parts of the city,
fairly mature) form of community representation, the Housing Auth-
ority' s knowledge of the Boards in that area of Queens was nil; and
given the history of the Community Affairs Office' s responsibilities,
that is not surprising. One can criticize the Authority' s leadership
for not including the Community Boards in their instructions as to who
should be contacted by the staff of the Community Affairs office. How-
ever, I think that misses the real core of the problem, which is best
exemplified by the events in April described below.
As mentioned earlier, Community Planning Board 6 for Forest
Hills and Rego Park and Board 3 for Elmhurst voted their opposition to
the housing project in April. This contributed to the political compli-
cations later on in a number of ways, not only in conventional political
judgments of the local politicians as they made their own judgments
about what posture to take, but also in adding to the complexity of the
city-wide issue of community control in general - a battlecry over which
the Ocean Hill-Brownsville black-Jewish school confrontation and the long
1968 city-wide school teachers strike had been fought. The Housing
Authority, however, only found out about the vote by reading it in the news-
paper. There was then an attempt by the Community Affairs Office' s
Queens representative to contact the chairman of Community Planning
Board 6, Joseph DeVoy. In order to get his telephone number he called
the City Planning Department' s Queens office and got the number from
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the staff person there who was responsible for both Board 4 (covering
Corona) and Board 6. Yet, despite the fact that he got "good vibes"
from this City Planning Department person, neither one suggested that
they discuss the problems of the housing project and try to formulate a
joint strategy for dealing with the Community Board, nor did they ever
meet. 67 And DeVoy, for his part, told him there wasn't much point in
trying to meet with the Board because they had considered the matter
carefully and felt that they knew enough about the project.
The Authority did speak to a couple of other community boards
that month, Board 4 and Board 12 covering Jamaica (the predominantly
black area discussed in Chapter VII of this paper as being in the same
school district as Forest Hills). In a continuation of the strategy of try-
ing to mobilize support for the project from people considered to be the
Authority' s friends, Simeon Golar spoke of the project to Board 12 in
terms of "building a better community than you now have. To68
Board 4 the Authority sent the director of Community Affairs, Blanco
Cedano, in one of the few trips she made to the area during the whole
dispute, and the then deputy director of Program Planning, Jim Messina,
who was ordered to go there possibly because he was Italian. 69 Their
approaches varied from an unsuccessful attempt by the Community
Affairs director to convince people that the project would not have nega-
tive impacts on the schools to the very outspoken and blunt personality
She cited the provision of classrooms in the early childhood center
and said that four public elementary and intermediate schools in the
area were operating at an average of 90% capacity. She could not give
data on the high school question, and could simply refer to a previous
Authority statement that the new high school in Corona would ease over-
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of the man from the Program Policy office, who told the Board, "I' m
not here to sell the idea of this development; it' s beyond that stage. ,70
According to the Times, a number of legislators also agreed privately
with this belief that it was too late to stop construction of the project.
At the same time Assemblyman Lisa was telling a Board 4
public hearing that the Governor' s office was "completely behind the
Corona school compromise, " for that too was still an issue of great dis-
pute. 71
While the Housing Authority did not have the responsibility or
need to keep in contact with what Community Boards were doing on a
monthly basis around the city, the City Planning Department did. It was
the one agency in the central executive government structure, as con-
trasted with the borough presidents, which had staff assigned to monitor
each board. It was the communication link that should have notified
another governmental agency that one of that agency' s projects was on a
board' s agenda for discussion, or, if a matter had been raised and voted
against all in one meeting, that a project was in trouble. Moreover,
given the degree to which Planning Commission Chairman Donald Elliott
had been involved with scatter-site housing from the beginning and the
strong support for the scatter-site housing principle which both the City
*(Continue d)
crowding. 72 The issue of school utilization rates was very messy, as
the City Planning Department and Housing Authority used central Board
of Education figures which the local school board and parents would say
were wrong. Technical differences in calculations, such as the use of
a classroom for a special reading program, thereby employing theo-
retically empty seats' 3 , make it difficult to say one side was right or
wrong. Also, by the central school board' s own figures, a fifth sc Il
in the area (an intermediate one) was operating at 143% of capacity.
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Planning Department' s Queens office director and his staff person
felt, it might have been expected that the Queens office itself would
try delaying tactics with the Board and other community groups to
prevent them from committing themselves while the Planning Depart-
ment tried to get the Housing Authority into the picture. As far as I
know, that did not happen. But even if it did, the contact person at
the Housing Authority for the Planning Department' s Queens staff per-
son was the Authority' s Public Information Office director, who, as
we have seen, was a "low-profile" advocate. 75 So another possibility
is that the Planning Department simply acquiesced in the way that the
Housing Authority was handling matters.
Whichever was the case the Queens Local Area Planning Office
decided, albeit consciously or by default, not to involve itself actively
with the community aspects of the project (other than talking with DeVoy) 7 6
nor with the person actually out in the field for the Housing Authority.
Perhaps it too simply felt that there was no point in spending a lot of
scarce staff time when all the legal approvals were complete, that the
planning process was over, and that it was simply up to the Authority to
execute. Furthermore, a couple of persons from the local office of the
Mayor' s Urban Action Task Force were active in the area. 7 If the
Queens office knew of their presence, it would have reinforced its view
In 1969 the Planning Department had created local offices for each
borough and had physically located them in each respective borough.
This decentralization meant changing power relationships both within
the Planning Department and outside with the borough presidents and
the local citizen organizations.
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that the problem was political. It would then not have been inconsistent
for the Queens Planning Office to stay out of any involvement, just as it
had stayed out of, and continued to stay out of, the Corona high school
dispute, which was under the same staff person' s jurisdiction at this
particular time.
This belief that the problem was political in the bureaucratic
sense, that is, that it was being handled at the highest levels of an agency
and that initiative and direction were to come from above rather than be-
ing initiated by a field office, would have been substantiated by knowledge
that a top level meeting between the Housing Authority, Planning Depart-
ment, and Controller's Office was held in the spring. A report from a
Housing Authority employee, which I have neither confirmed nor found
reason to disbelieve, indicated that such a meeting took place to discuss
the future of the project. 78 Once a decision to carry through on the pro-
ject had been made at this level the local Planning office would have had
to tread delicately, since involvement of City Planning might have been
interpreted as a power-play of Donald Elliott on Simeon Golar' s turf. 9
On the other hand, while the Housing Authority people had no
reason to be familiar with the political and social pressures that had
produced an explosion in nearby Corona, the Planning Department' s
Queens office did, and it should have at least taken the situation a little
more seriously. If nothing else, it might have proved to be more help-
ful in situations where the Housing Authority had no credibility.
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The above comments about planners and community involve-
ment would become irrelevant if one accepted at face value the line of
*
reasoning advanced by Roger Starr in his June, 1972, article, "The
Lesson of Forest Hills":
Still another argument is that scatter-site
housing would have been entirely successful in
Forest Hills if there had been more "involvement"
of the "Community" from the beginning. Yet one
of the specific irritants arose from too much, not
too little, local consultation. As a portent of archi-
tectural wonders to come, the original design of the
project was widely shown in the area after the plan
had been approved. When this design turned out to
be too expensive for federal subsidization, the con-
sultation itself was taken as proof of an intent to
deceive the local people. 80
I am not saying that there would not have been significant oppo-
sition to the project if there had been "community involvement. " Rather
I am saying that the argument advanced by him is specious by being too
great a simplification of the dynamics and specifics of community involve-
ment. The issue is not whether there would have been no opposition. On
the contrary, there is opposition to anything, and scatter-site public hous-
ing had been opposed in various cities across the United States for 20
years, as will be discussed in the last chapter. But how much opposition
is there, how strongly do people feel about it, and to what extent is it
mitigated by support? No, the issue is whether actions which one might
have reasonably and professionally expected from the Housing Authority
and Planning Department to the problem of community opposition could
have prevented the issue from escalating as it did.
* At the time head of the New York Citizens Housing and Planning Council,
Inc. He was appointed Administrator of the Housing and Development Ad-
ministration by newly elected Mayor Abraham Beame in January, 1974.
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The caveat, however, is that of timing, for once the major
thrust of an issue has been started, it may be almost impossible to
change that direction. That was recognized by outgoing Deputy Mayor
Edward Hamilton in his comments about Forest Hills at the end of
1973 when he was reviewing the record of the 8-year Lindsay adminis-
tration in a television interview. Hamilton, who came to New York
from Washington, D. C., in 1970 to be the city' s Budget Bureau
director, stated:
Obviously you try to do all those communi-
cation things behind the scenes before a problem
blows up because it is twenty times easier, and we
did. . .81
He said that Forest Hills was relatively non-controversial in
1966, and added:
After all, it was passed by unanimous Board
of E stimate vote . . .
We had communication with Jerry Birbach and
his group twice with the Mayor before it blew. But
Jerry Birbach has to be viewed as a politician - and he
did later run - and not as a community person inter-
ested in solving a problem. 82
Mr. Hamilton was right in principle but wrong in his judgment
of the situation. His second statement indicates his belief that the period
when easy communication remained possible did not end until the start of
1972, which is apparently when he thinks the problem "blew-up. " How-
ever, I think that positions in the neighborhood had really hardened by
the end of spring, 1971, and that is why so much of this paper has been
spent on this period. Although there is a great deal of material worth
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discussing about the events, decisions, policies, legal issues, and
other matters that come later, the time when the course of events
could most easily have been changed, the time when professionals in
the government had their best chances at preventing a confrontation
had really ended by summer. After that, one is really talking about
how to deal with a conflict whose battlelines have been drawn, irre-
spective of whether the parties on each side were all perceptive enough
to realize it at the time.
Indicative of the problem was the difficulty the Housing Auth-
ority had in just trying to present its case at public meetings, because
in the spring
. . . by the time public meetings were called the
opposition had already held six meetings before.
The only place to talk rationally was with the
Queens Council [for Better Housing and Com-
munity Development] and the local Jewish groups,
but they were [already] our friends. 8
Rumors and misinformation were circulating all over, ranging from
people saying the project was completely unbuildable because of the sub-
soil problems, * to exaggerations about the project' s size (up to 2, 000
units) and to claims that the project would add 900 students to the schools
(a projected age distribution by the Authority indicated about one-half
that figure). 84 By around May, in the retrospective opinion of the
Authority' s staff person who had been going to the local meetings, Forest
Hills had become a unique situation unlike that of any other public housing
project he was familiar with. 85
* As referred to in the previously quoted February newspaper articles.
A Housing Authority staff person said his verbal attempts to explain to
people that this was why the plans had to be changed for high rise buildings
were never reported in the press. 86
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May was a month of several developments relating to both the
housing project and the city' s Corona high school compromise. At the
very beginning of the month was the Times article on Simeon Golar' s
announcement that he thought bids for the Forest Hills project would be
asked for by the end of May and that construction would start by July.
In addition "he said he would soon announce the formation of a com-
munity advisory group in Forest Hills to 'enlist community support and
assist in building bridges of understanding and goodwill. ,,,87 This group
was to advise on "tenant selection" and "needed community facilities
and services. "88 But that announcement was never made. There was a
community meeting organized which met once that month with Golar. It
consisted of many of the same local leadership of rabbis and others who
had gotten themselves together in the abortive 1966 attempt to work with
the Authority in bringing public housing to the area. Again Rabbi Derby
was elected chairman, and again the effort collapsed. The Housing
Authority did not call Rabbi Derby back to continue the effort with a
second meeting, 89 possibly because Simeon Golar decided that the com-
position of the group was not to his liking, perhaps because it was lack-
ing any local politicians. 90 On the other side, when I asked one of the
rabbis in the group why they did not pursue the matter with the city
after the city failed to follow-up, he replied, "After all, we weren't
motivated by real estate interests [as he believed some of the opposition
to be] . . . We weren't crusaders. We had other things to do. '91 (My
emphasis. ) He agreed that the previous lack of cooperation from the
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Authority may also have affected things. So he and other Forest Hills
clergy continued to publicly support the project, continued to be critical
of the "negative climate arising out of emotional reactions to misinform-
ation, "92 but did not get into a mass organizing effort and had no contact
with the Queens Council for Better Housing and Community Development.
For the more the conflict was viewed as a "political" conflict in tra-
ditional terms, the less this rabbi wanted to get involved.
Shortly after Chairman Golar' s announcement, the Authority
produced its "Fact Sheet" on the Forest Hills project. This was a
seventeen page looseleaf document issued at intervals over a total span
of a month or so, but which had its major portions dated May 5, 1971.
It described the project' s planned physical, social, and economic char-
acteristics, as well as giving the Authority's version of the political
history of the project, including its 1966 site selection, and the Auth-
ority' s reaction to some of the objections to the project. It gave no
prediction on the eventual racial composition or percent of tenant occu-
pancy which would be receiving welfare payments other than saying
"Residents of the neighborhood by regulation get first choice of apart-
ments. The benefits to elderly people in the neighborhood will be im-
mediately apparent. "93
The potential benefits of a document giving a coherent pre-
sentation of what was being built were offset by several things. First,
*
in trying the risky task of writing a short history of what was a political
arrangement, the Housing Authority made a mistake, one which even
* The history part was written by the Director of Public Information.
Other parts of the "Fact Sheet" were written and compiled by the Queens
staffer of the Community Affairs office.
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went against the Authority' s own self-interest. Their version said not
only that the housing project had originally been proposed for nearby
Corona, but also that "the city' s original plan was to erect . . . a new
high school on the Forest Hills-Rego Park site" and that the two were
then "switched. "4 As far as I have been able to determine this was
the first time it was officially stated by any government official that the
two were switched and that the city, in its official processes, had ever
planned to put the high school on that 8 1/2 acre site. Before this date
none of the many newspaper articles I read ever indicated that the site
had at one time been selected for a school, nor did any of the internal
government memoranda to which I was able to gain access. Yet after
this time many of the published accounts stated this switch as fact, and
the publication of a simple plausible story in enough newspaper accounts
had a domino effect that led to its general acceptance by journalists and
academics writing later articles. So it would appear that the Housing
Authority "Fact Sheet" was the source of this version, which en-
couraged people opposed to the project to believe that if the school could
have been put on the site before, then it could be put on there now, rather
than letting the Housing Authority use the Board of Education as the source
of the objection to the site for the school. There was, however, some
basis for this confusion (raised also at the February, 1971, protest), as
there had been some local community discussion prior to 1966 about the
possibility of using that site for the needed new high school. These dis-
cussions probably involved the local community school board and maybe
These included all the articles on the Corona high school controversy
and scatter-site public housing by the New York Times from 1966 to mid-
1971.
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Borough Hall. For the many people who did not understand the official
site selection process nor the intricacies of the New York City govern-
ment, these discussions were sufficient to lead them to assume that the
site was going to be selected. Rabbi Bokser, for example, believed in
1974 that the site had been selected for the school prior to 1966 (he can
not recall by what particular branch of "the government") and said that
there was opposition to it by some of the nearby Forest Hills residents,
which led to its being moved to Corona. 95
But this was only a very small part of all the factual material
in the document. Since the document was intended to counter all the
misinformation floating around, one might have expected it to be widely
distributed, perhaps even door to door. But this was the second draw-
back. There was no attempt by the Authority to give it to the membership
of the community planning boards or to distribute it door to door to the
residents living in the blocks immediately around the project site, and
the reason for this was embodied in the philosophy behind its third drawback.
*
Similar misconceptions frequently occur in the capital budget process as
the desire of individual city agencies to look good combines with sloppy re-
porting by small local newspapers to yield a result that is misleading to the
public. For example, a local headline "City Plans New Fire Station for --
in 78" may easily have come from the Fire Department' s publication of a
booklet describing its planned 5 year capital budget. The article will then
carry supporting comments from the local district' s chief officer without
seriously mentioning that the item is only a request which will probably not
be approved by the City Planning Department or Budget Bureau because
they can only approve one-third of the requests. But the memory of the
headline will linger. Five years later some people will be resentful at
what they will feel was another broken city promise, and when the facility
is finally built 15 years later the thing people feel most is the resentment
that it took so long.
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For its third drawback was its negative characterization of
the opposition in its conclusion:
While the Authority realizes that many of
the objections to the project are really veils of dis-
crimination against poor families of our city, it is
also confident that the good sense of the community
will prevail, and that the project l be welcomed
as an integral part of community.
Even if the Authority' s assumptions about the anti-black and anti-poor
biases of the opposition were true, why state it openly to them if one
is trying to win their acquiesence or support, since they were the
people whom the future residents of the housing project would have to
live with? Why speak publicly about "good sense prevailing" when that
carries the connotation to the people whom you are presumably trying to
influence that they do not have good sense?
In fact the "Fact Sheet" was distributed mostly "in-house,
to the press, and to its allies already supporting the project, especially
the Queens Council for Better Housing and Community Development, 97
as a way of bolstering their morale and enthusiasm for the cause. The
opposition to the project was not to be won over, but to be over-ridden,
in the classic way that political battles with racial overtones were fought
out by a show of liberal support countering conservative opposition.
This liberal support, however, failed to materialize on the
evening of May 20th when the City Planning Commission held another
of its continuing series of public hearings in Queens on the proposed
Master Plan, this time for the area of Community Planning District 6.
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With the Times having reported a few days earlier that the Corona com-
promise was still pending in the state legislature the opposition to the
housing project took full advantage of the setting, with its audience of
400 and the potential of press coverage. Members of the newly formed
Forest Hills Residents Association "took control of the stage" after
one of their co-chairmen,
Jerry Birbach, . . . , a large man with a voice to
match, told Planning Commission Chairman Donald
Elliott, 'We want you to tell us now that you will re-
examine this project or nobody else will speak. '
They reviled the City Planning Commission for
45 minutes . . . and danced rings around the plan-
ners, chanting, 'Down with the Project, Up with the
School. '98
They also said that they intended to file a suit in a few days to stop the
project. Taking the whole thing calmly, Don Elliott simply responded
that he saw no reason to change his support of the project.
Although many of the local hearings on the "Master Plan" had
turned into general gripe sessions and harangues about individual items,
those had not received coverage in the Times. This one did, under a
headline of "Forest Hills Homeowners Seize Control of a Planning Hear-
ing, " when there was no basis to say that they were homeowners instead
of apartment renters other than the headline writer' s own image of Forest
Hills. The Times also, for the first time, affirmed the impression that
the residents had been "robbed" by stating as a fact that a high school
planned there had been moved to Corona. 100
An interesting sidelight to this hearing also took place there
when the Queens representative of the Community Affairs office was
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introduced to Jerry Birbach as being from the Housing Authority. Bir-
bach was apparently somewhat surprised, as he recognized him as
having been present at a lot of their meetings. However, Birbach
never asked him for help in getting any information about the project
nor was there any particular effort by this person to deal with the
Birbach-led opposition on the merits of the project. 101
During the next two weeks the Corona compromise legislation
collapsed in the State Assembly after unanimously passing the State
Senate. Although Assemblyman Battista' s bill had been defeated by
the Assembly earlier in May, the bill favored by the city and sponsored
by Assemblyman Lisa was bottled up in committee, ostensibly because
Speaker of the House Duryea considered it unconstitutional. On the
other hand, there were reports that the real reason was that Democrat-
Conservative Battista had agreed to give Republican Speaker Duryea the
vote that the latter needed in order to pass the controversial Rockefeller
state budget in that year' s very narrowly divided politically partisan
House in return for Duryea' s support on the Corona issue. These re-
ports of a deal were, of course, denied, while Speaker Duryea proposed
a bill which the city' s Office of the Corporation Counsel said would not
allow the compromise plan to be implemented. In early June the As-
sembly killed the Lisa bill, and both the Senate and Assembly passed
the new Duryea bill, which was denounced by Mayor Lindsay and Deputy
Mayor Aurelio. Battista replied that the city was now authorized to re-
turn all the homes to their owners (i. e. by not building the school on the
Corona site at all) while the City Council discussed whether alternative
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means, like a city-wide referendum, could legally save the compromise.
Lawyer Mario Cuomo, observing that the bill was a "gamble" because
the city could simply go ahead with the original plan to demolish all the
homes, said he would take legal actions to stop any evictions in order
to delay any action until the next legislative session. Throughout it all
the affected Corona residents remained split in two groups over whether
to accept the compromise or to continue fighting for more from the city,
and the bill remained on Governor Rockefeller' s desk for his signature. 102
So for some people, at least, the high school issue still remained as an
argument to use against the housing project, even though educational
pressure groups that were concerned solely with school overcrowding
wanted the city to go ahead with the Corona site because any change of
site would delay construction for years while new architectural designs
were drawn.
Another educational relationship between the housing project
and the community involved the issue of the racial composition of the
schools and the busing of minorities from the southern part of the local
school district to Forest Hills, the magnitude of which was described
in Chapter VII. Although it was not brought out explicitly in the media
coverage of the controversy, it was clearly an important causal factor
in exacerbating many people' s fears of crime from blacks and poor
people, especially young persons, as stories of individual conflicts
among children in schools could be easily categorized, and more vividly
remembered, as involving blacks. Parents' fears of drugs being brought
into schools by students from lower-class areas, of schools "tipping"
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racially with a subsequent drop in quality, of the problems associated
with groups of kids hanging around schools - all these things were in-
volved in the psychology of fear associated with the introduction of the
housing project.
I was able to confirm that at least some of the Housing Author-
ity staff were aware of this school busing pattern and the problems it
was creating. In some of the private talks which a staff person had with
some of the local citizens in early spring, the attempt was made by the
Authority to suggest that it was "better to have blacks in your neighbor-
hood than to have them bused in, " 103 but this was met with skepticism
as people did not believe the Authority' s word that the busing of blacks
would be proportionately reduced as the local black residential popu-
lation increased. Consequently, he then dealt with school district 28' s
superintendent, its board chairman, and other members on this issue.
Despite the very strong efforts of one board member to convince the
others, the local board refused to come out publicly in favor of scatter-
site housing. It said it would be "inappropriate " and refused to publicly
say that the increase of black students in the Forest Hills schools from
the immediate neighborhood would be compensated for by a reduction in
the number of blacks bused from Jamaica. This was reported in a
memorandum to the higher levels of the Authority and, as far as my
source knew, there was no follow-up on the matter by the top officials. 104
However, this is one of those lines of inquiry which I have not
been able to pursue completely, and although I know of no effort by the
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Authority to refer the matter to higher officials in the central Board
of Education, I cannot be certain of what really happened or why. In
view of the present debate over school busing and recent federal court
recognition of the relationship between housing policy and school in-
tegration, this might be worth further investigation. In any case,
there was no public comment by any educational officials on the matter
throughout the rest of the long controversy, nor do I know of any hint
of behind-the- scenes involvement.
Theoretically this was one area where the involvement of the
City Planning Department would have been more credible and success-
ful. After all, this kind of overall coordination to relate separate agency
programs to overall goals was what people perceived its function to be.
Both the degree of political clout and expertise in performing this kind
of marriage between two agencies was greater in the Planning Depart-
ment than in the Housing Authority. But this may be all academic, for it
may very well be that the Planning Department was not aware of this
situation at all, given the lack of communication between the staff of the
Housing Authority and City Planning Department at that time.
It is interesting to speculate, although the question cannot be
resolved, the extent to which the failures of communication came from
bureaucratic barriers, and how much from particular personalities.
Policy determinations may be mirrored by changes in the
power relationships among the staff of an agency and its head. The
course of subsequent events may be determined by the whole dynamic of
the resulting new interpersonal relationships which involve lines of com-
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munication and trust. These grow out of not just the policy and philo-
sophical values of people but also the personal working style of officials,
including their degree of openness with other staff, their aggressive-
ness, the depth of information (and history) they require before making
a decision, their flexibility, and the degree to which they accept personal
responsibility for the direction of any situation with which they are con-
cerned - even if it was inherited.
This "tremendous reliance on the personalities of individuals"
was recently alluded to by Roger Starr in discussing what it felt like to
be a new top administrator in city government after being a private
citizen involved with housing issues. Calling it a disturbing facet of
government that he "had never thought about before, " he said that the
absence of a simple market measure like profit in private industry means
that there is no way to tell whether anyone is doing a good job other than
by listening to different people' s opinions, which may be based on opinions
about events years old and frequently may be at wide variance. The
"speculation and . . . emphasis on personality, " he concluded, was both
"frightening" and "fascinating, ,105 and this latter characterization is
certainly applicable to the entire Forest Hills saga.
Within the Housing Authority, for example, one should note
that general manager Joseph Christian pretty much dropped out of direct
involvement with Forest Hills after April. For it was soon after that
time that he left the Authority to go to the City Housing and Development
Administration. There is reason to believe that he left simply because
he did not like working with Simeon Golar, either personally or profes-
sionally. 106
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In more general terms, the changing of operating policies of
the Authority (running the gamut from rising admissions of welfare
tenants to liberalizing the lease form to responding to legal challenges
on Authority eviction procedures) were perhaps inevitably linked to a
perception of new minority employees in the Authority versus the old-
line white civil servants who had been working in the system for many
years107 - a phenomenon similar to that occurring in other city agencies.
So as the Authority' s clientele was changing, so was its own internal
composition, and this was simultaneously linked with a narrowing of the
circle of power and trust to persons closer to the Chairman' s office.
This restricted spread of information reinforced the perception within
the Authority' s administrative structure that the project was "political"
from its very inception, -since the site choice had been forced on the
Authority by the Mayor' s office. Rather than getting an extra degree
of detailed attention by the line staff, the project tended to get less; it
was an exception to be handled by the top, which, of course, was busy
with all the other operating problems of the Authority. Since there was
also employee turnover among those acquainted with the project in all government
agencies as the years passed, by the summer of 1971 I do not think there was
any one person who could be said to know a complete and accurate history
of its what and whys.
This was especially true of those who viewed the racial integration
of housing and the city' s employment structure as a conventional political
response to the fact that Lindsay relied on the votes of blacks and minori-
ties to win election rather than as something which was socially desirable
and right on its own face.
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One of the best indicators of the lack of communication be-
tween the top and the bottom was the fact that a Community Affairs
office person does not recall ever hearing the words "scatter-site
housing" - let alone having a general office discussion about its impli-
cations - from the start of 1969 until after Forest Hills blew up. 108
It was only after the fact that he learned that the Latimer Gardens
project, whose renting he had worked on, was a scatter-site project,
and considered to be a model one at that! Also, the exclusion of this
field person for Queens from the Chairman' s strategy meetings on the
Forest Hills projects certainly did nothing to encourage his sense of
confidence in what he was telling people about the project, and, in
fact, after a while he began to feel that there was much going on about
the project at the top that he did not know and which might be contrary
to what he was saying to people he was meeting with. 109
The tone of the Authority toward the Forest Hills situation, if
there had been doubt in anyone' s mind, was clearly spelled out during
the second week of June by a speech that Simeon Golar gave at a dedi-
cation ceremony for the fully-occupied, 423 unit, Latimer Gardens pro-
ject in Flushing, Queens. After citing the Flushing Remonstrance, a
famous colonial document against religious oppression of Quakers by
the government of New Amsterdam, Golar lashed out at the opposition,
saying,
Now in 1971, in the nearby community of Forest
Hills, the voice of discrimination is heard again.
More subtle this time - the voice masks its intent
in a hundred subterfuges. 110
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If there was any doubt about the schism widening, it was resolved
by the public reactions to the speech and by other events that week
reported by the Times. Racism and discrimination were denied by
all. Jerry Birbach added, "Would he call Congressman Benjamin
Rosenthal, Queens Borough President Sidney Leviss, and City Council-
man Arthur Katzman racist? All of these people are committed to
public housing, including me.''il Another person raised the defense
of overburdened subways, buses, and schools; and the Chairman of
Community Planning Board 6, Joseph DeVoy
also expressed indignation. He said of Mr.
Golar, 'If there' s anyone the Flushing Remonstrance
would be addressed to, it would be him. If he is so
interested in helping the poor and putting up low-income
housing, why is he wasting millions of dollars that could
be used for additional housing [ a refereneie o the debate
about the subsoil and need for pilings] ?'
The public hint that liberal politicians were also starting to be
wary of the project came with the announcement that the Congressman
for that district, Benjamin Rosenthal, had asked the federal General
Accounting Office to investigate charges of fraud after receiving over
2, 000 letters of opposition. 113 Congressman Rosenthal was consistently
at the top of the Congressional ranking list issued by the liberal Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action. He also had asked HUD Secretary Romney
to hold up funds for the project pending the results of the GAO investi-
gation. Going even further was Congressman Halpern from the district
covering Jamaica, who wrote the Forest Hills Residents Association
that he opposed the project and "have been expressing my views in no un-
certain terms with the appropriate parties at HUD. ',114
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With this incident as an indicator of the direction things were
going, one can say that this time of late spring and early summer
marked the end of this phase of the Forest Hills project. It had clearly
*
become a public issue. The Housing Authority and opposition had
taken strident public positions against each other with no indication of
compromise between them and no communication either. The opposition
had succeeded in getting attention with its vocal protests and in neutraliz-
ing any immediate show of public support for the project by local elected
officials, as had been hoped for by the Authority and which conceivably
could have occurred, given some of the very liberal politicians in the
area. The local community support for the project was not well or-
Although the role of press coverage throughout the affair was much
criticized for ignoring the statements of support for the project and
emphasizing the confrontation tactics of the opposition, one can specu-
late whether central city government officials - like maybe a planning
commissioner or someone in the city human relations office - would
have raised some questions about what was going on if more of the
Times articles had made their city-wide edition. As in previous and
later cases, the Authority - by luck or by connections - managed to
keep the story of Golar' s Latimer Gardens speech in limited circu-
lation editions. While at the same time a much smaller article on
opposition to the announced construction of a project in the Lindenwood-
Howard Beach section of Queens (near the Bay.and Kennedy airport)
got city-wide coverage. In this case, which was also one of the original
1966-67 scatter-site projects, the Authority' s representative at Com-
munity Board 10' s hearing, James Messina from the program planning
office took the opposite tack, telling 600 people that
'the Authority recognizes the paucity of facilities' but
that they can be added and that the important thing is
to provide housing, in a good neighborhood for low-
income people. 1
Whether the Authority really believed this and/or took any steps to work
with the community planning board and other city agencies to obtain these
facilities I do not know.
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ganized, even though it clearly did exist, and some persons who might
otherwise not have cared one way or the other about the project felt
intimidated enough not to say anything that might be seen as supporting
the project. (One example was the case of an elementary school prin-
cipal, visited by an Authority representative, whose school was not
overcrowded but who was unwilling to say that publicly to project op-
ponents who were saying it was. )116
In early July the Forest Hills Residents Association filed suit
against the project, the Housing Authority finally sought bids on the
project - already one month past when Mr. Golar had predicted con-
struction would be underway, and the General Accounting Office agreed
to conduct an investigation. At the same time as these events of June
and July were taking place, the Community Affairs office of the Authority
started to phase out of the picture. The ending of the initial effort at
raising community support, the fact that the battle was being fought else-
where (as in the courts), and the belief that the decisions were being
made at a higher level into which that office really had no input, all led
*
that office to believe that its time and efforts were best spent elsewhere.
Yet another factor contributing to the apparent slowing down in the pace
of events was the simple fact that people in the community went on summer
vacations.
The Queens staff person worked with a couple of other projects and
spent a major amount of his time in training staff to be tenant hearing
officers as the Authority went over to a semi-judicial type of process
to handle proposed tenant evictions.
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They could go on vacation with at least a little sense of
victory, for there had been a temporary injunction issued against the
Authority during the latter part of July. Thus, for the rest of the
summer it was no longer legally possible for the Authority to sign a
construction contract, even though the low bid eventually came in
six million dollars below what the Authority staff had estimated it would
be, albeit many millions of dollars over the 1966 estimated cost.
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CHAPTER IX - FOREST HILLS HITS THE FRONT PAGES
People laugh at me when I say this, but when you
question the Lindsay people on Forest Hills you get
the same kind of answer you used to get frogy the
White House when you questioned Viet Nam.
-Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal,
an original supporter of the project
now opposing it.
The Village Voice, December 9, 1971
The good middle-class families of the Forest Hills
and Lindenwood section[s] of Queens may not be the
white bigots they are being called . . . But it is hard
to tell . . . The look on the[ ir] faces . . . differs
little from the look on the faces of those 'bad wite
people' of Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama.
-"Politics in Black, "
The New York Amsterdam News
(a Harlem newspaper)
December 4, 1971
Press coverage and editorial opinion on the Forest
Hills affair have hit hard on the theme that the pro-
testors are either bigots or misinformed, or both.
This is inevitable, perhaps, because the middle class
doesn't make good news copy. They aren't like the
lower-class Italian homeowners of Corona, full of color-
ful little ethnic details . . . The middle class speaks for
itself . . . It' s dull, ordinary, predictable, and sup-
posedly reactionary in racial matters . . . This type of
slander is effective in an emotional issue like racial in-
tegration, but it doesn't check out . . . People who
share similar values and abilities can overcome racial
differences. With an influx of low-income families, ho -
ever, that value sharing is minimal and strained . . .
-Article in The Village Voice
November 2 , 1971
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We've never had a thing from the city. Not one
damn thing . . . We' re middle-class liberals.
We' re not supposed to fight back. Our picket line
must have come as quite a shock to him (John
Lindsay). 4
-Joe Walderman, vice-president,
Forest Hills Residents Association
The Village Voice, November 25, 1971
I - Autumn, 1971
After a quiet, perhaps deceptively quiet, summer, Forest
Hills blew up in late fall and winter in 1971, becoming a daily front page
newspaper item. It reached the point where presidential press secretary
Ron Ziegler began answering questions about it in his morning press
briefings (and in an ironic commentary on future Nixon administration
problems, one of his 'answers was then called a "lie" by Senator
Buckley' s office). 5
During this quiescent summer, however, all had not come to a
halt. At the national level the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment made known its intention to promulgate a new policy on the location
of housing eligible for the various federal subsidy programs, a policy
that had the intention of putting more (though not complete) emphasis on
approval of projects outside areas of minority concentration. Publication
of the new criteria asking for comment appeared in the Federal Register
in June, 1971, and again in October, 1971. The final version, published
on January 7, 1972, to take effect one month later 6 was supportive of
low-income housing in Forest Hills. HUD was not unaware of the relation
to the project. William Green, the New York regional administrator of
HUD, commenting on the effect of the new policy, said, "The highest
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priority will go to projects like the Forest Hills project, which does
produce integration. " His statement was published on October 10,
1971. It was only a month later that this project - the epitome of what
HUD wanted to encourage localities to do - became nationally known
by the opposition to it. Yet it was a project which ironically had been
started at local initiative years earlier and which might have progressed
much faster in its planning and design stages with more sympathetic
processing by HUD. Further compounding the irony was the fact that by
now, as a result of the long time differences between policy approval of
housing development location in the city administration and the start of
bricks and mortar, the city had shifted its policy to focus most of its
federal housing subsidy funds in urban renewal and model cities areas
"on the ground(s) that housing should be built in the 'areas that need it
most, which in New York means the areas of minority concentration,
as Deputy Commissioner Frances Levenson of the City Housing and De-
velopment Administration put it. '8
Also during the spring and summer, at what might be called a
combined local and national level, the issue of the housing project began
to be discussed by various Jewish organizations. Since Forest Hills-
Rego Park has one of the heaviest concentrations of Jews in the city
(estimated at two-thirds in 1963 versus 5% in 1930 by Nathan Glazer in
his book, Beyond the Melting Pot), 9 and since the national Jewish or-
ganizations have their headquarters in New York, any item of significant
concern to the local groups could very quickly be transmitted to the staff
at national headquarters.
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The fact that the issue was seen at least locally as one affect-
ing Jews as a specific ethnic group, rather than one affecting whites in
general, created serious splits between the local chapters of Jewish
groups and their respective national organizations, as well as variations
in the positions and approaches taken by the national groups. In the con-
text of HUD' s promulgation of the national site guidelines and the con-
comitant discussion taking place among groups concerned with race and
housing, national Jewish organizations were in general adopting policies
of support for scatter-site housing of both low-income and minority
*
groups in more affluent white residential neighborhoods. But when
the generalities of national policy were confronted with the specifics of
the Forest Hills project by affected local Jewish groups over the suc-
cee ding months in autumn, not only were relations between national of-
ficials and local members strained, but conflicts also arose within the
national staffs themselves. The national organizations were thereby in-
hibited in taking an immediate firm stand, and when finally (if ever)
announced, the impact of their supportive positions upon the public at
large was reduced by knowledge of the local-national dissension. On
the other side, the local Jewish disenchantment with the more liberal
national Jewish organizations increased their alienation from that
national leadership which did not represent them, a disenchantment re-
flected in a shift away from traditional Jewish voting patterns in the
Nixon-McGovern race and in the 1973 New York City Democratic four-
way mayoral primary race.
One of my partners in the research for this study, Sylvia Chaplain,
and my father, Morris Milgram, were both members of the American
Jewish Committee' s National Housing Committee.
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As important as this topic is for Jewish organizational politics
and for Jewish-black relations in general (over such issues as minority
job quotas in affirmative action programs), it is beyond the scope of this
paper to go into the details or internal significance of the many lengthy
debates within the Jewish community on the issue. This paper will re-
fer to the different organizations and their positions only when it seems
appropriate to understanding specific developments in Forest Hills.
Also during the summer Governor Rockefeller, apparently
agreeing with the city' s position, vetoed the Corona legislation, an act
which placed the whole matter in limbo. It also left as its legacy a once
tightly knit small community that was now being torn apart with hatred
and personal distrust as accusations of pay-offs, sell-outs, and other
personal threats flew back and forth while two factions fought over the
compromise proposal. All of this led Jimmy Breslin to say, around the
middle of 1971,
No other city has ever condemned land and given
it back. This is the only administration I know that would
have done this thing . . . I wanted to prove what Norman
(Mailer) and I said in '69 - that the health of a city depends
on the survival of its ethnic communities. But now I' m
sorry I ever got involved. It' s a rat' s nest. I used up all
my credits in City Hall trying 8 help those bastards instead
of myself. Now I owe favors.
Meanwhile, the low-income housing was presumably being held
up by the preliminary court injunction, although in fact the Authority was
secretly satisfied to let that be the public impression while it quietly con-
ducted an engineering restudy of the piling foundation and reduced the
weight of the buildings to be supported. In any case the Authority had no
doubt that it would eventually win the case.
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On October 29, 1971, it did win. * The State Supreme Court
refused to rule on the social questions involved in the project' s lo-
cation, and said that the charges that neighborhood depreciation would
result from low-income housing were not proven. The judge also said
that because the funds involved were federal, the Court could not grant
a permanent injunction even if there had been "waste, " noting that the
Court was deliberately skipping the question of whether or not any un-
usually high costs might be compensated for by any social benefits. 12
But the more significant forerunner of things to come was the
tone of the testimony at the City Planning Commission public hearing
of October 13th on the Lindenwood public housing project (see footnote,
p. 249 ). This five year old 559 unit development of 12 buildings, 3 to 9
stories high, was almost ready for construction, except that, unlike
Forest Hills, it needed a final round of public approvals for changes in
zoning and the city street map. Continuing the thrust of a line of ob-
jection that had been going on for at least a year, 13 the testimony es-
calated from problems of lack of services to a widespread fear of crime
and physical violence from black occupied public housing projects against
Jews. It culminated with a written statement from a local Rabbi, Maurice
Simckes, which said, "'It strikes me as tragic that all middle-class
areas selected for low-income projects are Jewish areas. ' It asked
whether this was so because other ethnic groups 'fight back and Jews
are not known to?' " 4 The reaction from the two Jewish Planning Coin-
This was not the first court case involving the project. The judge noted
in this decision that a request for a preliminary injunction had been denied
in March, 1969, in the case of Cohen v. Lindsay (New York Law Journal,
March 11, 1969, p. 16, col. 3).
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missioners, Gerald Coleman and Prof. Chester Rapkin, was one of
public shame and outrage, with Rapkin terming the statement as
"paranoid. "15 The conflict between the commissioners and the Rabbi
was, of course, covered and circulated in the Jewish press, and in
the long run the denials were less important than the very raising of
the issue itself.
Activities focussed on the project now seemed to proliferate.
Moreover, their significance broadened, for this was the time when
there was rising political speculation about a presidential bid by Mayor
Lindsay, a bid in which his presumed strength would be from urban
liberals and blacks. By the same token, any possible bid by Simeon
Golar, the highest black appointive official in the city and active in the
Liberal Party, for Mayor or other high elective office would also need
to rely on the support of the liberal and black constituency in the city.
The opening salvo came from the National Committee Against
Discrimination in Housing, which in federal testimony in Washington,
D. C. on November 3rd accused the city of "bowing to white resistance"
in killing eight of the original eleven scatter-site projects. Calling
New York a more subtle case than Chicago, it called for a cut-off of
federal public housing funds, as had been done by court order a month
earlier in Chicago in the Gautreaux case. Golar defended the city' s
scatter-site program, as having 1, 700 units of 8, 522 under construction
being built outside of "slum" areas, with another 2, 500 units planned.
The last figure included the Lindenwood project, whose zoning and map
changes had been approved that same day by the Planning Commission.
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Much of the difference between the two sides, of course, lay
in whether a neighborhood that was not a slum would satisfy the criteria
of integrationists as being in an all white area as opposed to being in a
?gray" non-slum area, one in which public housing, in the view of some,
would merely accelerate a rate of racial change that was already under-
way rather than help in stabilizing an area. The Housing Authority in-
cluded those projects located in transitional areas and also those that
were in all white areas but were designed for 100% elderly occupancy.
But activist groups on the other side wanted projects in higher class
non-gray areas, and the higher the percentage of elderly in a planned
project, the less these were considered to fulfil the purposes of scatter-
site housing, which included giving greater opportunities in a better
neighborhood for families with children.
Thus, aside from reasons of principle, Golar and the city ad-
ministration needed to be seen as taking a strong, and visible, stand
The executive director of National Neighbors, a national federation
of inter-racial neighborhood organizations, confirmed to me that her
member groups were constantly fighting plans of Housing Authorities and
HUD to build public housing or publicly assisted housing in neighborhoods
which her member associations were trying to keep viably integrated and
prevent from "tipping. "
**
See "Scatter-site Housing: Forest Hills and Other Battles, " New
York Post (fourth article in a five part series), April 27, 1972, p.7 4 1 ,
for a discussion of the location and elderly make-up of 24 projects
designated as scatter-site by the Housing Authority.
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on Forest Hills when it broke, for it was a major part of the scatter-
site program for which the city was already on the defensive.
In the first week of November, the regional office of HUD
acted on the one week old request from the Housing Authority for
concurrence in the awarding of bids for the project and approved an
official amendment of the contract with the city for the new funding
amount by the local area HUD office. This in fact was one of those
cases of judgment at the top in a situation where an agency could block
something by following the rulebook if it wanted to, and the people in
the agency were well aware of that. For the opposition had by this
time raised the issue of the need for an environmental impact state-
ment as per the.National Environmental Policy Act before substantive
construction had started. With that matter in doubt because HUD was
disputing the general flat need for environmental impact statements on
all housing developments in the country and especially on those planned
before the date when NEPA was passed (1969), conservative policy would
have dictated taking no action on the project. But the regional head of
HUD wanted to keep the project moving now that the Housing Authority
was legally and administratively able to start action. So he authorized
the signing by HUD of the necessary new financial contracts and HUD' s
concurrence in the award of construction contracts by the Authority. 16*
By making a determination that the project had no environmental impact,
based on draft environmental impact documents provided by the city Hous-
*
The formal approval was on November 8. The Annual Contributions 17Contract with the Authority was amended for a project cost of $29, 980, 000.
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ing Authority on November 5, the agency legitimatized its taking of a
substantive action on the project without waiting for the production of
a formal impact statement of its own. Nevertheless, it eventually
*
wrote an environmental impact statement even while claiming that it
was not legally required to, rationalizing that it was its policy to do so
in controversial cases. This was accepted by a federal court and
thereby avoided a negative court decision which would have been precedent
setting at the time.
On November 17, 1971, the project hit the front pages of the
newspapers and remained there. Senator Buckley announced that he
had persuaded HUD Secretary Romney to review the project. Congress-
man Rosenthal reiterated his opposition and accused HUD of breaking a
pledge not to fund the project until after the General Accounting Office
had completed its investigation (a charge which conveniently ignored his
own statement earlier in the summer that he would not take a stand on
the merits of the project until the report was in). 20 Mayor Lindsay re-
*
The draft impact statement was released for complete circulation to
federal agencies and other parties for comment on January 14, 1972.
The final statement for the Council on Economic Quality and the public
was released on March 28, 1972.
An official involved in the production of the one-half inch thick
document said that the administrative effort involved had required many
man-months and that if a similar effort were made for all federally
sponsored projects everything at HUD would simply grind to a halt as a
result of the administrative effort involved. 18
One of the consequences of the process was the application of
environmental standards not in force when the project was initiated. Air-
port noise standards which made an area housing over two million people
in New York City either completely off limits or marginal for any type of
federal housing investment or mortgage guarantees led to the decision to
require air conditioning for all the units. The extra cost for heavier
wiring and individual room air conditioning units for the 840 apartments
was estimated at just under one-half million dollars. 19 That, in turn, be-
came another source of resentment for the Forest Hills middle-class resi-
dents about the "luxuries" provided for the poor.
252
-262-
sponded by asking whether " political considerations' would be allowed
to overrule a 'professional evaluation, ' " (i. e., the approval by HUD
staff) and said that this raised the issue of whether the federal govern-
ment was willing to enforce its own guidelines. 21 Romney responded in
a press conference that being in an area away from minority concen-
tration was one of only a number of criteria against which HUD judged
projects, others being environmental impact, etc. The head of the Queens
Council for Better Housing and Community Development, Herbert Kahn,
joined the fray by requesting Romney to meet with representatives of his
25 groups in support of the project.
On the evening of Thursday, November 18th, a mass rally and
torchlight parade protest at the site peaked briefly into just enough
violence for the police to call for reinforcements and fire engines, as
demonstrators tossed rocks and torches at the construction trailors which
had been moved onto the site the day before. Although the "mob", as it
was called by a police officer on the scene, had dispersed into small
groups by the time the extra equipment arrived, and although no major
damage occurred, the high level of emotions was clear. It was made
more clear to the rest of the city the next morning with a four column
wide, front page, New York Times dramatic photograph of a demonstrator
in the act of hurling a flaming torch. And the message of the group was
clear - a combination of fear of what they expected the project to bring
and hatred of Mayor Lindsay. 22
Events quickly escalated in a matter of days. Lindsay denounced
the incident, and the opposition denounced Lindsay in no uncertain terms.
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NAACP head Roy Wilkins called the opposition racist, and the opposi-
tion continued to organize demonstrations at the project site despite a
temporary restraining order which the city had obtained. 23 Senator
Jacob Javits issued a statement in support of the project, the prelimi-
nary report of the General Accounting Office was publicized as raising
some questions about the financial feasibility of the project with its high
foundation costs, * and Congressman Rosenthal - rejecting repeated
telephone efforts by Dick Aurelio to get him to change his position -24
said the city had not considered the level of public facilities or com-
munity attitudes in planning the project. Jerry Birbach and Simeon
Golar traded accusations of "bigot" and "liar" with each other on a
television debate, 25 the Queens Jewish Community Council accused the
Housing Authority of deliberately trying to destroy Jewish communities,
a firebombing of a Queens home was initially linked (possibly incorrectly)
to the conflict, and the Federal Aviation Administration joined the Linden-
wood residents in opposing that scatter-site project because of noise
Actually, the final GAO report of December 1, 1971, found no indication
of any improper costs or other irregularities. It concluded that the "ready
to build cost of the site" of $3. 8 million ($2. 3 million for land and $1. 5
million for "abnormal foundation costs), or $10. 33 per square foot, "com-
pares favorably with previous sales prices of comparable land parcels in
the area. "
It noted, however, that HUD' s understanding that it would pay no
more than $1. 7 million for pilings when it approved the site in 1968 was only
verbal. So, to protect HUD the GAO said it should get a written agreement
from the Housing Authority to pay any costs over $1. 7 million. This was be-
cause, as the report said, there was some degree of uncertainty over the
length of piles needed until test piles were load tested, and there was no way
of knowing the number of iles required due to rejected or broken piles until
all work was completed.
Part of the long foundation history discussed in the report was the
fact that in January, 1967, HUD' s appraisers had recommended rejecting
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levels from Kennedy airport. The Times review of the Forest Hills
situation concluded that race was the major issue, and Jerry Birbach
kept emphasizing the Jewish nature of the area and the Lindsay ad-
ministration' s insensitivity to Jews, citing as an example the fact that
he was served on the Sabbath with a court order restraining further
demonstrations. At the end of a week Secretary Romney said "he
could not see 'any basis on which I can reverse prior firm contractual
commitments' "28; Jerry Birbach told 500 people picketing the site that,
nevertheless, the project could and would be stopped; and bulldozers
started clearing the site on the same day. (The bulldozers were a public
relations effort by the Authority to convince people something was happen-
ing, out of a fear they would lose the project otherwise. )29
Things continued like this for weeks, with the political con-
troversy rising and the issues on which the debate was taking place
widening. The issue of community control reappeared in strengthened
form, with the Mayor saying that no project in the city could be imple-
mented without full community consultation, especially since it had to
be approved by the City Planning Commission and Board of Estimate, a
position which both supporters and opponents of the project said was not
true. Various Jewish groups issued statements in support of the project
* (continued)
the site because of possible high foundation costs, but the matter was re-
solved over the following months. Also, a private developer, who between
1961 and 1964 had sunk test pilings as part of a plan to build two 23-story
apartment buildings, was turned down in his request for an FHA insured
mortgage because the FHA "questioned the marketability of a project with 27
the high foundation costs. " The project was then dropped by the developer.
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while others reiterated the charge that the Jewish way of life in Forest
Hills would be destroyed. The Queens chapters of the NAACP said op-
position to the project was based on racial prejudice. 30 People argued
about whether or not a majority of the Forest Hills residents were
against the project. 31
Among the most important politicians to take a stand was
Congressman Herman Badillo, the former borough president of the
Bronx. He said that some of the politicians opposing the project were
"' copping out' of their responsibilities. ,32 He became the most articu-
late politician supporting the project and wrote an article in the Decem-
ber 2nd Village Voice attempting to refute on a detailed point by point
basis the fears about the project, the statements that the city had thrown
in no sweeteners to the community, and the claims of overstrained pub-
lic services. For example, he asserted that local officials had never
made any serious efforts to improve services, such as by meeting with
the Planning Commission, and that it was therefore a phony issue. 33
This was then denied by Community Board 6 chairman Joseph DeVoy.
On the other side, lower Manhattan Congressman Edward Koch,
whose Greenwich Village political club ultimately split with him by vot-
ing to support the project, became the first liberal congressman outside
of Queens to be publicly against it. He was quoted in the November 25th
issue of The Village Voice as saying,
The residents of Forest Hills are expressing two very
real and rational fears. The fear of crime is a very
real one, and second, it' s absolutely rational to be-
lieve property values will decline in the area of a hi h
rise project. Fear moves in and people move out. 3
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To counter the claim that the opposition was necessarily racial in
nature the article recounted Koch' s recollection of a meeting in which
the former black mayor of Cleveland, Carl Stokes, told fellow black
politicians about his attempts to build low-income public housing in
middle-class black areas. ' If you think it' s only whites who don't
want low-income housing projects in their neighborhoods, ' Koch re-
members Stokes saying, 'baby, you' re wrong. ' '5
Also coming out against the project were Queens Borough
President (and former city councilman) Donald Manes and Queens
county political leader Mathew Troy.
Within the Queens Council for Better Housing and Community
Development, the black membership eventually overruled the white
liberals in deciding to have counter-demonstrations in support of the
project at the construction site, saying, "We have to show-up these
people' s racism. ,,36 This resulted in simultaneous demonstrations
separated by police lines, and the contrasts in the political, racial,
social outlook, and geographic origins of the participants (some sup-
porters being bused from other areas of Queens and the city) only tended
to be emphasized.
On November 23rd a very significant decision was made by the
Board of Estimate, which voted to kill the Lindenwood public housing
project despite its two previous approvals of the project. Mayor Lind-
say, Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, and Bronx Borough Presi-
dent Robert Abrams were the members to vote for the project. Reports
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indicated that the last minute swing vote against the project behind the
scenes was that of Controller Abe Beame. The surprise decision was
interpreted by all as being a valid indicator of feelings about Forest
Hills, and the residents of Lindenwood publicly thanked the Forest Hills
people for making their victory possible. Percy Sutton, the only black
member of the Board, commented on the decision that the last time he
had felt so bad was when "he felt fear on a bus ride from Atlanta,
Georgia, to Jackson, Mississippi. ,7
On December 3rd a new suit by another Forest Hills group was
filed in State Supreme Court against the project. The most important
part of the suit was the charge that the project as being built was not the
same project that was approved by the City Planning Commission and
Board of Estimate in 1966. It was alleged that the change of the physical
configuration of the structures within which the unit types were arranged -
from one 22 story, three 12 story, and three 10 story buildings to three
24 story buildings - was so substantial that new legal approvals by the
city were required.
Also in early December the Housing Authority said it expected
the racial mix of the project to be 60-65% white, 35-40% black, with the
first priority for admission to be those persons from the immediate area
of Forest Hills-Rego Park and second priority to be Queens in general.
However, since one of the problems was that the Housing Authority' s
credibility was so low that some residents did not even believe the state-
ment that 40% of the units would be for the elderly, this one had little
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effect. Or, to the extent people believed it, they would respond that
after a few years Housing Authority projects went all black anyway,
whether the Authority wanted to do it deliberately or not, as a result
of changing population characteristics of the applicants for public
housing - a trend they felt was beyond the Authority' s control. On the
other hand, Congressman Badillo wrote that he thought that having less
than 35% minorities was grounds for "blacks and Puerto Ricans . . .
(to be) outraged, " for it indicated "that the city has bent over back-
wards to accommodate Forest Hills at their expense. "38 To which
Nat Hentoff responded, "Does anyone doubt that sense of outrage
exists?"39
This difficulty, that "people there believe that low-income
housing is for Blacks and Puerto Ricans only, "40 was discussed in a
very interesting City Planning Department memorandum (a memo
directed to its public information office rather than to people in the field
office because Chairman Donald Elliott had recently started talking
publicly about tenant selection policy). It pointed out that Brownsville
and other heavily concentrated minority areas of the city that used to be
Jewish areas still contained many elderly Jews - Jews whom much of
the larger Jewish community had forgotten about, who were too afraid
to venture out of their apartments, and who in any case no longer had any
local Jewish institutions to go to. For these people, it pointed out, the
40% elderly allocation was ideal, and would increase as well the attendance
at the local Jewish institutions, institutions which had moved at a cost of
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millions of dollars from former Jewish areas and were afraid of any-
thing which might start a trend that would cause them to relocate again.
It also suggested that preferential treatment for lower floor apartments
might be given to elderly orthodox Jews who would not use elevators on
the Sabbath, if in fact these lower floors were designed for the elderly.
(They were not, in keeping with a policy of putting large family units
close to the ground. ) But, as a key section of the memo stated:
The problem we will have to overcome is that
no one in Forest Hills believes that the city can be
trusted to keep its word. I wrote to another rabbi
arguing that the responsible Jewish position ought to be
that the Jewish poor must be given an equitable portion
of the housing. One response was the following: 'The
most problematic part of your letter was the assumption
that the Housing Authority will prevent the proposed de-
velopment from becoming a Black enclave by ensuring
an equitable portion of Jewish poor receiving apartments.
Here, the Housing Authority record is not too encourag-
ing. ' 41
As this memo indicated, in mid-December Planning Commission
Chairman Don Elliott had added to his public defense of the project a sug-
gestion that an advisory committee including Forest Hills people might
help the Housing Authority screen prospective tenants. This suggestion
drew less than unanimous praise, as there was uncertainty about whether
he meant private citizens would have access to the details on an indi-
vidual' s application or would merely give guidance as to selection criteria
and priorities. The Housing Authority and other liberal groups were
willing to accept the latter position, but were strongly opposed to the
former possibility as a dangerous intrusion on the confidentiality of an
applicant' s personal history, the responsibility for which rested with the
Authority.
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Meanwhile, at another level of action, efforts had been in-
tensified to have the White House intervene after the refusal of Romney
to stop the project. Spearheaded by Senator Buckley, who by now was
charging that the selection of the site had been "dictated" by City
Hall, there was a period of several days of confusion and contra-
diction. Buckley' s office quoted powerful presidential assistant John
Erlichman as saying that the White House was "actively" looking at,
and "concerned" about, the project, and had not yet "foreclosed" on
it. At the same time press secretary Ron Ziegler said that although
the President would not intervene to stop the project then, that Buckley
had "new" information which would be looked at, a claim which Buck-
ley' s office said was not true. On the next day Ziegler reversed him-
self and said the White House was still reviewing it. 42 The Housing
Authority, for its part, said it did not think the President had the legal
power to stop the project.
Also in early December, the Corona situation re-emerged. A
year after saying the compromise offer was "final, " Deputy Mayor
Aurelio, in one of his last acts before resigning to run Lindsay' s presi-
dential campaign bid, announced a new compromise that would leave 47
of the homes in place as opposed to the original 32, leaving only 13
homes that had to be physically moved to new lots. As Mario Cuomo
tells it, he and Aurelio were sitting in Aurelio' s office wondering what
to do, with the site plan spread over the desk. And idly sitting there,
"after the plans had been looked at by planners and engineers for six
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months, I suddenly said to Dick, 'Dick, you' re not going to believe
this, but we can save ten more homes by moving this line 50 feet. ,43
What they had done was simply move the school building slightly over.
This meant that the backs of the houses would then be up against the
building, a situation which did not conform to the modern standards
of school site planning. But, as Mario Cuomo said, this was a common
situation with old school buildings all over the city and one which people
could live with better than being completely evicted.
In Cuomo' s view this was the kind of technical trade-off that
planners should have made in dealing with the larger issues of preser-
vation of people' s homes versus ideal school sites, but which they did
*
not. And it is probably true that many of the original reasons for want-
ing schools set out in an open area, such as noise, light, fire truck
access, etc. , could be satisfactorily resolved during the detailed design
stage of the process. To do this from the beginning would change the
whole site selection process from the simple application of routine
standards to someone being required to initiate and then follow through
on small details throughout the years-long city processes. If nothing
Planning Commission Chairman Don Elliott has always maintained
that the compromise was a mistake. For one thing, he feels that the
nature of the immediate neighborhood will be so changed by the high
school that the people will regret having4 ught to keep their homes
where they were rather than relocating.
**
The touchy issue of architectural review, and the fact that the city
does not hire a private architect until after a site has been selected,
raises another set of complications.
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else, it would complicate matters simply because it would require
substituting another level of individual judgments in an area where a
set of basic rules had guided the administrative system before and
had made agreement between different agencies of government easier
to achieve. It required, in other words, the institutionalizing of
*
flexibility.
This new plan, enabling legislation for which was to be sub-
mitted again to the State Legislature in January, did not settle the in-
ternal bitter split among the Corona residents. Assemblyman Battista
and a faction headed by Lilian Manasseri still opposed it, and Mrs.
Manasseri announced that her group would join the Forest Hills resi-
dents in opposing the housing project in order to put the school there.
A start was made toward this end, under prodding from the City
Planning Department, by having a consultant and study committee con-
vince the Board of Education and the Budget Bureau in late 1971 that
they should adopt a policy of 1) building much smaller schools, 2) leas-
ing space for school use in a flexible manner in residential and com-
mercial buildings. Smaller schools not only had less site problems,
they also had less of a security problem as well as other educational
advantages in terms of personal interaction.
The study was critical of building large over-designed struc-
tures with a life expectancy of 75 years when the educational usefulness
of the building frequently ended much earlier. It sugested that all pro-
jects be re-examined in view of these new policies.
The consultant for the study was subsequently appointed head
of the school planning section of the Board of Education when its poWe r-
ful and longtime head, Adrian Blumenfeld, retired. Although it seemed
irrelevant to the high school and Forest Hills issue then, several years
later it was going to enter into the picture in an important way.
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(The fact that it took a year for the Corona "Fighting 69" people to
come out in support of the people in the Forest Hills protest is an
indication that there was no love lost between the groups, either ethni-
cally or in the sense that the new residents of the apartments in Forest
Hills-Rego Park were perceived by the old Corona people as the ones
who were slowly forcing out their life style. ) The split in the city ad-
ministration was also made clear during the December hearings of the
Planning Commission on the proposed school capital budget, as Don
Elliott, getting pressure from parents groups about the need for more
schools, accused Assemblymen Miller and Battista of being responsible
for adding to school overcrowding by their opposition to the New Queens
High School in Corona.
The manner in which Mayor Lindsay involved himself in the
Forest Hills controversy is another matter of interest. The question
must be raised of whether his activities furthered or retarded the
resolution of the conflict, or, to look at it from a slightly different per-
spective, whether they furthered or retarded the short or long range
future of scatter-site housing.
As early as the end of November the viewpoint being publicly
expressed by the Mayor was that "In the final analysis, this is a funda-
mental test, and will be so viewed nationally, as to whether those who
argue for integrated communities have the courage of their convictions. "46
At the same time, as he drew attention to the project by citing its signifi-
cance, he continued a policy of not giving any degree of recognition to the
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opposition by refusing to meet with them, which furthered their ability
to say in the community that the city refused to even listen to them. In
addition, with the emphasis on the racial objectives of the project, and
with the self-serving argument being circulated within the neighborhood
that they were picked because Jews were passive liberals not prone to
violence, there was a visceral envy and resentment brought forth with
the memory of the Mayor's much publicized visits to Harlem and
Bedford-Stuyvesant when there was violence there. All of this seemed
to coalesce in the feeling - somewhat bitter after the Mayor' s support
for the "black viewpoint" in the Oceanhill-Brownsville school dispute
and subsequent teacher' s strike - that one got favored treatment if one
was black, especially if one was violent.
With the Mayor not seeing local people, the line administration
official left to deal with all this was Simeon Golar who, after events of
the previous eleven months, was hardly in a position to reduce tensions,
despite his having a secret meeting with Jerry Birbach in the fall. 4 He
just had to take the flack, and he took a lot, including being misquoted
by some Jewish groups that the successfully integrated Pomonok housing
project had no whites on its waiting list as a part of the overall dispute
about the racial trends in public housing projects in Jewish areas.
With all this emotional undercurrent, the situation was not
helped at all when the Mayor' s press secretary said in November, even
though it may have been true, that "the Mayor had not appeared in Forest
Hills because the community was 'not on the verge of an explosion that
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would involve human life and safety. ''48 For people feeling ignored
the implications of this were obvious. One of the consequences of this
were the repeated public references - picked up in the press, of course -
by Jerry Birbach that he would try to keep the weekly protest marches
nonviolent, which was a very subtle way of implying the threat of violence
without actually having to pay the price (legal and emotional) of violence.
On December 9th, Lindsay gave a speech at a groundbreaking
ceremony for a public housing project in the Williamsburg section of
Brooklyn (a low-income area with a mixture of Puerto Ricans, Hassidic
Jews, and blacks) in which he said that that project in Brooklyn was of
"worldwide importance" in that it showed, speaking as if it were already
built, that "people of every race . . . [can]. . . live together in peace"
and that "politicians do not have to lead them into war, ugliness, bitter-
ness, and despair. " He asked, "Will our civilization be remembered
for its buildings or the quality of its justice ?" and in a reference to the
India-Pakistani and Arab-Israeli conflicts, asked why "political leader-
ship, instead of appealing to the best in people, brought out the worst in
them, " and criticized "petty politicians. " (This last remark was ii-
terpreted by some to be aimed at Senator Buckley, whose White House
review of Forest Hills had started two days earlier. Lindsay denied
this. ) After the ceremony Lindsay said that as far as the Forest Hills
project was concerned, "There is nothing further to be said. No com-
promise. No change in plans. "'h It was those last comments about
Forest Hills, not the lofty ones about the Brooklyn project, that made
the headlines on the newspaper columns.
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The following week there was speculation in both the general
and Jewish press that a "compromise" reduction in the size of the
project was possible. Simultaneously, attention was given to a state-
ment by "a vigorous supporter of the project, "50 Rabbi Ben Zion
Bokser of Forest Hills, that he still supported it, but "would prefer
to see the project smaller. "51 An opposition Sunday demonstration of
an estimated 3, 000 people was countered by two smaller supporting
demonstrations, with the different parties separated by about 250
police. 52
In this atmosphere, a highly significant and controversial step
was taken by John Lindsay. After being criticized repeatedly by both
complete opponents of the project and some supporters of the project
for refusing to meet with anyone from the local community to discuss
*
the situation, Lindsay, at his own initiative, and apparently without
consulting officials like Simeon Golar or Human Relations Commissioner
Elinor Norton, 53 called a large meeting on the project. Invited to the
meeting, along with these two officials, were other top officials - in-
cluding both deputy mayors, former Deputy Mayor Aurelio and Donald
Elliott; a variety of black civil rights leaders; representatives of the
opposition from Queens, including Jerry Birbach and Jewish groups; and
Jewish groups supporting the project. Not invited were any elected of-
*
An official of a Jewish organization trying to mediate the conflict was
told by the Mayor' s administrative assistant, "The Mayor doesn' t sit
down with local groups, " a statement this official termed "bullshit. t54
State Senator Gold from Forest Hills (another person with a 100% A. D. A.
rating) said the Mayor' s "confrontation politics . . . [ had] set public
housing back 15 years. "55
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ficials nor the Community Planning Board 6 chairman Joseph DeVoy
(an omission later termed an "oversight" by the Mayor' s office after
Jerry Birbach invited him, but one which led DeVoy to charge that it
was typical of the way the Mayor gave "lip service" to the community
planning boards).56
The American Jewish Committee, which had not taken a pub-
lic position on the project so that it could keep its lines of communication
*
open with both sides in an attempt to create a "rapprochement" between
them, was horrified at the way the meeting was called and organized, with
both hard line sides together in a public type meeting. It put on a last
minute effort with the Mayor' s staff to call off the meeting, and, failing
that, attempted to dissuade the various Jewish groups and Jerry Birbach
from going. 57 It was only partly successful with Jewish groups and
failed with Birbach. Birbach, who had earlier been unsuccessful in
getting a private meeting with the Mayor, said he went because he "owed
it to my friends in the media, "58 for which he held press conferences
both before and after the meeting.
The meeting was opened by the Mayor saying there would be no
change in the project. 59 And that was the tone throughout the 1 1/2 hour
calm meeting - Birbach said little ("I didn' t come to talk, I came to
listen, ")60 but blasted the Mayor afterwards. Preparing for a chartered
bus protest to the Mayor' s home, Gracie Mansion, for the following day,
he said in his news conference, "We are not interested in screening ap-
*
As a result it was also able to get information about what was happen-
ing that it otherwise would not have been able to.
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plicants to the project. The community will defeat the project. "61 Civil
rights groups were happy at the Mayor' s strong stand, which was that
any reduction in the size of the project would mean killing it because of
increased costs and the need to go back to the Board of Estimate. Simeon
Golar left early to catch an airplane flight and said there was no compro-
mise but that "we are still trying to involve the Forest Hills people in the
62
project" by forming an advisory community group.
Elected officials, who had fumed about not being at the first
meeting, met with the Mayor a week later. This meeting, held just
after Lindsay' s hour-long meeting with civil rights leaders, was termed
a "waste of time" by Borough President Manes because Lindsay refused
to support a compromise to make the project 12 stories high, a change
which Congressman Rosenthal said "would be a plus for scatter-site
housing. " 63 Manes, who as a city councilman had opposed scatter-site
housing, particularly objected to Lindsay' s use of the word "morality."
"To talk about morality in this case is idiocy. We are for a project on
this site. The disagreement is about size. ",64 Civil rights leaders,
meanwhile, issued a statement saying that the issue was whether one
would have an integrated society, pointing out that scatter-site housing
had been opposed all over the country. NAACP head Roy Wilkins put
the stakes as high as they could go by saying that if Forest Hills were
stopped, "it would mean the end of the program of scatter-site housing
throughout the country. Even to make it smaller, he said, would be
'heralded as a defeat for scatter-site housing.' " 65
No politician mentioned publicly how to finance the reduction in
the size of the project. Nor did civil rights supporters talk about what
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was happening at that very time to New York' s ongoing attempts to plan
new scatter-site projects, both low and moderate income. Various under-
takings were being withdrawn and defeated as politicians began reacting
negatively to the proposals because of the very fact that they were con-
sidered controversial. Nor did anyone ask, publicly at least, how one
could simultaneously try to convince Forest Hills residents that most of
the project' s occupants would be both local and white, as the Housing
Authority had stated, when the project was being identified by national
civil rights leaders as being crucial to blacks and other minorities trying
to escape from the slums and ghettos.
On December 17, the same day as the first Mayoral meeting, the
opposition obtained from a federal judge an order for the city to show
cause on January 18 why the project should not be stopped for environ-
mental reasons. *66 It was for this case that HUD was preparing the en-
vironmental impact statement referred to earlier. The Housing Author-
ity, which had so far only been clearing land at the site, was given per-
mission by the judge (as is apparently routine in these cases) to drive
18 test pilings as long as it gave the other side notice. 67
This produced another one of those little anecdotes about the
nature of relations between the two sides. Haskell Lazere of the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, trying anything that might change the public tone
of conflict, said to Dr. Alvin Lashinsky (president of the Queens Jewish
Donald Elliott' s comment on this was that for five and one half years
no one raised the issue of noise or environmental impact, and then it was
used by the opposition as one more method to haunt the project. 8
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Community Council, which was one of the first Jewish groups to oppose
the project in the beginning of the year) that the test pilings represented
an "agreement" between the lawyers of the two sides. So he suggested
that Lashinsky, who had boycotted the Mayor' s meeting, call Housing
Authority vice-chairman Walter Fried (as Golar had just taken the air-
plane trip) and issue a joint release describing the agreement. Lashinsky
did so. "Fried called back saying 'We are litigants. Our policy is not
to issue press releases during litigation, and besides, we don' t want to
issue any releases with you. ' 69
Among the other events taking place during the last two weeks
of December were State Senate hearings on the project, hearings which
led to a variety of angry exchanges between Jerry Birbach and the State
Senators when Birbach said he was not opposed to the principle of
scatter-site housing but would like to see two-story garden apartments
for the elderly of all races. 70 The issue was further exacerbated, both
at the hearings and otherwise, by a counter demonstration of 200 people
in front of Birbach' s company, a real estate office on West 91st Street
in Manhattan which owned and was renovating properties in and around
Manhattan' s West Side Urban Renewal Area. 71 The hearings also heard
the black organization N.E. G. R. 0., represented by its head Dr. Timothy
Matthew denounce scatter-site housing as "genocide. ,,72 Planning Com-
mission Chairman Elliott reiterated the original criteria for selecting
sites for scatter-site housing and the importance of continuing the pro-
ject once such difficult to find sites had been approved. He said that the
schools could accommodate the project and that any reduction in its size
271
-281-
"would kill it" because of federal cost limits. 73 William Green, the
Regional Administrator of HUD, talked about the recent Chicago scatter-
site public housing federal court decision. 74
At other meetings around the city, various state legislators dis-
cussed legislation to require community planning board approval of public
housing and legislation to require the New York State Urban Development
Corporation to build a school or middle income housing on the site. Jerry
Birbach was appointed by Borough President Manes to be a member of
Community Planning Board 6; the Liberal Party criticized officials whom
it previously had endorsed for election who by now had supported the idea
of a scaled-down compromise on the project; and calls continued for a
moratorium on construction to allow a study of the project. As 1971 drew
to a close, the Forest Hills Residents Association, following Jerry Bir-
bach' s expressed thesis from the beginning of the year that you have to
make things political, said it was planning to demonstrate in Miami and
other places where Lindsay was going to run in the presidential primaries.
By this time it is clear that the controversy had created a high
level of personal antagonism and emotionalism among people in the area,
with the "intensity of . . . anger and fear" so high that it was extremely
"intimidating" to most local people who supported the project, who feared
"community sanctions. " Words like "Communist" or "nigger-lover"
were hurled around at project supporters, 75 for Forest Hills was not
monolithic by any means. There were supporters of the project among
the residents. One woman, for example, told a reporter,
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[I] f this community could spend as much
energy working with the project as it has trying to
keep it out, this could be a model community. But
people won't do that. Some of my old progressive
friends tell me I' m crazy now not to fear blacks
I read about violence in other projects like the
Baruch Houses, and I get a little scared. I guess it
might be a little more dangerous here if they build
the project.
But I always remember a book I read about
years ago, 'But Not Next Door . . . ' * And that' s
what keeps happening throughout the city. Frightened
people are saying put them somewhere else, but not
here, not next door. So the hostility and fear keep
getting worse.
'It' s got to start somewhere, ' she said. 'I
know it could b difficult, but "next door" might as
well be here. '76
Yet, as the reporter sadly noted, for this woman was speaking
with the kind of calm tone that he wished the politicians would use, "one
of the most disturbing things I learned in Forest Hills was that the woman
who made those remarks wouldn't let me mention her job or her name for
fear that the community might indict her as a treacherous radical. 7
But for a whole variety of reasons, envy of the Italians in Corona
for having the will to fight against the city, racism, fear of crime - what-
ever the reason in each individual case - the fact remained that a significant
number of people were bitterly opposed to the project. It did not even mat-
But Not Next Door by Harry and David Rosen (Astor-Honor, 1962) is a book
about the attempt by Morris Milgram to build a private, suburban housing
development with homes for sale on an open-occupancy basis in Deerfield,
Illinois, in 1959. The town condemned the two parcels of land, which had
houses under construction, for use as public parks. The developer' s suit
in federal court was lost when the United States Supreme Court refused to
hear the case in 1963.
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ter whether they were a majority or not, as some kept asking, for that
was a false issue. In many situations, including neighborhoods, a large
enough minority with strongly held views is sufficient to outweigh by its
actions the views of a majority which remains passive, whether those
actions be either active, such as demonstrations, or passive, such as
by putting up for sale signs, and fleeing. Whether such fears are rational
does not matter if they form the basis for people' s actions and one cannot
convince people otherwise.
It may indeed be "scary, " as writer Nat Hentoff said, that
there was "so much ugliness in anticipation of so few of 'them. '" For,
after going through the detailed demographics of the project and Forest
Hills and showing that "after the hordes have encamped, only about three
percent of Forest Hills will be non-white, " he said he was forced to ask
with a sense of incredulity, "I mean, this is a tipping point?"78 His article
then went on to discuss the constitutional issues involved in the case.
Unfortunately, that low a percentage may indeed be a tipping point,
not necessarily to those among the 100, 000+ who live in Forest Hills, say,
a mile or more from the project, but for those who lived near it. For a
percentage gives a total distribution, while the reality, in another sense,
has to do with a particular location and people' s feelings about how close
they are to it and to what degree they feel they will be affected. Fear is
a contagious commodity, and it can be self-fulfilling. One of the things
which started happening in Forest Hills, and which was not known unless
one was very close to the situation, was blockbusting. In mid-December
of 1971, in an effort to stop such activity before it had gone too far, Haskell
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Lazere, director of the New York Chapter of the American Jewish Com-
mittee, let it be known in the area that his organization was taking action
to stop such illegal activity there. 79 In fact, as he privately revealed,
he did not have resources to take any monitoring action and made his an-
nouncement as a bluff in the hope that it would put enough fear in local
real estate agents to prevent them from engaging in such activity. 80
II - The Controversy Continues Into 1972
During the first six weeks of 1972 the tempo of actions continued
at a pace consistent with a controversial issue. The Housing Authority,
in announcing that it had started a record 10, 008 units of public housing
in 1971 (including 1, 201 acquired or leased) out of its goal of 14, 000, was
now ironically in a position where it felt obligat ed to publicize that it was
building most projects in low-income areas:
While the focus of publicity has been on the 840-unit
project in Forest Hills-Rego Park, 30 other low-income
projects were started throughout the city in 1971 [in all
boroughs except Staten Island]. The vast majority are
in low-income neighborhoods, giving the lie to the re-
cent impression that public housing is not being built in
low-income neighborhoods as well as outside of them. -1
Indeed, according to another Housing Authority document, almost 90% of
the units were in low-income areas. 82
With that statement in mind, and remembering that construction
starts did not necessarily represent present planning policy for new pro-
jects, it is interesting to look at a size distribution of the projects the
Authority did start, as follows:
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TABLE 15
Size Distribution of Public Housing Projects
Whose Construction Started in 1971
Number of units in Project
30 - 99
100 - 199
200 - 299
300 - 399
400 - 499
500 - 525
840
936
8, 807 units
Number of Projects
4
8
7
7
1
2
1 (Forest Hills)
1
31
284 units per project
Source: New York City Housing Authority
~~ ~ News release, January 14, 1972
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Total
Average
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Whether or not a smaller project would have created less
opposition is one of those questions which can never be answered, for
there is no single answer to a complex situation. But it is clear that
Forest Hills was at the high end of what was being built that year by the
Authority. Also, one must not forget that that is only one way of look-
ing at a project - how the units are distributed in terms of building
heights is another measure that may or may not be important at a given
time, as is density. (As a case in point, when the Cuomo compromise
later halved the project, using the Latimer Gardens total project size
and building heights as a guide, two members of the City Planning Com-
mission objected that the resulting density of the Forest Hills project
would be much lower than that of the Latimer Gardens. )83
Early January also saw public announcement of the formation
of the first organized effort of local people who said they were not neces-
sarily in favor of the project, but wanted to "accept the project as a
fait accompli and labor within that framework to calm the passions and
fears which have been aroused" and to work for a program "to effect a
smooth transition for present and future inhabitants of Forest Hills. " 84
The group, Forest Hills Neighbors, was headed by Paul Sandman, who
said that the new organization had about 100 to 150 members. He took
pains to emphasize that although the Housing Authority was "most en-
thusiastic" about his group they were not connected with the city ad-
ministration. 85
This, in fact, was true, and it is interesting that the Housing
Authority was partially correct in its long-held philosophy that once people
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believed a project was real they would start to try to make the best of
the situation rather than continue to fight. An Authority staff member
said:
About December, when it became evident a pro-ject would be built, we began getting telephone calls and
feelers from people we hadn' t known, saying, "I was not
in favor of it, but I want to help the community get to-
gether."
The Community Affairs office compiled lists and
tried to get these people in touch with each other. This
was viewed as a valid Community Affairs office job be-
cause it did not seem political. We didn't do much, but
we started the process going.
Community Affairs was taking a low-key approach
because organizing would kill the legitimacy of any grass
roots group. We talked with Forest Hills Neighbors and
gave them information when they asked for it, but they
were meeting and organizing themselves on their own. 86
Such grass roots efforts, however, were not carried out without
cost to the individual. In what was only to be the start of the personal
price which Paul Sandman was to pay for his efforts, the inclusion of his
home telephone number in one of the early local newspaper articles
about the organization' s formation led to so many threatening calls that
he had to get an unlisted number. 87
The Authority followed-up in January, 1972, with the publication
of a White Paper on the project. It said in the document that it was
taking this step in a "spirit of genuine reconciliation" in an "attempt
to re-open some reasonable discussion about the issue. ,88 Toward that
end Simeon Golar reiterated his interest in "the establishment of a
broadly-based Forest Hills Advisory Committee which can assist this
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Authority in a broad variety of ways to make the new project in Forest
Hills a constructive addition to that community. ,89 This time the
Authority again detailed the great need for public housing in the city
and its responses to all the objections to the project in as conciliatory
and positive a tone as possible. For example, whereas its earlier fact
sheet had said a new high school would be open when the project opened,
it now said,
For the next eight to ten years, the project will
contribute relatively few high school students. There
are plans for new high schools . . . [which] will be
built long before the youngb children from the project
are ready for high school.
At its heart the hope for a document of this type rested in govern-
ment credibility, which was sadly lacking by this time and was not helped
by the studious avoidance in the White Paper of any mention of mayoral
involvement, an involvement that was widely known by now. But what was
most fascinating about the document was that, by refusing to mention or
acknowledge the names of the opposition groups and by not offering to sit
down with them directly, the Authority was still engaged in the same kind
of posturing that combatants at war employ, where sitting down with the
other side means a form of acceptance or recognition of a viewpoint which
you feel is not just wrong but closer to "evil" or "immoral. "
However, while the Authority was partially correct in its view
that some people in the Forest Hills area would start taking a more posi-
tive view about the situation, to the degree that it was incorrect about
the opposition it was very incorrect. By this time the people most
-289-
strongly opposed simply dug in harder. Because the issue had escalated,
the people in leadership positions of the many organizations making pro
or con statements about the project made them out of perceptions about
the issue and out of a view toward the "principles involved, " and they
were physically too far from the immediate locale of the project to be
influenced by it in their own personal lives. The issue escalated into a
bitter debate over whether or not the Lindsay administration had "ne-
glected" Jewish interests in the city with a speech made in February
by the President-elect of the New York Board of Rabbis, Rabbi Berko-
witz, who linked the Forest Hills project with a "City Hall sellout" of
Jews. 91 The Mayor' s office responded by releasing a memo from a
mayoral aide listing various things the administration had done for Jews, 92
the Times immediately printed an editorial criticizing Berkowitz for "in-
flaming latent racial prejudices, "93 and the level of press coverage in-
creased as various Jewish organizations and leaders throughout the city
felt obligated to make their own public statements on Rabbi Berkowitz' s
charges. Roy Wilkins, while agreeing with the Times criticism of
Berkowitz' s speech, objected to the part of the editorial that said, "There
are ample reasons for opposing in its present form the huge low-cost
housing project that is being so brusquely dumped into the Forest Hills
area. "9 In particular he objected to the words "brusquely dumped, "
saying
This suggests, erroneously, that, prior to the
recent weeks of rabble-rousing protest, the community
knew nothing of the housing plan. In truth, the project
goes back at least five years and opponents of the pro-
ject have voiced their protests at designated hearings
and have lost in each voting . . .
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Rabbi Berkowitz, whether he intended it or not,
has confirmed the suspicions of those in the black com-
munity who have insisted all along that the racial issue
was the basic one. The Times, although properly con-
demnatory of the Berkowitz language, does not help
itself in the search for a solution by feeding the dubious
and suspect charge that this housing project was
"brusquely dumped" upon the community.
At the same time word began leaking out that the Mayor' s office
was thinking about calling a meeting between blacks and Jews on the pro-
ject. (Whether or not the Mayor had personally come up with the idea is
unclear. ) Simeon Golar, asked about these reports on the day after
Rabbi Berkowitz' s speech, said he was opposed to such a meeting and
added bluntly, "Forest Hills is not a matter to be bartered between blacks
and Jews. "96 The very fact that City Hall was talking in these black-
Jewish terms horrified a number of the people involved - people who
were on both sides of the issue - because they didn' t want Forest Hills to
get created as a black-Jewish issue, which it would if enough people
simply kept talking about it enough in those terms. But one of the prob-
lems in these situations was how the parties involved could get out of a
meeting with the Mayor gracefully, and after some phone calls between
various parties, Roy Wilkins sent a telegram to the Mayor expressing
his feeling that the meeting would not be constructive and that he would
not attend. The proposed meeting was called off. 9
Meanwhile, John Lindsay continued campaigning in the presi-
dential primaries - now putting heavy emphasis on Florida - being
followed all the way, and especially in the Jewish areas of Miami Beach
and other resort towns, by New York City Jews opposed to the housing
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project. And any suggestion, as occurred at one of the private meetings
between Lindsay and Queens Jewish leaders, that he was meeting with
them because of Jewish hostility in Florida, caused Lindsay to become
furious, a factor further complicating the equation of human emotions
and political symbolism. 98
On February 16, Justice Irving Saypol of the State Supreme
Court, which despite its name is actually a lower court, agreed with the
plaintiffs and ruled that
While the original plan was legally adopted in 1966, the
marked changes in design, number, and juxtaposition
of structures in the present fourth or fifth plan of 1970 -
from seven to three buildings, from one tallest of twenty-
two stories to three of twenty-four stories, evolving
internally in the defendants without the r uired public
hearing demands judicial condemnation.
The "required public hearings" meant submitting the project to the
City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate for reapproval, and
the tenor of the times was such that there was no doubt among project
supporters that the Board of Estimate would kill the project now if it had
the opportunity to vote on it. Forest Hills had become a political lia-
bility, one so great that while supporters said that standing strong on
Forest Hills would strengthen the cause of scatter-site housing, the ad-
ministration was being forced to drastically revise, or withdraw, other
scatter-site public housing or subsidized housing, such as one in the
East New York section of Brooklyn.
Although the city was eventually able to obtain approval to con-
tinue sinking pilings while it appealed Judge Saypol' s order to halt con-
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struction, the effects of the decision were far-reaching, both on the
immediate course of events and in its legal implications for the future
of any new public housing in the city.
In the latter case the problem arose from the fact that the
New York Public Housing Law distinguished between a "plan" (defined
as a "plan or undertaking for the clearance, replanning and recon-
struction or rehabilitation of a substandard and insanitary area . . . ") 00
and a "project" ("a specific work or improvement to effectuate all or
101
any part of a plan . . . ") . For some thirty years the city had been
approving a "plan and project" for public housing simultaneously, which
was why the wording of the resolution from the Housing Authority to the
city describing the proposed physical development was always put in terms
of "tentative, " "approximately" or "probably. " Detailed engineering
and architectural work had not yet been done because those private pro-
fessionals were not hired until after a site was officially approved. After
they were hired it was not uncommon for the physical nature of the pro-
posed project to change greatly while keeping fairly close to the general
specifications about number of units, percent of elderly, etc.
The specter facing the city if the decision were upheld was the
necessity to first have a "plan" approved by the city, with the requisite
public hearings, and then to go back through all the administrative and
legal approvals a second time several years later for the "project" in
all its exact details. Not only was this the lack of administrative flexi-
bility frightening for those familiar with the problems of getting anything
at all built in the city, but even more serious was the belief that no public
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housing project would ever be able to make it through the political pro-
cess of public hearings and the Board of Estimate twice because of the
increased leverage which local community groups would have. Thus,
the Housing Authority was forced to state in its legal appeal that that
which planners, architects, social scientists, politicians, and real
estate developers know to be frequently the case in the real world was
not true legally:
The Court should not entertain objections per-
taining to the height of the buildings or the number of
buildings to be constructed, since these are matters
which have no valid community impact and are not the
concern of the City Planning Commission and the
Board of Estimate.
Building plans with respect to the height and
number of buildings are frequently modified and there
is no requirement in the Public Housing Law that ap-
proval of such modifications be obtained. 102
The immediate impact of the Saypol decision was on the vari-
ous negotiations and proposals for trying to resolve the conflict that
were underway at the time. One scheme, worked out by Dick Aurelio
and the Mayor' s aides, involved reducing the size of the Forest Hills
project by one third and resurrecting the Lindenwood site for a project
of about 300 units, which was slightly over half the size of the project
rejected by the Board of Estimate four months earlier. This had the
symbolic sweetner for the supporters of the project that the total num-
ber of units would be twenty more than the original total in Forest Hills.
But whether or not it would have been acceptable to supporters or op-
ponents, particularly to Borough President Manes who had managed to
kill the Lindenwood project, was unknown. It never was to be known,
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in fact, because Aurelio floated that trial balloon on the same day that
Justice Saypol announced his decision, which had changed the entire psy-
chology of the situation. 103 Essentially the Birbach-led part of the op-
position, with its slogan of "no project, no way, " now saw no reason
to compromise. It was buoyed by its success, a success that got further
moral encouragement from a meeting arranged by Senator Buckley that
a delegation had with President Nixon' s aides, who said "the President
regarded the fight over the Forest Hills project as having 'national sig-
nificance. 104
Another proposal in its formative stages that was scuttled was
one that the American Jewish Committee had been working on for a
month and a half, one to which the City, after an initial failure to re-
spond to the idea, had agreed. That was to use professional crisis reso-
lution techniques and put all the major participants together in a controlled
and isolated setting under a professional consultant' s supervision. There
were to be a series of conditions, such as the key one that there had to
be an initial agreement on an agenda, that a person would have to stay
throughout the entire process until agreement was reached, that upon
consensus there would be implementation of the agreed upon action, etc.
But the "confrontation lab" idea ended when the Jewish Committee and
Dick Aurelio* agreed that the Birbach opposition would simply "laugh in
our faces" at the suggestion of the lab in view of Saypol' s decision. 105
*
Aurelio, despite his resignation as Deputy Mayor in December, was
still the key Lindsay advisor making decisions on these types of matters.
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Also, in a different variant of this type of approach, sometime
during these months there had been a highly secret request by the
Mayor' s office to two professional mediation firms asking them to ex-
plore the possibility of mediating the dispute. After very quietly ex-
amining the situation, they refused. One of these firms was headed by
the highly respected black politician Basil Paterson (a former state
senator from Harlem, he was elected vice-chairman of the national
Democratic Party later in 1972), and the other was the well-known labor
mediator and mass transportation advocate, Theodore Kheel. 106
In yet another event during the week preceding Saypol' s de-
cision - an event unrelated directly to the Forest Hills project but in-
dicative of the complex nature of people' s feelings about the physical
and social nature of their surroundings - 2 twenty story middle-income
buildings of 400 units under construction by the Lefrak organization in
the Forest Hills-Kew Gardens area were, after vigorous local oppo-
sition, blocked by the Board of Standards and Appeals on a technical
ruling of fact. In this case the building was going on under continuing
one year extensions excluding a developer from the requirements of
the new 1963 zoning ordinance, requirements which had been tightened
to prohibit buildings higher than three stories on the land in question.
Again the widespread community and political opposition was based on
fear of overloading community facilities and a desire to keep high rise
buildings out of the neighborhood, and, again, the lawyer involved in
the case was Mario Cuomo. Cuomo, commenting that he had not been
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very sure of winning the technical case before the Board, added, "I
think this means our system can work. It shows that if a community
group is right and if they apply themselves they can work through the
system. " 07 (The Board of Standards and Appeals decision was later
overturned by the state courts. )
From the time of Judge Saypol' s February decision until early
May, much of the attention Forest Hills got was focused on the political
and legislative scene, although local community meetings pro and con
continued on a regular basis and the appearance of a black-Jewish rift
intensified with acrimonious charges and counter-charges after a secret
meeting of black ministers and Jewish rabbis was revealed by one of the
participants. 108 I say appearance because in fact there was by no means
unified support among all blacks for scatter-site housing. A number of
blacks - planners and architects, as well as community activists -
favored the building of low-income housing in slum areas as part of an
internal black community development effort, and they were finding this
difficult to do with the federal housing guidelines and lack of money. 109
There had even been sit-ins by Reverend Tim Matthew' s group N. E. G. R. 0.
in the offices of the NAACP in January. However, this type of issue did
not get very much or accurate coverage in the "white" press. There,
it on the whole managed to be hidden under a general call for more fed-
eral housing dollars for all public and subsidized housing, as that was
one thing which both sides agreed on, but the philosophical schism was
wide indeed. It was just as wide as the split between the black supporters
of scatter-site housing and the Jewish white opponents.
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The State Assembly passed in March a bill sponsored by
Assemblyman Miller that would require a county-wide referendum on
public housing projects, including a retroactive provision to cover
Forest Hills. Afterwards, Miller, invoking the rhetoric of "com-
munity participation in education" and "neighborhood government, "
called the measure a "devotion to democracy. " He also pointed out
that the bill did not cover nursing homes or elderly housing, pre-
sumably because they did not "vitally affect [ people' s] daily lives.
Yet, in an ironic commentary on how fast social issues change, by
early 1974 widespread community concern had caused the City Planning
Commission to pass special zoning legislation to restrict the concentrated
proliferation of nursing homes in certain neighborhoods.
This carrying of the issue to the domain of the State Legislature
intensified the political split locally, for State Senator Gold, whose dis-
trict included Forest Hills, had refused to come out against the project,
and, in fact, was publicly opposed to the anti-public housing bills. Con-
sequently, he was faced with the prospect of a Democratic primary
battle, which he got when Jerry Birbach announced for his seat. In April,
despite Gold' s denunciation of it, the State Senate took a route different
from the Assembly and passed a bill requiring all public housing pro-
jects not beyond the foundation stage within five years after initial local
government approval to be sent back to the local legislative body (the
Board of Estimate in the case of New York City). The Senate added a
provision that the bill should be deemed to have been in effect since
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September, 1971, thereby putting the Forest Hills project retroactively
beyond the five year time limit provision. This version of the bill was
overwhelmingly passed by the Assembly on May 2, 1972, and went to the
Governor' s desk for signature.
As if the Forest Hills project had not had enough problems al-
ready, the point of reference from which the public at large related to
physical design issues suddenly shifted drastically. At the same time
as the Assembly was approving the bill, and only three months after the
Times' architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable had blasted the design
of the Forest Hills project (as discussed in Chapter V), the most drastic
high rise public housing failure in the country was emblazoned on the
public consciousness. National network television news showed movies
of high rise public housing buildings collapsing in unison from simultane-
ous dynamite charges; and a two page wide color photograph of the build-
ings in mid-collapse was printed in the May 5th issue of Life magazine, *112
with a circulation of over six million. Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis became
a symbol of the failures of high rise public housing to the public as well
as it had been earlier to housing professionals.
On another battlefront the political fortunes of John Lindsay had
not gone well in the presidential primaries. Having switched from the
Republican Party to the Democratic Party, he finished fifth in the
March 14, 1972, Florida election, and in the April 4 Wisconsin primary
he finished sixth. He withdrew from the campaign the same day the
Wisconsin race ended.
* The same photograph was used to illustrate the back cover of Defensible
Space by Oscar Newman.
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The conventional political wisdom about the effect of this on
the Forest Hills issue was discussed in a five part series, "Scatter-
site Housing; the Battle of Forest Hills, " published in the New York
Post in late April.
Lindsay' s withdrawal . . . has raised few
hopes of a compromise. In fact, with the pressure
off from his advisors who may have feared his em-
barrassment by hecklers, he is now in a firmer
position to make a stand on principle, observers
noted.
'Politics play a role, ? said Marvin Schick,
Lindsay' s special assistant for intergroup relations,
'but not presidential politics. The factors that in-
hibit compromise, like cost, court decisions, what
the community and politicians will accept are in-
dependent of presidential candidacies. ? 3
Adding yet another complication and uncertainty to the politi-
cal and legislative equation was the position of Governor Rockefeller.
In late March, at the same news conference in which he had announced
he supported President Nixon' s proposed Congressional moratorium on
court-ordered school busing for racial integration, he said he would
rather "develop areas that have deteriorated . . . so they become at-
tractive areas . . . [This] would avoid exactly the kind of conflict
which exists now [in Forest Hills]. ,114
With this and the existence of a long term Lindsay-Rockefeller
"feud" as a background, Lindsay, in a May 3rd interview, said he would
ask the Governor to veto the anti-Forest Hills bill. But he "indicated
he was pessimistic" that Rockefeller would do so. If the bill became
law he said the city would then challenge its constitutionality in court.
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Furthermore, he said that if the Forest Hills plan was resubmitted to
the Board of Estimate (my emphasis), "'A compromise is better than
nothing. I' m sure that there'11 have to be compromises, ' he said, be-
cause 'I think it' s going to be very difficult to get it through the Board
of Estimate again. ' " He added that the project had "generated 'intense
political heat' and said that 'the Board has never been known to be com-
pletely firm in the face of political heat. ,,115 Lindsay' s remarks
were interpreted by the Times as the first sign he might be changing
his prior position. Simeon Golar refused to comment on the Mayor' s
remarks, and Jerry Birbach said his people were not interested in a
116
compromise.
City Planning Commission Chairman Donald Elliott was at
least one person who had not been consulted about this. For I was inter-
viewing him on May 4th when the Times published the story. When asked
about it and the possibility of a compromise, he said that there wasn' t
any and that the reporter must have misunderstood the Mayor. 117
Simeon Golar was also now bitterly opposed to any compromise,
so much so that in Mid-April he saw no point in having any meeting what-
ever with the vocal opposition. He did not feel a meeting would be pro-
ductive, not even for talking about community relations after the project
was fully built. 118 One of the complications was that he had apparently
proposed some changes which had been either turned down by the Mayor's
office or had been failures, and now he felt he could only go forward with
the project.
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On that same May 4th the Appellate Division overruled Judge
Saypol. It said the general provisions of the State' s 1939 public hous-
ing law should be liberally interpreted in order to give the Housing
Authority the flexibility it needed to fulfill the act' s intention of pro-
viding public housing. It concluded that the changes in number and
heights of buildings and number of dwelling units were minor as com-
pared to the basic purpose of the "package" approved by the Planning
Commission and Board of Estimate, namely the building of public hous-
ing on the site in question. 119
With this victory by the city, one might have thought, as per
the conventional political wisdom, that the city would simply continue
to ride through the storm and build the entire project. Things also now
seemed to be going the city's way in a related matter. For in late
April the Corona compromise bill sponsored by Assemblyman Lisa and
Senator Ferraro and supported by the Lindsay administration had been
overwhelmingly passed by both branches of the State Legislature, as
had also been the more general bill of Assemblyman Battista. Thus the
choice of which bill to sign was left to Rockefeller. This situation,
though still fraught with uncertainty, was nevertheless promising, since
the Governor had supported the City' s Corona compromise the previous
year.
However, one of the Mayor' s advisors felt that with "Lindsay' s
presidential bid now over, with the Court decision in his favor, and with
the mood so ugly, he could now compromise. 120 As this person later
explained his view of the history of the situation:
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The City was taking a firm position, since the
city could ride it through. But Lindsay announces for
the presidency, and makes Florida the test, with all
the transplanted Jews, and another opportunity for the
opposition arises. They could cause trouble there, and,
boy, did they. It set a tone that didn't help him. Given
that, if he succumbed at that point, it would have been
untenable. The blacks would have nailed him. It would
have been very artificial and made him look like a man
of no convict n. So, the Mayor had to be out of the
campaign. 121
This attitude presumably meant that the compromise schemes
floated earlier, like the Lindenwood one, would only have been approved
by the Mayor if they had been totally acceptable to the liberal black com-
munity, whereas now there could be more latitude.
This official further explained his position by saying
My biggest disappointment was that the liberals
folded, and then when the New York Times folded, it
was the final irony . . .
That community, more than most others, could
accommodate it. No project in the city is perfect . . .
But I do acknowledge this - because polarization
developed, that became a factor . . . I was all in accord
with CPC [ i. e. , Don Elliottj and the HA [i. e. , Simeon
Golar], but there were new factors, . . . the collapse of
liberals and the demagogues. It wasn't worth proving
you were right. It was the responsfility of government
to take some of the edge out of it.
The belief that the city could have ridden things through if Lind-
say 's presidential bid and Florida had not happened has been disputed by
others close to the situation. 123 In any case, it was true that polarization
was increasing, for both in Corona and Forest Hills the opposition had
moved more strongly into the political arena, with Jerry Birbach running
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against State Senator Gold in the Democratic June primary, and Lillian
Manasseri, leader of the Corona group opposed to the moving of any
homes, challenging Assemblyman Lisa in the primary.
There ensued within the Mayor' s office consideration of a
number of routes to take on Forest Hills. The idea of a three member
special committee was rejected. Then, as has been confirmed from
several authoritative sources, Jimmy Breslin and Dick Aurelio, talk-
ing about Forest Hills, hit upon the name of Mario Cuomo. Breslin' s
opinion was "I bet Mario could solve it. ''124 Aurelio, who had re-
spected Cuomo so much after the Corona compromise that he had tried,
and failed, to convince Cuomo to accept a city government post, fought
hard to convince Lindsay to appoint Cuomo to deal with Forest Hills. 125
But other members of the Mayor' s top staff were opposed to Cuomo on
the grounds that he was totally unpredictable. In other words, "his
good features are what make him unacceptable to us. ,126 Another in-
formed source believes that one of the factors leading to Cuomo' s ap-
pointment was that Breslin told Aurelio, incorrectly, that Cuomo had
already worked out a solution to the project, one that would have three
eighteen story buildings, 127 and that this reduction, viewed as "only
symbolic" was acceptable to Aurelio. 128 However, how much this in-
cident affected the final judgment, as compared to the other factors
surrounding Cuomo' s reputation, is unclear.
On May 13 Governor Rockefeller vetoed the anti-Forest Hills
legislation. Although he made it clear that he was less than enthusi-
* A second concern about the legislation was its effect on other public
housing projects. Although the retroactive provision could reasonably
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astic about scatter-site housing, he noted that local housing authorities
had to comply with federal guidelines, and he also encouraged the Mayor
to fulfill his prior indications of a willingness to compromise on the
Forest Hills project. 129
Four days later Mario Cuomo' s appointment by John Lindsay
"to make independent explorations of possible revisions" in the project
**
was announced. The job was to be non-salaried. Construction of the
project - still the driving of pilings - was to continue during the study,
which Cuomo hoped would be completed in six weeks. 131
Reactions to the appointment varied. Golar, publicly opposed
to any reduction in the project size (although, as previously mentioned,
there is reason to suspect that privately he had already indicated support
of trying to convert some of the units to moderate or middle-income use,
a very complicated and difficult idea) 1 3 2 phrased his support of the
effort in terms of trying to "end the bitterness and division. "133 It
* (continued)
be expected to be declared unconstitutional as an ex-post facto law, the
real worry of many housing officials was that many other low-income
projects in the long housing pipeline would be affected. It was felt that
having to resubmit these projects to the Board of Estimate would add
at least a year's delay to each one.
*
Rockefeller was not the only one to use the rationale of federal re-
quirements. Simeon Golar believed that during the controversy Elliott,
Flatow, and others did some harm by creating the impression that
scatter-site was Lindsay's idea because it obscured HUD' s site require-
ments. 130
** Cuomo also turned down reimbursement of his expenses by the city
so that he c qul not be accused of having any financial connection with
either side. 136
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split the ranks of the opposition for the first time, with the president
of the Queens Jewish Community Council calling it "a step in the right
direction" and Jerry Birbach saying in effect that he was willing to
meet only with the Mayor. 134 The editorial comment of the Long Island
Press was that the selection of Mario Cuomo was "excellent, " calling
him "bright, young, articulate and knowledgeable about the area and its
problems." It went on:
If anyone can find a way out of the Forest Hills
morass, we think Mr. Cuomo can. His integrity is
unassailable. He has the respect of city officials and
deserves the confidence of the community. He neither
owes nor expects any political favors . . .
Now it is up to the opponents of the project -
who said all along they only want a compromise - to
demonstrate their good faith. The initial reaction from
Jerry Birbach . . . is cceptable. He says he won't
work with Mr. Cuomo. I
Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the announcement
that the Mayor was willing to even consider some kind of compromise
came as a surprise to the Housing Authority staff because they thought
they had won the battle in that there was starting to be a "whisper of
community support. "137 The future of the immediate neighborhood,
however, did not depend on the balance of support for the project. Even
if only a minority of people were opposed, if their feelings were sufficiently
strong to cause them to react violently against newcomers or to move out
of the neighborhood, then it would jeopardize the future not of the project
per se, but of the reason for putting it there, which was the existence of
a stable middle-class neighborhood.
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How seriously one took this threat, whether one considered
it a bluff by residents or not, and how one responded to it as a govern-
ment official, were matters of judgment over which people differed
widely. Liberals might tend to minimize popular opposition by question-
ing who was financing Jerry Birbach' s political campaign. Yet, even if
it were true that the real estate developers had gotten together an anti-
Forest Hills project fund for which Sam Lefrak had been assessed
$10, 000, as Simeon Golar said Sam Lefrak told him 1 3 8 - even that, no
matter how upsetting that might be to liberals, could not change the re-
ality of people' s fear, founded or unfounded. And that fear continued.
Nine days after Mario Cuomo' s appointment I and two other
M. I. T. planning students attended an evening citizens meeting on the
project held in the auditorium of the elementary school across the street
from the project. Though all three of us had been at community pro-
test meetings before, this was an eye-opener. A year earlier, a high
city official trying to get support for the project from rabbis had ex-
pressed shock at hearing them say that they were troubled because the
community was upset, and he later commented that "rabbis are sup-
posed to lead, not reflect" community feeling. 139 Now some were
leading, but not the way he had wanted.
One rabbi said the real issue was the right of a government to
impose something on a community, and, citing the example of the St.
Louis Pruitt-Igoe project being dynamited, called on people to "stand
fast . . . There is not a single bigot in this audience tonight. All we
-307-
Lnt is a stable community. " Another said the issue was not racial
integration, which the "New York Jewish community has matured
enough to accept, " was not economic integration, which "admittedly
some oppose . . . but I don't, " but the issue was one "ignored by
the politicians: crime, vandalism and deterioration of the community
[caused by] multi-problem families.
He continued,
If you want to solve the problems of society,
we will help you, but not at our expense. They will
be solved by scientific solutions, not by old liberal
ideas.
Our greatest problem is our liberal friends,
especially in the Jewish community . . .
The time has come when the Jewish people of
the city must speak as an ethnic group, and this we
were taught by our black neighbors. They have a
right to do it and so do we. . . .
For the sake of Israel we must keep alive the
greatest Jewish city in the world.
Other speakers spoke even more strongly. The vice-president
of the Queens Jewish Community Council said the issue facing the 2 1/2
million Jews of New York was an "historic and great event - the disso-
lution of the New York City Jewish community, the heart of the American
Jewish community . . . The whole world of Jewry is watching you. " An-
other speaker likened John Lindsay to Adolf Hitler. The head of the
National Jewish Community Rights organization, Professor Seymour Segal,
said that he was involved because "the liberal people in this community
were about to have their community destroyed. " He said, "We pleaded
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with the city 6 months ago to appoint a mediator, but instead Lindsay
tried to put group against group . . . and then, . . . after Florida,
without asking us, he chose a mediator. " Declaring that "whatever
the motives, the reasons, or the stupidity [of the cityJ, a compro-
mise is coming, " he said he was willing to meet with the mediator,
but demanded, as a "show of good faith, " an immediate moratorium
on construction, a theme repeated by various groups over the next
several weeks.
The audience lapped it all up - the comments that the only
reason the protest had managed to get as far as it had was because of
the city' s stupidity, the patently untrue exhortations that "all of New
York' s Jews are behind you, " and the calls for "Let the Mayor come
to us, not talk to the press. We're reasonable . . . We will fight for
our survival."
Finally, to a standing ovation, Jerry Birbach was introduced.
Starting with the statement that "he was only unhappy with one word,
' compromise, '" he launched into a rousing anti-Mario Cuomo, anti-
John Lindsay speech. "The problem of the Mayor is that he believes in
preferential treatment. He' s forgotten the middle class. " He then
ranged from saying that every civic association from Staten Island to the
Bronx is "behind us" [and it was true that there had been joint meet-
ings of the civic associations called in Queens] 140 to pointing out that
when the Housing Authority tried to evict a "problem family" they were
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stopped by the American Civil Liberties Union. Proclaiming that
"liberals are the biggest bigots in God' s creation, " he went on:
It was wrong for me to get up to lead you
people, but we had no elected people who would . . .
We're sincere about finding a true viable
solution. But I don' t start with 24 stories and come
down. I start on the ground and go up. . . At no time
will anybody or any group make any deal with any
mediator or so-called fact finder without the partici-
pation of the community . . .
Now I'll get political, and you'11 have your
chance on June 20th. 141
For the two months following his appointment Cuomo met
with hundreds of people as he pursued his investigation. * Calls for a
moratorium on construction were rejected by the city. Ideas about
various compromises were publicly floated, one being that some of the
units should be reserved for Viet-Nam veterans, on the theory that this
would be likely to increase security in the project.
Just as the investigation was starting, a semi-related event
in late May demonstrated the complicated bind the Housing Authority
was in in trying to respond to its many different pressures. A federal
judge ruled that the Housing Authority' s agreement to give preference
to Jews for a new public housing project in a Lower East Side Manhattan
urban renewal area because it was near a very old synagogue was illegal
in that it meant that persons who had either been relocated from the build-
ing site or who had lived in the neighborhood, both of whom were now
* For a detailed account of his study, see the publication of the diary
which he kept, Forest Hills Diary: The Crisis of Low-Income Housing,
released by Random House in August, 1974.
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largely black and Puerto Rican and not Jewish, were losing their
priority rights. Months earlier, this situation had been cited to me
by a knowledgeable Jewish official as an example of one of the effects
of Forest Hills. He said that Simeon Golar, "abused so much that this
has taken years off his life, " had "overcompromised himself " in
order to "show he' s nice to Jews" by making "a secret deal with
rabbis to have 80% of the Seward Park Extension project Jewish in a
Puerto Rican area, " a deal that the minority groups found out about
and f ought. 142*
On June 20, in an election which was perceived by many as a
referendum on the Forest Hills project - though this was disputed by
some - Jerry Birbach lost the State Senate nomination to incumbent
Senator Gold by a vote of 12, 851 to 9, 848. Lillian Manasseri also lost
her challenge to Assemblyman Lisa.
With the Forest Hills project now clearly at a point of major
decision about its future, with everyone awaiting the recommendations
from Mario Cuomo, I tried to change my perspective of the situation
from one where I was doing an academic historical study to mentally
putting myself in the position of being back working for the New York
City Planning Commission and being faced with making my own decision
**
about the future of the project. This meant that whatever I decided
After the court battles, in which the Authority claimed a right to
do what it had done because of the legal requirements for racial in-
tegration (a right an Appeals Court agreed with), the issue was quietly
and successfully mediated under court supervision after a couple of
years, with each side getting some units.
I should note that not all the material presented in this paper was
known to me at the time.
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had to not only meet my objectives from a planning viewpoint, but also
had to be put in such a way as to have a chance of being implemented
by the political process. During the middle of June, while I was in
Manchester, New Hampshire, I decided that there should be changes
in the project, worked out the details of my compromise proposal, and
telephoned several people whom I knew from working in New York for
their planning and political reactions to my proposal, reactions which
were encouraging. On Saturday, June 24, I met for four and one-half
hours with Cuomo in his Brooklyn law office to present it.
Our talk covered a wide range of topics, from the history of
the project to the role and powers of planners in a democratic society
with a representative form of government. Cuomo' s questioning of the
way planners had handled the social aspects of scatter-site housing led
to a discussion of the history of planning. This included the facts that
it had only been a little over half a century since the first American
zoning law embodied such a basic concept as the physical separation of
residential and manufacturing uses, and that, in comparison to the
hundreds of years in which law had been a recognized profession, it had
only been about forty years since planning had first become a recognized
university graduate degree.
My proposal was that the project should be reduced in number
of units rather than trying to change the mix of income levels in the pro-
ject, and that this should be accomplished not by eliminating one building
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but by reducing the heights of all three. Because the project had be-
come so symbolic and for other reasons, I felt that construction
should proceed as fast as possible with no stop for redesign. This
meant leaving everything overengineered and simply removing se-
lected floors from the plans in such a way as to adhere as closely as
possible to the original percentage distribution of apartment sizes
and elderly units. The politically face-saving way that the supporters
of the principle of scatter-site housing could accept a reduction in size,
I felt, lay in the rationale used to determine how many units were to
be built. Therefore, I said that the project should be changed to what
had originally been advocated by the city for the scatter-site project,
the 509 units for the Corona site.
I proposed that the financing of this reduction should be borne
by the city but in such a way that it would force the elected officials in
Queens to shoulder some of the budgetary responsibility along with the
rhetoric of "community control" that they were espousing and also
force them to be more honest with their constituents about the "fictionl
of a number of items that were in the capital budget from previous years
but which were now never going to be built. This would also be an as-
pect of the total package that I thought would appeal to the Lindsay ad-
ministration officials in the Planning Commission and Budget Bureau.
I knew that they had previously tried, and failed, to convince the Board
of Estimate and City Council to officially eliminate some 60 school pro-
jects which had been put in the budget in years past but which because
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of changing population and school enrollment patterns were not going
to be built. In essence I wanted an equivalent dollar value of Queens
projects that were either never going to be built anyway or which were
very low priority projects to be stricken from the budget. This, to
me, meant that minority and low-income groups from the rest of the
city would not be so easily seen as contributing their tax dollars to
pay for potential housing that was now being withdrawn from them.
At the same time it left open the possibility for the Queens politicians
to reinsert those projects they still wanted and could justify into the
following year's capital budget.
Since my proposed unit size reduction was 39, 5%, if one as-
sumed that there were no cost savings from smaller buildings in either
materials, labor, financing fees, etc. and also assumed that the federal
government would not share in the increased per unit costs because HUD
was at its legal limit (which, it turned out, it was not), then the potential
cost that the city would have to bear was, proportionally, $11, 842, 000.
(For comparison, the total cost of a typical elementary school was then
running about 5 to 6 million dollars. ) To the extent that most of these
cost assumptions were to some degree obviously not valid, then the cost
born by the city would be less. But this could only be determined by
Cuomo' s working out the details with the Housing Authority and HUD.
I also said that the proposal should be submitted to the Board
of Estimate worded in such a way that if the compromise were rejected,
then the original project would be built. I felt that the act of going back
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to the Board itself was desirable at a time when the responsiveness of
government was in question and when people could get away with saying
that a project was being built based on the 6 year old approval of a Board
whose members were totally different. Going back to the Board would
make its present members vote for a scatter-site project, albeit subtly
forced. The political accommodations necessary for that act itself
would put enough of a seal of political legitimacy and finality to the con-
troversy for a time long enough to get the project built in a less tense
atmosphere. The act of going on record with a vote would be sufficient
for most of the politicians involved to take it off their speaking agendas.
It would also be enough to make the citizen opposition feel that they had
been listened to, which, after all, was one of the underlying emotional
issues.
I hoped that these results would be reached because of my judg-
ment both of what was needed for the success of that particular project
after its future residents moved in and of the kind of atmosphere needed
for the city to be able to build any more scatter-site housing in the future.
These requirements will be discussed in the chapter on conclusions.
In early July, just after Governor Rockefeller had signed the
city supported Corona compromise bill, there was one of those rare oc-
casions that brings out the contrasts and ironies, as well as the very
personal and human side, that exist in such conflicts. A celebration
party was held by many of the Corona people at Jeantet' s, a local res-
taurant. * Yet absent was an early leader, Lillian Manasseri, who,
The owner, Marino Jeantet, headed Queens Community Board 3
and was trusted a great deal by Cuomo.
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still battling, * had joined a very angry picket line of Forest Hills resi-
dents outside the restaurant, a picket line which John Lindsay needed a
police escort to get through. While the pickets reviled the Mayor,
while Jerry Birbach called Cuomo a "fraud" and termed his appoint-
ment a "political ploy" by the Mayor, and while Mrs. Manasseri was
injured on the picket line, the Italian women inside smothered the Mayor
with kisses and hugs, something which in fact they had not wanted to do
before the party but which they had been convinced they had to do for the
occasion. 143 The party also showed how much the Mayor had been
changed in his years of tenure in office, for whereas he originally would
have simply announced that he was going to attend, this time he tele-
phoned to ask if it would be all right for him to come, at which point an
invitation was issued. 144
I might just note, with regard to Birbach' s charge of a Mayoral
"political ploy" that one of the initial comments I received about my pro-
posed compromise was that "I don' t know if it will be politically accept-
able. In politics it' s dangerous to go backward and not forward . . .
Jerry Birbach has lost the election . . . Lindsay has already made his
points by asking for a compromise (my emphasis) . . . But go ahead with
your idea . . . "45
On July 7 New York' s highest court, the State Court of Appeals,
upheld the Appelate Division's approval of the project by a 6 to 1 vote.
Judge Charles Breitel wrote
* She pointed out that the city was still sending them monthly rent bills
for their own homes and asked what kind of victory that was.
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Viewing the issue in a functional frame of ref-
erence the change in number and height of buildings is
not a material one. Quite different, for one example,
would be a change from [ a] garden apartment scheme
to high-rise vertical elevator buildings . . .
[The approval process] was never contemplated
to prevent nonessential changes in the project designs,
nor for the community or anyone else to change in es-
sence or stop altogether a project once approved.
The remedy to change this project, if that should
be, is no longer in the hands of the local legislative body
or the courts, but with the administrative branch of the
city, politically responsive to th people of the city and
the community within it . . . 1
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CHAPTER X - MARIO CUOMO RELEASES HIS COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
With a final favorable court decision now in, and with the
project approaching the completion of piling and the start of the above
ground phase of construction, which would make any compromise that
much more difficult to achieve, Cuomo intensified his work. On July 25,
1972, the report was published, the culmination of an investigation which
involved meeting with hundreds of government officials and private citi-
zens, including many volunteer professionals of all types, various com-
munity groups, and ordinary citizens. It included research into the legal
and moral aspects of scatter-site housing, and attempted as best as
possible to briefly review the history of the project, starting with the
City' s 1966 scatter-site program and the original site in Corona.
He recommended that the project be reduced to about 430 units
in 3 twelve story buildings, with the occupants to continue to be all low-
income and 40% of the dwelling units to continue to be reserved for the
elderly. On the one hand, he pointed to the constitutional requirement
that government funds not perpetuate patterns of racial segregation, as
expressed in recent court decisions, which made it clear that all federal
housing funds for such housing in the city would quite likely be cut off
unless significant funds were spent on low-income housing for non-whites
in white areas. Acknowledging that approaches other than building low-
income projects might be theoretically better - in particular the Section 23
leasing program - he accepted the pragmatic position of the city that such
-317-
308
-318-
programs presently consisted of such small numbers of units that total
reliance on them would in fact be "mere tokenism. " "(I )t would be
nothing but cynicism, or worse, to suggest it as a complete alternative
to project housing.
On the other hand, whether scatter-site housing was viewed as
a legal necessity or as a sociological one, in that one wanted to avoid
large concentrations of low-income people irrespective of race,
. . . its effectiveness . . . depends necessarily on
the survival of a middle class environment and upon
the receptivity, or at least lack of hostility, on the
part of the middle-class community . . . [ A] change
in the character of the community so that it became a
racially concentrated low-income area [would mean that]
the scatter site project would be self-destructive.
Describing the degree of fear, hostility, or concern about the
project as being almost directly proportional to the distance Forest Hills
people lived from the project site - to the point that some parts of Forest
Hills had a majority of people either not afraid of, or supportive, of the
project he said that the opposition of the "community immediately
affected . . . exists in substantial enough degree and in large enough
numbers of people so that it might eventually lead to large scale departures.
*
In 1972 there were fewer than 4, 000 leased units in the city, with
most of the ones there were in Queens being in racially concentrated
areas. 3 The resistence of private owners to lease apartment units in
middle-class areas, plus the problem of the costs involved for the
Authority in a tight housing market, are illustrated by the fact that al-
though the Authority had leased units in Sam Lefrak' s Brooklyn buil-
ings, it had none in his thousands of Queens units as of April, 1972.
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I sought to resist this conclusion at the outset of my investigation and
regarded the evidence offered me skeptically. But now, . . . I am
persuaded . . . the possibility . . . is a real one. "5* Whether the
reasons for people' s fears and complaints were "reasonable" or not,
he added, was irrelevant. For, he argued, if that concern
could be allayed by intelligent disputation, that would
have occurred already. The Chairman of the Housing
Authority has made many persistent and articulate at-
tempts to defend the project in its present dimensions.
He has appeared publicly, debated, argued, and ca-
joled, all to no avail. One must conclude that if the
community is not now convinced tha a project of 840
units is workable, it never will be.
Cuomo used the Latimer Gardens project in Flushing as his
starting point in recommending 432 units in 3 twelve story buildings,
saying that he agreed with Simeon Golar that it was an example of how
scatter-site housing could work. He rejected various income-mix pro-
posals because of 1) difficulty of getting federal 236 funds; 2) prob-
lems in finding private sponsors for a New York State Mitchell-Lama
project because of marketing difficulties that would exist for a project
with such a "spectacular history"; 3) the widespread fear that what-
ever income mix was adopted initially would simply revert to all low-
income in the future, thereby not being a proposal which would tend to
immediately reduce community fear; and 4) his belief that the project
was too large, both in terms of number of people involved (for their
effect on community services and because it was big enough to create
*
Although he did not give the exact data, for fear of further exacerbat-
ing the situation, apparently the vacancy rate of nearby apartments was
rising.
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a community of its own rather than melding into the surrounding com-
munity) as well as in terms of the scale of the buildings. He said that
the objections about needed schools and transportation facilities were
not "substantially refuted"?7 and the fact that similar complaints would
probably be heard anywhere else in the city that one tried to build a
project this large did not make them any less important. Furthermore,
as to the assurances that needed services would be developed to meet
the need (such as more bus service and the new express subway line,
in addition to the Corona high school), Cuomo remarked, "One should
not be surprised at the skepticism of a community which is asked to
wait for an indeterminate number of years for relief from problems
about which they have complained for decades. "8 He also discussed
the suitability, or lack thereof, of high rise buildings for either families
or the elderly in low-income projects, commented that the buildings
were indeed higher than those immediately next to it, and concluded that
" -- it seems to me not a persuasive answer to point to other buildings
in the general vicinity which are regarded with equal distaste and re-
pugnance." 9
The costs of various amounts of reductions in building sizes
were estimated by HUD for Cuomo. For the three twelve story building
recommendation, they felt that the total development cost could be re-
duced from $31. 2 million to $23. 8 million through the redesign and re-
duction in size of such elements as the structural steel, etc. (and any
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weight savings also reduced drainage problems). However, per unit
*
costs kept increasing, so that whereas the original project was $2
million underneath the federal limits, at 12 stories the project would
be $2. 4 million above federal limits, which the city would have to pay
as an equity contribution. 1 This amount, he said, should and could
be paid from the city' s capital budget, since Budget Director Edward
Hamilton had indicated to him legal changes by the State in the city' s
debt limit now made an amount in the range of $2. 5 million to $3 million
fiscally possible.
Legally, Cuomo stated, the Court of Appeals recent decision
was not clear as to when a reduction in project size had to be resub-
mitted to the Board of Estimate. But he recommended that it be done
in any case, along with a public hearing, no matter how "painful" that
hearing might be, given the passion with which both sides held their
views, "since any compromise would depend for its efficacy largely on
the receptivity of the community at large. " The caveat, though, was
that any resubmission be done via a "tandem proposition, " which he
thought was legally possible, so that "under no circumstances" would
it be possible for the Board of Estimate to kill the entire project once it
had been placed upon its agenda. 11
A number of other recommendations were made. Some dealt
with ways of insuring the success of whatever size project was built,
such as the city' s working with various Jewish organizations to provide
*
From $37, 172 to an estimated $54, 990.
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ongoing social services and programs. Others involved suggestions
on how to implement better ways for planning and producing more
scatter-site low-income housing, both throughout all of Queens and
the rest of the city in order to alleviate the tremendous problems faced
by the Housing Authority. Among them was an idea advanced by Planning
Commissioner Martin Gallent that the site selection process be changed
by having the central Planning Commission allocate to each Community
Board a certain number of scatter-site units for which that Board then
had to find a site(s) for.
Closing his report by noting that he had recommended a reduc-
tion in the size of the project because he believed that the loss of units
now might make possible many more in the future, whereas to build the
whole project might "jeopardize scatter-site housing in this city for
many years to come, " Mario Cuomo concluded:
It seems to me it is easier to take one of the
extreme positions - for or against the entire project
exactly as it is. There is a tendency to regard the
fiercly articulated, simple, extreme posture as the
more courageous one. It has the advantage too, of
assuring the concurrence at least of those on one
side of the controversy. To me these are easier po-
sitions to take because they avoid many of the subtle-
ties and exquisitely balanced conflicts that merge to
make this situation the conundrum it is. I have been
driven to the middle position not out of a desire to
seek shelter, but by the inexorable cross-currents
of closely matched competing considerations.
The position I recommend will call for po-
litical courage on the part of those who assume it,
since criticism and pressure from both sides is in-
evitable. Hopefully, however, the criticism will be
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outweighed by a predominant reasonableness which
recognizes and appreciates what was stated by a
great man long ago:
'All government - indeed every human
benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and
every prudent act - is founded on com-
promise. . .
Edmund Burke
Speech on conci jition with America
March 22, 1775
The political maneuvering over whether to accept or reject
Cuomo' s report started before it was released. In addition, as is un-
fortunately the case too many times in politics, some people took their
position before they even knew what the report was going to say, out of
a sense of political loyalties or considerations of images of political
power.
The private position of Queens Borough President Donald Manes
was that he could not accept Cuomo' s report, no matter what it said,
"even if it was perfect. ,,13 The fact that he himself had advocated a re-
duction to twelve stories the previous December did not matter. For the
longer the conflict dragged on, the less willing the opposition was to ac-
cept reductions that it would have welcomed much earlier. By contrast,
another important Queens politician, hearing from a contact shortly be-
fore the report became public that Cuomo expected trouble with his report,
telephoned to offer his support, saying that it didn't matter that he had no
idea of what the report was going to recommend should be done. 14
The Mayor' s office was provided with a draft of the report in
advance and was very unhappy with the size of the proposed reduction.
The Mayor' s chief of staff, Jay Kriegal, observed that "blacks will be
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enormously upset. ,15 John Lindsay, caught in a dilemma because his
initial reaction was to reject the proposal and because he also felt that
he was committed to accept it, was told by Cuomo that that was not the
case, that he was only committed to publishing the report as Cuomo
wrote it. 16 So the report was released with a noncommital statement
from the Mayor that it "deserves thorough study. "7
Simeon Golar, however, minced no words. He said his re-
action was "disappointment followed by a lawyer' s respect for an im-
pressive job of advocacy to achieve an outrageous result. " He used
such words as "manifestly absurd, " "a technical and fiscal nightmare,
and "not a rational solution, " in continuing his description. 18
On the other side, Jerry Birbach called the report "totally un-
acceptable. "19
As the weeks went by there ensued a complicated series of po-
litical maneuverings as Cuomo attempted to get his compromise imple-
mented. In some cases the problem was one of making someone feel
important enough to have influence over the decision process while at
the same time not ending up with an "unworkable" result. 20 In other
cases people tried to refute Cuomo' s conclusions out of a feeling for
the principle of public housing. In still other cases people opposed it
out of a feeling for the neighborhood. Thus, one had such situations as
Manes going on vacation to Europe and Israel saying that Lindsay should
submit Cuomo' s plan to the Board of Estimate while he refused to say
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whether or not he would vote for it; 2 1 Golar saying the costs to the city
would be millions of dollars more than Cuomo said; 2 2 Cuomo being up-
set that Golar did not immediately initiate the start of redesign as a pre-
cautionary move before a political decision was made and before con-
struction proceeded too far in order that the cost savings HUD had
esimated could actually be realized;23 and a whole host of other com-
promise proposals being mentioned which different people and groups
said they would be willing to accept as positions slowly changed over
time. (For example, Golar refused to reduce the size of the buildings but
endorsed changing one 24 story building to a middle-income Mitchell-
Lama status if low-income units were provided elsewhere, saying that he
could accept that because it was consistent with his previously stated be-
lief that only mixed income developments should be built rather than
straight public housing. At the other extreme Birbach said he wanted no
project but rather wanted the city to subsidize the rents for 840 families
to be "scattered" in existing Forest Hills buildings. )
* This was clearly untenable for the administration. Without knowing,
at least privately, that Manes, and, by implication, a majority of the
rest of the Board would vote for such a proposal, Lindsay could not afford
to submit it, nor would it resolve any community protest.
A scenario of Lindsay and Golar submitting a plan to halve the
project and then having to continue building the whole project after the
Board' s rejection would have escalated the community protest and increased
political polarization. The opposition, encouraged by the administration' s
shift and even more outraged by the whole project, would continue pressing
for the total cancellation of the project. All except the most liberal mem-
bers of the Board would defend their votes against the compromise by saying
they wanted it still smaller, and the political rhetoric and pressure would
increase.
If the administration implemented the Cuomo plan without a Board
of Estimate vote, then civil rights groups would clearly have challenged it
in court, leading to the likelihood of years of more delay, and the certainty
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The Times editorially endorsed Cuomo' s proposal a few days
after it was released. 24 Three weeks later, on August 19, Mayor Lind-
say said he was "reluctantly" accepting the report of Mario Cuomo as
"the basic guideline, " though noting that he "realistically" might have
to accept the view advocated by Borough President Manes that there be
a mix of income levels. Simeon Golar said that he was "disappointed"
by the decision but as an appointee of the Mayor would cooperate by hav-
ing his agency submit the requested change to the city government, 25 a
change he said would cost the city $10 million, not $3 million.
The approval process then started again with very stormy pub-
lic hearings all along the way. Community Planning Board 6 in Queens
held a hearing on September 12 and decided to continue opposing both the
original project and the Cuomo plan as well. The City Planning Com-
mission held its public hearing on September 20. Two weeks later the
physical changes recommended by Cuomo were approved by the Com-
mission on a 4 to 2 vote (one seat being vacant). Don Elliott, who for
years had said that any change in the project would mean killing it, and
the majority said that although the cost was high, both in terms of
dollars and lost housing units, "If it can move us from the tactics of
confrontation and the excesses of emotionalism and the racial epithets
toward a more reasonable and humane society, it will be worth it. ,,26
Of the two dissenters, one was John Zuccotti, later to become Com-
mission Chairman with an avowed purpose of making the Planning Com-
* (continued)
of keeping the matter before the public in the form of speeches and
rallies. Neither of these would allow the time and breathing space needed
in Forest Hills to allow emotions to calm down before the project opened
for occupancy.
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mission more responsive to the desires and needs of New York' s local
communities and neighborhoods. He and Commissioner Ivan Michael
said, in answer to Cuomo' s quote from Edmund Burke about compro-
mise,
It could also be urged in reviewing the history
of the proposal, that a quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson
would be at least as equally appropriate: 'All compro-
mise was surrender and invited new demands. '
A reasonable compromise can be the best way
for reasonable men who hold different points of view to
find common ground and so begin to work together. But,
there are unreasonable compromises, too, as Solomon
understood. We find the present compromise would be
retrogressive and fiscally imprudent . . . 2
The matter was now scheduled for a Board of Estimate hearing.
In the final stages of negotiation, Borough President Manes, told he could
not have an income-mix within the 12 story building limit because Golar
would not accept any further reduction in the number of low-income units, 28
then proposed the idea of converting the project to a low-income co-
operative. 29 Community Board 6 then added the occupancy issue to this,
saying it could accept a low.:-income co-op of 12 story buildings if 65% of
the tenants were elderly and 35% were veterans, which Manes then also
proposed. 30 Birbach countered by proposing a 100% elderly co-op in 3
eight story buildings. 31
Although almost everyone (HUD, the city, and the community)
agreed they were interested in the idea of a co-op, no one had any idea
as to how all the legal and financial complexities would eventually work
out, with such questions as whether sweat equity would work in modern
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high rise buildings, whether the money was available to bring the monthly
charges down to the level where elderly poor could afford them, and what
the moral and legal situation was with regard to tenant selection by the
proposed co-op' s Board of Directors.
For these and other reasons, Mario Cuomo and others privately
opposed the co-op idea. They believed that the chances for success in
working out the details were so low that they were merely opening the door
for another conflict one year hence, when Jerry Birbach and others would
charge that the city had deceived the local community once again. 32 But
with the need to solve the present political problem and with the trend
toward the idea of home ownership, Lindsay and Golar on October 23,
1972, finally accepted the co-op proposal in principle, and the Housing
Authority submitted an amendment to that effect to the Board of Estimate
agenda. 33 Golar then successfully blocked Manes' bid to legally mandate
a 65% elderly occupancy mix by saying that would require a physical change
in the buildings - due to a need to redesign the apartments - beyond that
mandated by the Cuomo proposal, and that under the terms of the tandem
proposal he would then go back to building the original 24 story buildings. 34
On October 26, in a twelve hour hearing that featured a sit-down
and was described as "the roughest in my three years" 3 5 by City Council
President Sanford Garelick - who, as presiding officer, had "threatened
many times to clear the chamber,, 3 6 - the Board of Estimate approved the
Cuomo compromise with the co-op modification. The vote was 20 to 2,
For an excellent account of the hearing, see The New Yorker, November 11,1972, pp. 169-182.
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with Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton casting the negative
vote. The Board also passed a non-binding resolution that it was the
"wish" of the Board to have the occupancy be 65% elderly and 35%
veterans. Jerry Birbach capped off his campaign by getting himself
arrested for disorderly conduct in trying to lead a march down Broad-
way and got a ride back to City Hall in Donald Manes' limousine. 37
Mario Cuomo, who had intended to speak against the co-operative
amendment, realized from the tenor of the hearing that there would be
"bedlam" if he did so, and at the last minute he decided to remain
silent. 38
Construction on the revised plan continued. The battle of
Forest Hills was over - at least temporarily.
CHAPTER XI- AFTERMATH
Today, in the summer of 1974, more than 1 1/2 years after
the Board of Estimate reduced the size of the project, construction con-
tinues. The brick skin on the buildings is almost complete, and occu-
pancy is expected to start in late fall or early winter of 1974.
After over a year of uncertainty HUD, in June, 1974, approved
the financial and legal restructuring of the project into a cooperative. 1
The delay was said to be due to the fact that this was to be the first large
scale public housing cooperative of its type in the country, with a com-
pletely different set of income limits (slightly higher) and operating
financial system from those of standard public housing, so that it came
under close Washington scrutiny.
Tenant selection by the Authority has not yet taken place, but
over 10, 000 applications have been received specifically for this project.
With the higher income limits allowed under the cooperative system, the
long application list, and the Authority' s stated admission priorities,
some civil rights groups have begun to object that a majority of the resi-
dents would probably be white and that the minority persons getting in
would not be from the central city ghettos.
Organized community opposition virtually ended for about a
year, as the Forest Hills Residents Association became inactive and its
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president, Jerry Birbach, moved to a more expensive part of Queens.
A period of calm and resignation took hold. 2 However, in late 1973
and early 1974 some of the survivors formed a new organization and
began protests again, much smaller than the ones of 71-72. They
demanded that no welfare tenants be admitted into the project, that it
be 100% elderly, etc. They were rebuffed in their attempts to get
sympathetic action from the first Jewish Mayor of New York, Abraham
Beame (though it has been reported that he was active in trying to get
the co-op approved by the federal government); and what opposition
there is is termed as "rumblings"3 that have been largely ignored by
the media. Nevertheless, the current head of the Housing Authority ex-
pects that there may very well be trouble when occupancy of the project
starts, though the Housing Authority did use the respite it had gained to
try to open up direct communication with the citizens in the opposition,
but only time will tell how successful that effort will be.
Simeon Golar in 1973 resigned as Chairman of the Authority
to be the Liberal Party' s candidate for City Council President. His
successor is Joseph Christian, who was appointed by John Lindsay to
return to the agency where he had been general manager, after a two-
year stint at the city' s Housing and Development Administration, * and
he was reappointed as chairman by incoming Mayor Beame.
As a deputy commissioner at HDA Christian was directly in charge of the
West Side Manhattan Urban Renewal Area. As that project has been marked
by years of community discussion and debate over racial and economic class
composition he got plenty of experience in dealing with citizen conflict. In
the article 'VWest Side Debate Echoes Forest Hills, " the Times reported
Christian' s observation "that in the last year there has been more discussion
with West Side groups than there Vs been with people from the other 39 re-
newal sites in the city combined.
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During the 1973 political campaign Golar defended his record
at the Authority by saying that he had made one pledge, to get public
housing built, and the record showed that he had succeeded at that. His
Republican-Conservative Party opponent, architect Thomas Galvin, a
former chairman of the Board of Standards and Appeals, publicly op-
posed scatter-site housing. As part of his campaign, Galvin filed suit
to stop construction of the Forest Hills project on the grounds that new
public bidding for construction was required because the project was
not the 1966 one for which bids had been originally solicited. The Forest
Hills issue also split the various candidates for mayor, though it caused
even those most supportive of continuing the Forest Hills project to be
more cautious about future scatter-site housing in general.
Also on the political scene, Mario Cuomo made the dinner
6
circuit rounds exploring the possibility of running for mayor in 1973,
but eventually decided against formally entering the race. In 1974 he
did declare for the office of Lieutenant Governor, won the Democratic
state convention nomination, but was defeated in a three way primary.
Queens Borough President Donald Manes in 1974 campaigned
hard for the gubernatorial nomination, using as his campaign pitch his
"1proven" executive ability in managing the affairs of a county of two
million people. He eventually was forced to withdraw from the Demo-
cratic race.
At the national level, in September 1973, the Nixon adminis-
tration proposed a housing allowance program for low-income families
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to replace a program that was oriented toward housing production. HUD
Regional Administrator William Green "said Forest Hills 'absolutely
was one reason the program was suggested. "
The new high school in Corona, meanwhile, has moved even
farther away from reality than it was in 1972, when all the parties in-
volved had agreed that its construction should be expedited. In 1971-72
the education section of the City Planning Department, with Donald El-
liott' s active support, spent a year working with Adrian Blumenfeld' s
successor at the school planning section of the Board of Education,
August Gold, to formulate a new policy for smaller schools (see footnote
on p. 272 ). They were finally able to overcome the opposition of the
engineers at the Bureau of the Budget (as represented by Assistant Budget
Director George Zandalasini) when Don Elliott took the matter up with
Budget Director Dave Grossman. 8
This new policy for high schools of 2, 000 students was later
applied to the Corona situation by the Board of Education in 1973. Con-
sequently, with the school board refusing to commit itself to build the
4, 000 seat high school but favoring a complete redesign for a smaller
school, the City Planning Commission refused to include construction
money for the school in the 1974-75 capital budget. It said it would re-
consider the matter for the 1975-76 budget. 9 Since this total redesign
might use a smaller site, none of the Corona houses have been physically
demolished or moved to new sites pending resolution of the issue. There
is, however, apparently still agreement among city agencies that a total
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of 4, 000 new seats are needed for the central portion of Queens, so
building a 2, 000 seat school would also require the initiation of the
whole site selection process again for a second school somewhere,
creating further delay. However valid the issues might be for the
educational planners now, the people of the area only know that there
is still more delay in the city government' s acting to reduce the heavy
overcrowding at the existing high schools.
Finally, in order to respond better to community needs, the
Planning Commission instituted a policy for its 1974-75 capital budget
deliberations of asking for, and publicly responding to, the top five
priority projects which each local Community Board submitted. Queens
Board 4 selected as its number 2 priority the acquisition of the semi-
vacant Hagen industrial property for playing fields because of a shortage
of recreational space in the neighborhood. 10 This was the same land
that had been proposed as the athletic field part of the alternative high
school site in 1967 but which the Planning Department had felt was a
viable future industrial area. The Commission agreed the request had
enough merit to warrant consideration for the 1975-76 capital budget.
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CHAPTER XII - OBSERVATIONS ON PLANNING PROCESS AND POLICIES
A Summary Statement
The directions of the Forest Hills and Corona conflicts could
have been changed at many points. For any individual planner to have
influenced events in another direction, he would have had to have both
the information and knowledge necessary for a wider perspective and a
personal willingness and ability to act. The summary below presents
the more important conditions under which a staff with these qualities
can be developed or maintained, as they have emerged in this study, and
the attitudes conducive to successful effort. A more extended and per-
sonalized discussion of the salient points follows the brief summary
statement.
1. Planners must learn from history and not think that their
case is unique, either to the period of time or geographical location.
When similar projects facing similar difficulties can be undertaken in
various cities with earlier experience given no consideration by the
later planners, it is apparent that something should be changed in the
ways planners are educated and kept informed during their working life.
This is particularly obvious in the Forest Hills situation, which paral-
leled that described in a "classic" publication in the planning literature.
2. The negative effects of bureaucracy on widespread in-
formation flow, individual initiative, and dissent from official policy
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must be countered if a planning agency is to retain sufficient foresight
and flexibility to respond creatively to a society that is experiencing
more rapid technological and social change than ever before. This re-
quires
a. Initiative by individual planners in crossing barriers
to communication that develop within and between agencies
without waiting for direction from above or going through
hierarchical channels.
b. Reducing the tendency for specialists to have knowledge
only in their given field. The ability of planners to in-
fluence decision-making is justified only by an ability to
understand social and physical interrelationships better
than other people do, and this depends on their constant
awareness of new information and theory gained by other
planners and professionals with diverse specializations
and backgrounds.
c. Recognizing that some persons in a planning agency
may not be planners and it may, therefore, be inappropri-
ate (or more appropriate, as the case may be) for them to
handle certain issues.
d. A clear policy within the agency that job security will
not be penalized by individual disagreement with a con-
sensus.
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3. Planners must recognize the limitations of arbitrary
standards, just as building codes are slowly being changed from speci-
fications to performance codes.
4. Planners must also recognize that any social changes in-
volving overtones of race relations, ethnic community identification,
and economic class hostility can at any time burst into a full-scale
conflict, and that media coverage of such events is likely to inflame the
situation. Despite the wish of the highly educated white collar profes-
sional to believe that such behavior is no longer a part of a modern
civilized society, America has a long history of violence related to
social and economic movements; and it continues to be a country that
is reluctant to put any effective curbs (either legal or by social mores)
on the production and distribution of guns, ammunition, knives, or fire-
works. The remedy to this should not be an attempt at the artificial
manipulation of the media but rather a continuous concern with pro-
motion of communication, to reduce inflammatory rhetoric and rumors
so that a matter is not considered "newsworthy" in the usual sense of
sensationalism.
5. The escalation of a specific issue into a battle of "principle"
between liberals and conservatives may be counterproductive in housing
and school integration disputes. The planner must be willing to make the
hard social choices between accepting what looks attractive as a short-
run victory even though it may lead to long-run defeat, and working for
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long-term goals which may look like an immediate defeat. In doing this,
he must be willing either to become publicly identified with the recom-
mendation or, if necessary to achieve it, to remain silent and let someone
else take the credit.
6. Time itself must be recognized as an important factor in the
planning process. Not only is it frequently difficult to predict how larger
social values can change and what specific events will arise seemingly
from out of "left field" to affect a situation, but it is also certain that
over time the likelihood of a political consensus falling apart is increased,
and, as participants change and memories become blurred, so is the prob-
ability of rhetoric being believed as fact. Thus, in debating various is-
sues of merit, ranging from budget to quality concerns, one must question
whether the time lost in debating the issue at hand is more important than
immediately resolving the dispute, either by paying the extra funds needed
or by giving up on one or another of the technical issues. For there is
always an unpredictable aspect to the future and a concommitant risk.
Some specific issues of planning policy, as opposed to those of
planning process referred to above, are
7. Programs to continue the aims of a scatter-site housing pro-
gram, to encourage racial and economic integration, should be continued.
But no one program will meet all the different circumstances in various
localities, and therefore one should not push for one major type of pro-
gram at the expense of all others but rather support a variety of programs.
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Programs of a rent subsidy nature will be appropriate in some situ-
ations, production-oriented programs in others, and fair housing
programs for the private market in others. To abandon such programs
at the same time that attempts to foster school integration lead to efforts
like busing to couteract residential patterns is clearly counterproduct-
ive.
8. One should recognize that the issues of siting public hous-
ing, schools, and other facilities are at heart a question of land use. In
areas of dense urban growth there is a need to build in a way for persons
in the future to be able to correct for what inevitably are either mistakes
or things not considered at the time of the initial determination of land
use, whether by private market forces or public decision. Mechanisms
like land banking, public ownership of all land, or ways to make the re-
location of persons from occupied land more palatable deserve further
investigation.
Introduction
In one form or another I have been living with the Forest Hills
and Corona issues for over two years, with my involvement fluctuating
from very intense at times to very little while classes were in session.
As stated in the introduction, the experience has led to a great deal of
introspection about the role of the individual who, as a planner, is per-
sonally and professionally liable for fulfilling his "social responsibili-
ties" and who, at the same time, if employed by the government, must
*
As I do not propose to try in this paper to define "social responsibility"
I refer the reader to the American Institute of Planners Guidelines for the
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exist and survive within a hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative
system that ultimately tends to reflect the socio-political goals of the
government' s elected leadership. For the Forest Hills-Corona situ-
ation encompasses in a microcosm the essence of much of the social
dilemma facing America today, that is, how government can effect racial
and economic integration, both school and residential, at the local com-
munity level at the same time that it tries to pursue such other goals as
the provision of a decent home for every citizen. These goals must be
accomplished within the framework of a democratic political system in
which, by definition, government policy must in the long run be responsive
to "the people, " but a system in which it is now in dispute as to what
group of people constitute "the community" to which in a particular
situation any level of government is to be responsive.
Obviously, then, there are a tremendous number of topics and
issues arising from the long Forest Hills-Corona affair that could be dis-
cussed. What follows are observations on some of them which seem of
importance to me.
* (Continued)
Social Responsibility of the Planner, which includes responding to the
needs of minorities and low-income persons, dealing with the people
"affected by the planning process, " "appropriate coordination among
functional planning . .. (to) assure that activity in one functi n does not
cancel out the social effectiveness of actions in others, " etc.
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Historical Precedents
One of the things that struck me during this study were the
many similarities between the Forest Hills-Corona situation and that
discussed in the classic study by Martin Meyerson and Edward Ban-
field about site selection by the Chicago Housing Authority, Politics,
Planning, and the Public Interest. 2 The desire to get a large package
of sites approved by a generally unreceptive legislative body; the differ-
ent perceptions of and criteria about sizes, designs, and images of pub-
lic housing projects; the escalation of the issue into one of principle and
the subsequent political postures which both sides assumed; the wide-
spread opposition by neighborhood Jewish groups to a couple of sites in
Jewish areas, along with the rise of the suspicion that Jewish areas
were chosen because Jews were known to be liberal, and the just as wide-
spread support of the projects by city-wide Jewish organizations; the
effect of the position which the press took on public housing: all had com-
parable features in Forest Hills. Coincidentally, the book discussed in
some detail the parallels and differences between the planning and po-
litical process for public housing in Chicago and New York City. 3
So, not only do we have this well-known study of a public hous-
ing battle fought over the principle that public housing should be sited for
integration purposes on vacant land in developing areas, but it was
written long enough ago that we also have the ability to see the long range
results of the conflict. The proponents of public housing had claimed
that they had won a victory in Chicago, but in fact in the long run they
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lost. The very fact that there had been a long and politically costly
struggle meant that almost no one, especially the politicians, wanted
to go through another. Thus, scatter-site public housing actually died
in Chicago, as is evident from the early 1970' s Gatreaux court case.
The political resistance to such a program by then had grown so great
that the city was even willing to forfeit public housing in the ghettos
rather than approve such housing for white suburban areas.
Thus, one of the lessons to be gained from this Forest Hills
study is what would seem to be obvious, that planners or other govern-
ment officials should not act as if each situation is unique, but should
make an effort to inquire if there were similar programs attempted in
the past by other cities from which they could gain useful information.
Furthermore, a planner cannot assume that an official of a specialized
agency, say for housing, is aware of the information in the field which
a planner might consider to be common knowledge. Even more im-
portant, persons in the planning agency may also be unaware of relevant
studies because they are not specialists in the particular subject or even
may not be trained as a professional planner. For example, two people
of the Housing Authority, who had been involved with scatter-site hous-
ing and with whom I happened to raise the question, had never heard of
the Meyerson and Banfield Chicago study. 4 In another case, a staff
planner in the Queens city planning office, who had responsibility for
the Forest Hills and Corona areas during 1970-71, had come into the
Planning Department several years earlier with a background of two
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years as a social worker and an undergraduate major in French. He
stated to me that he did not consider himself a planner and was proud
of the fact that he did not have an academic planning degree. 5 In ad-
dition, people like Planning Commission Chairman Donald Elliott, the
then executive director of the Planning Department, Edward Robin, and
Housing Authority head Simeon Golar, were trained as lawyers, not
planners. In other words, at the two opposite ends, both the policy-
makers at the top of the planning agency and the person in the field who
is supposed to give early warning that problems are developing in the
implementation of plans, were making decisions based on their personal
opinions as derived from their own prior experiences and personal phil-
osophy rather than on anything that could be termed a "professional"
planner' s judgment.
Institutions and Planners
People who are professional planners must also deal with the
institutional structure within which they are working (see pp. 154-156, 161
and 167 ). That function of planning which involves the coordination
and overall monitoring of the implementation by other agencies of previ-
ously approved plans requires the planner to counter the negative effects
of other bureaucracies while he himself is part of a bureaucracy. This
needs particularly independent and sensitive people if it is going to be
successfully achieved, and the more the Planning Department becomes
a traditional bureaucracy, the more that kind of innovative person is dis-
couraged from remaining in it. As that bureaucratization proceeds, the
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effectiveness of the planning agency itself will go down. For the ability
to see in advance when things are going wrong, for social or other reasons,
and then to do something about it, requires someone who is willing per-
sonally to be identified as having an unconventional viewpoint and who is
willing to try tenaciously to convince others of what he believes. He
must simultaneously be able to accept defeat at times, while also being
self-confident about his own abilities so that he does not let concern about
job security deter him from what he thinks is right. 6
I say this because Forest Hills and Corona provide examples of
two contradictory types of difficulties which planners can get into. Dur-
ing Donald Elliott' s tenure as head of the Planning Department, the agency
more than doubled in size, reaching a level of about 400 employees. As
a part of this expansion, offices for each borough were created, and in
1969 these offices were moved from the main Manhattan office to locations
in each respective borough.
Obviously the function of these offices was to bring the work of
the Commission and Department closer to the neighborhoods of the city.
At the same time, they created many problems. There were jurisdictional
difficulties, both in terms of power to influence decisions and in terms of
taking responsibility for a given issue. The physical separation of offices
restricted the flow of information, both about policy matters and New York
affairs and also about what was happening in the field of planning in gen-
eral. The department' s library in the main office, for example, became
less accessible to people in the field, and notices of occasional department
lectures on current planning issues were deliberately not sent to borough
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offices, with the rationale that the room couldn' t hold the whole depart-
ment so the borough offices were skipped rather than attendance being
on a first come-first in basis for the entire agency. 7 The logistical
difficulties imposed by physical considerations were exacerbated by
employee turnover and expansion, which meant that lines of communi-
cation and trust between staff became attenuated, as well as making it
more difficult for the lower staff to know what policy was in anything other
than the specific project or specialty in which they were involved. This
was especially true in the many cases that general policies were not
spelled out precisely, but rather were merely the accumulation of in-
dividual decisions on the assorted issues that came before the Depart-
ment and the Commission.
In the Corona case the then head of the City Planning Depart-
ment' s Queens office in 1970 in fact did feel the school site was inap-
propriate and tried to convince Chairman Don Elliott of that. He failed,
not because of a lack of a physical plan, for one similar to the ultimate
Corona compromise had been worked out in cooperation with one of the
technical staff at the main office of the Planning Department, but
rather, in his words, because he could not overcome Elliott' s belief
that "once a decision is made you have to stick by it and if you change
your mind in the city you'll live to regret it. ,,8 This Queens office
director, who has planning and architectural degrees, said he dis-
agreed with Elliott on this. He believed, he subsequently said, that
"recalcitrance to change from an earlier decision is more a cause of
later setbacks than the fact that the city did change. If they had moved
quickly to change a bad decision that would have ended it. '9
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Some directors and other staff in the Planning Department at
times made known to the Planning Commission, either at executive
*
session or privately, their disagreement with any position advocated
by the Chairman. However, the Queens director' s perception of his
role was that the Chairman was his boss and that he "would not have
gone behind the Chairman' s back and tried to play hero. ,10 He be-
lieved he had to either support the Chairman' s position or leave the
agency, and he did not see the other six members of the Planning Com-
mission as an appropriate, or legitimate, body in which to make known
his dissent. For he further rationalized his position in this particular
instance by pointing out that the Commission did not technically have
the City Charter responsibility for school site selection, whereas the Chair-
man did, in his role as director of the Planning Department. To the
argument that this was a technicality, since a refusal by the Planning
Commission to approve the street closings would void the entire site,
he responded that if the Commissioners had wanted to, they could have
pursued that issue, but they did not. Furthermore, as he added, the
Commission, with its part-time Commissioners, was hard pressed to
keep up with its heavy load already, "without adding site selection to it. ''1
*
On much rarer occasions a few planners had either testified at the
public hearings of the Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate
against administration positions or had helped citizen groups in oppos-
ing something. This, of course, had to be done very carefully if those
people were not to lose their influence with higher officials in the De-
partment, let alone their jobs.
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Ironically, Commission members agreed with that view of their
work load, and for that reason they were forced to rely on the staff to
point out where there were legitimate alternatives in a given issue. 12
Since the staff did not in this case, they had no reason to dispute the
Chairman' s version of the situation, so there was no serious effort by
the Commissioners to override the Chairman. Further illustrating the
discrepancy between philosophy and practice in this regard, when I
pointed out to the Queens director this practical reliance by the Com-
mission on department staff, it was his opinion that the Commissioners
could "confront the problem of no staff by confronting the Chairman, "
especially since he felt that the position of Commission Chairman "was
supposed to be a bridge between the Commission (and staff), not a
buffer. "13 But he did not, obviously, see this view of the way the situ-
ation should be as a reason to change his mode of operation. In fact,
whether he was aware of it or not I do not know, but the Commissioners
had repeatedly requested that a staff person be assigned directly to
them. This had never been acted on by Elliott, and the Commissioners
did not have sufficient cohesion or willingness to trade their votes among
themselves to band together to block any administration proposal in re-
turn for a staff person - the kind of political horsetrading that the Borough
Presidents had learned to use in the Board of Estimate.
Thus, the solution in Corona arrived at in 1970-71 was one
which this planner and others in the Planning Department had supported
and had indeed thought of earlier, but in the end, people outside of govern-
ment , such as Mario Cuomo, Jimmy Breslin, et alia, had more to do with
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originating it than persons in the government. Rather than planners
in the Department having been able to convince the Chairman of the
Planning Commission, change was forced upon him by the Mayor' s
office.
Corona thus was a case in which the local planning office,
which had been created for the purpose of better dealing with neighbor-
hood matters, withdrew from direct participation with either the citi-
zens or the other governmental agencies because it had been overruled
by the head of the Planning Commission, who was handling the matter
personally. The Forest Hills housing project was different, insofar as
this section of the Planning Department was concerned. Here, accord-
ing to the head of the Queens planning office, although "the process by
which it [the site] was originally selected, the precise number of units,
etc. , I might have changed, I agreed with the housing project [being
there]. " 4 In other words, he viewed it as a matter of principle - a
viewpoint which, as I think I have made clear, I believe was wrong in
this case, but about which there can certainly be a reasonable difference
of opinion. However, one would have then thought, with the Queens
office and the Chairman in agreement, that the Queens office would have
made a major effort to deal with the community problems that arose in
connection with the project. This was not the case, for a variety of
reasons, not least of which was the opinion of its director that "the de-
cision, once made, became a political decision, and it would have meant
little for us to intervene. "15 This is yet another of the many ironies,
for many people both in the public and in the other agencies of the city
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viewed the Planning Department as "political, ,,16 and therefore did
not trust it or like its interference in their affairs. But, the question
remains, if the planners will not get involved with social issues when
they become politically very hot, then who will provide the staff ex-
pertise to help guide the politician?
Throughout this paper I have pointed out the great strength of
institutional arrangements in establishing a direction and momentum
of decisions which the individual planner or, indeed, politicians and
elected officials, can rarely change, especially since each change they
see themselves as possibly making seems to require simultaneous
changes by other persons, changes which they view as so unlikely as
to be not worth the effort to try. Yet it is also clear from the very
fact that compromises were brought about in both Corona and Forest
Hills that these forces are not all-powerful. These constraints can be
broken by the community if enough people are sufficiently aroused to
seem a political threat, as was the case in these two projects. Or,
possibly not broken but certainly bent, by the determined action of in-
dividuals who are part of the bureaucracy itself.
Standards and Information Flow
Yet another lesson planners should draw from this experience
is that one should not apply arbitrary standards but must be flexible, as
I think is shown by the original school site selection dispute in 1966. Be-
fore such flexibility can be implemented, particularly in such a large city
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as New York, changes would have to be made to overcome what I shall
call the "frictions" of government in communication of information and
knowledge. Some of these, as they relate to the Planning Department,
have been mentioned on page 344 . But there are others, and with the
long time needed to implement any project in New York, they involve not
only the lateral set of circumstances at one time but the longitudinal
history of what was done, why, and by whom.
With turnover of people inevitable over the time-spans involved
and with so many parts of the governmental system that must approve
some aspect of any development along the way, the ability easily to trace
the history of a development becomes crucial at the time many years
later when an issue suddenly becomes important enough to reach the at-
tention of top government officials. For at that stage the official wants
to be given a summary of the situation, usually in a rush. Furthermore,
that kind of detailed information is crucial to the bureaucracy' s ability
to function with non-rigid standards, for rules and rigid standards were
created to facilitate the processing by a large organization of a con-
stant flow of paper, as well as to reduce the suspicion of corruption
which can arise on any government project.
The nature of the system in New York City, however, frequently
makes it impossible to obtain an accurate version of a history, even if
one is willing to go to great efforts. In the first place, it seems that the
New York City government is the largest American governmental or-
ganization outside of the federal government, with 340, 000 employees.
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higher the level of the official making a decision, the less likely the
reasons for that decision are written down and placed in a file. Further-
more, the person who at some point replaces the first official and then
deals with the situation in his turn is unlikely to have the same set of
unspoken criteria as those under which a project was approved. By
then, other elements may also be changed. This was the case, for in-
stance, when in 1966 an official in the Lindsay administration accepted
the principle of moving the public housing site from Corona to Forest
Hills, but only with a complex set of conditions, never written down:
that a slight increase in the number of units might be required for po-
litical reasons, and that a personal quid pro quo had been made with a
high Housing Authority official in return for the site' s "being forced
down the Authority' s throat"; and that a city capital budget amendment
would be gotten to provide a subsidy if subsoil conditions at the site
caused serious enough foundation problems to jeopardize the concept of
keeping the public housing buildings "low. "17 But this administration
official's responsibilities were changed before the details of the project
were approved by the Board of Estimate in December, 1966, 18 and,
under the direction of another official, the number of units went up sig-
nificantly, and the capital budget amendment never was implemented.
A second area of friction lies in the public hearings, which take
on a more important role in communication along with the growing em-
phasis on community participation. As citizen groups have proliferated
and the planning process has been decentralized, both administratively
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in the Planning Department and through the formation of community
boards which also hold their own public hearings, the sheer number of
people involved in talking about an item has increased geometrically,
and so has the potential for misinterpretation and different versions of
past events, particularly since personnel in each group changes over
the years. But the city' s system of communicating what took place at
a public hearing has not changed. The published summaries of the
hearings are little more than a scorecard, listing the number of people
for or against an item and its final disposition. This procedure is
hardly conducive to promoting rational discussion, which might be en-
couraged if people knew that the content of the debate, in the form of
transcripts, would be open to all parties to refer to and use as the basis
for subsequent discussion of the matter, as is the case with federal pub-
lic hearings. Stenotype notes of hearings are made, but they are not
transcribed unless either a government official wants them or a member
of the public, including the press, is willing to pay one dollar per page.
Furthermore, it may take weeks to receive the transcript after it is re-
quested, too late to influence a decision. Compounding the difficulty,
*
The official published records of Board of Estimate hearings are in
bound volumes at the Municipal Library. Dating back for about one
hundred years, they give the technical disposition of items but are not
a help in understanding why decisions were made or a helpful part of
the process on a real time basis for decision makers.
For example, the published version of the October, 1966, Board
of Estimate meeting at which the agreement was announced to put the high
school in Corona and the public housing in Corona gives no inkling of that
at all. Technically, the item at hand, a public housing site in Corona, was
simply held over for discussion at a later date, and that is what the official
record indicates.
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each request for the same item is considered an original request, re-
quiring fresh typing -- Xeroxing is not permitted -- and reimposition
of the one dollar per page charge. 19 Moreover, since one usually
cannot know whether significant information was presented in the pub-
lic hearing so as to make it worth the cost and effort to get a transcript,
the normal inclination is to skip the whole thing.
One of the consequences of the difficulty of obtaining a trans-
cript is an increased reliance on newspaper and other media accounts
of what happened at public hearings. This can be disastrous, given all
the problems of the quality of the reporter, the need to make deadlines,
etc. Even with competent reports, it becomes more difficult to check
the accuracy of subsequent statements of what happened in respect to
specific actions, since a newspaper cannot include everything. For
example, in 1971, New York' s public television station was trying to
determine the truth of charges by a councilman that the Board of Esti-
mate had broken a promise made by the Queens Borough President to
continue its December, 1966, consideration of the Forest Hills housing
project on Monday because many of the orthodox Jews had to leave the
late Friday night hearing to observe their Sabbath. But the station
could not afford the estimated $300. 00 to have a transcript of the pub-
lic hearing typed. 20 No complete transcript has ever been made of
*
that hearing, in which the project was approved after 11:00 P. M.
* I later found out that a private citizen had made a tape recording of
the meeting, which proved helpful years later to a staff person of the 21Housing Authority, but its existence has otherwise remained unknown.
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In the last few years the 31 community school districts and
62 community planning district boards have assumed much more im-
portant positions of responsibility, with all holding public hearings
and negotiations with the city operating agencies, the City Planning
Commission, and elected politicians. New York City, however, has
not made any institutional changes in its method of keeping track of
what transpires at all these public meetings, let alone at the private
executive sessions of the Planning Commission and Board of Estimate.
With the long lead times necessary before any development is com-
pleted in New York City; the certainty of turnover in the composition
of all the boards, civic groups, and paid staffs that are involved in
these talks; and the inevitable misunderstandings and rumors that must
occur when so many people are involved in anything, especially when no
one individual can personally know all the people involved in a matter
and with the reliance on verbal communication, I predict that in a few
years there will be a proliferation of community-government disputes
over just what was or was not agreed to in prior negotiations.
The institutional and informational changes discussed earlier
in this chapter could also have a serious impact on the level of per-
formance of the staff in the New York City Planning Department. With
the borough offices of the Planning Department generally assigning a
different person to cover each community board, and with the phenom-
enon that at any meeting that representative is "the government" insofar
as those people are concerned, it becomes all the more important for
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those planners to have a general knowledge of the functional city-wide
policies and programs that could have a bearing on any specific matter
within their area of geographic responsibility. For a broader per-
spective enables the planner to put a specific planned facility or zoning
change into a different context - one which helps him in his formulation
of ideas for his specific field of responsibility that are consistent with
the higher level policies, in his understanding of the purposes of a
particular project whose genesis was prior to the time when he became
responsible for it, and in his ability to explain these to the community
groups involved.
A good description of the scatter-site housing program and a
map (see Appendix III ) of the various sites in the city planned for it and
the vest pocket program in Model Cities areas was contained in the De-
cember, 1968, report by the Community Renewal Program arm of the
City Planning Department, Between Promise and Performance . . . A
Proposed 10-Year Program of Community Renewal for New York City.
But this report did not, as far as I can tell, become a working document
in the Planning Department. It can only be a matter of speculation
whether the reactions of the members of the staff would have been differ-
ent if they had been familiar with it in those cases in the late sixties and
early seventies when the Forest Hills project came up in isolated in-
stances, such as in 1969 when Board 6 Chairman DeVoy called the Queens
office of the Planning Department. The Queens office did not have a copy
of the report for general staff use; I never saw a copy of it during the two
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years I worked in the Staten Island office; nor, indeed, did I ever hear
of the term "scatter-site housing" during the two years I was in the
Staten Island Office of the City Planning Department, despite the fact
that one of the few 1966-67 public housing scatter-site projects to be
finished was under construction on the Island at the time.
Part of the problem appears to be that when new staff are hired
there is no attempt to provide a structured education in what the overall
policies of the Planning Department have been by having them read and
discuss the general policy documents the agency has produced. This
failure encourages the continuation of the feeling by so many in the govern-
mental bureaucracy that they do not have a personal responsibility for the
implementation of overall policy in their daily work. This problem con-
tinues to manifest itself in various ways among career employees of the
agency as well. And whatever else may be said, if staff is not aware of
the policies which the agency and the city have previously publicly ad-
vanced, then the reality of the sum total of many small decisions - indi-
vidual zoning changes, site selections, etc. - do not in fact reflect what
is supposed to be an overall policy.
In contrast to the lack of use of Between Promise and Perform-
ance, the Plan for New York City has received a great deal of day-to-day
use, not its main volume of Critical Issues, which was the one that got the
attention of the press and the American Institute of Planners, but rather
its five volumes on the boroughs. They provided people for the first time
with vital basic information about each community district, such as a
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large-scale map that showed the block by block location of all public
facilities in an area, which could be compared to an aerial photo and
zoning maps at the same scale. It is this kind of hard information
which has been used by staff people in improving the making of day-
to-day decisions, helped in no small measure by its wide and free
distribution and the fact that it was physically produced in such a way
that it could be rolled up and torn apart for easy use in the field. At
the same time I suspect that most persons in the City Planning Depart-
ment have not thoroughly read the Critical Issues volume (let alone the
borough volumes) despite the insight it could provide on historical
trends and planning policy because it did not seem helpful to them in
the solution of the immediate problems on which they were working.
In complete disregard for the power which information can be
for decision-making, the formulation of new ideas, and the application
of ideas and programs which others have used elsewhere, the City
Planning Department' s library was eliminated in the last two years.
Its extensive planning reference material has been scattered in a ran-
dom fashion, and the accumulation of current urban literature and
journals, which the library institutionalized for the use of staff in a
convenient manner, has now been left to the resources and initiative of
each individual employee, a situation which obviously hinders informa-
tion dissemination. That the Planning Department for a city of 8 mil-
lion people no longer maintains a library is a situation which I think is
incredible and should be rectified immediately. The consequences of
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the failure to do so will not be evident immediately but it will show
in the long-range quality of work which the agency produces.
Another problem of communication, one specific to housing
in New York, is that over time the meanings of the words "scatter-
site" and "vest-pocket" have become hopelessly confused, both
among professionals and the public, just as it is meaningless today
to try to distinguish between urban "renewal" and urban "redevelop-
ment. "22 Whether they imply a "small" development (whatever
"small" means to both the listener and speaker), or a kind of neighbor-
hood, or buildings of a height and scale consistent with those next to the
*
development has become very garbled. Because of their symbolic con-
text, however, despite this confusion, their use influenced decisions
pro or con, as individuals and the New York Times editorial writers
took positions that were based on a perception of what "true scatter-
site" meant, and whether or not the Forest Hills project really was one.
Moreover, since people in ordinary conversation use a few words of de-
scription in discussing a concept, rather than spelling out the details of
building plans, the use of such catch-terms introduces another possi-
bility for conflict. For if words don't mean the same thing to all people,
it is very easy for someone to jump to the conclusion that he was de-
liberately misled, and once one starts suspecting motives, the problems
of planner-community interaction just multiply.
For example, New York State Housing Commissioner Charles Urstadt
wrote a letter to the Times in December, 1971, saying that the term vest-
pocket only referred to the size of the lot and did not imply any particular
building height. 4-5 On the other hand Simeon Golar said that the Lindsay ad-
ministration people' s confusion of Forest Hills as a vest pocket project rather
than a scatter-site project made it seem that the project was too large and its
buildings too high.
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Issues, the Compromise, and Liberals
I would like to conclude by discussing the liberal attitude on a
number of issues, their opinion of those opposing the public housing
project, their opposition to any compromise, and the reasons for my
personal belief that a compromise was essential.
The escalation of the Forest Hills issue into one of principle
meant that specifics could no longer be discussed in calm terms and
that the grounds for conflict increased on both sides. It made the ques-
tion of whether the reasons for specific objections to the public housing
project had "merit" really superfluous.
Perhaps the point to start with is the observation that exactly
the same question concerning public housing in general or the Forest
Hills site in particular could be raised by two different people, and the
reaction would differ based on the assumed motives of the speaker. The
issue of welfare recipients in public housing, which was closely identi-
fied with the issue of violent crime, is an excellent example. When
raised by people in the area of the proposed public housing, it was viewed
by some liberal supporters of public housing as an expression of racism
rather than as a legitimate issue. But the same reservations concerning
welfare tenants in public housing were publicly voiced in early 1971 by
both the city Housing and Development Administrator (and former Housing
Authority Chairman), Albert Walsh, and by Housing Authority Chairman
Simeon Golar. Walsh, in January, "warn(ed) that unless extensive social
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services are made part of public housing, (it) will decline to the level
of 'welfare hotels, ' " and he said that "40% of those admitted to public
housing projects in '70 were on welfare. " *25 In February the Times
had a lengthy interview with Simeon Golar, who
. . . said he was worried that the wholesale
admission of families on welfare into public housing
would create 'social problems' in some cases, but
he argued that past practices of screening families
for 'social criteria' had led to housing projects that
were 'lily white.'
About half of those admitted into public hous-
ing today are on welfare, Mr. Golar said, whereas
the current population of welfare families is 30 per-
cent. 26
Of course, neither of these two people was seen by either the
liberal or black communities as raising these issues out of an objection
to the principle of more and better housing for low-income people (who
might or might not be black), because each had a visible record already
which made it possible for them to be categorized as friends. But most
people have not been visibly involved in an effort for public housing.
When someone cannot be identified as having been for something in the
past, his raising of an objection to a project when it affects him can
readily be viewed as an obstructionist tactic. Once this started, it was
fairly easy for the construction of the project to be seen as a principled
*
The welfare issue also led people like Congressmen Koch and Badillo
to debate how many people in public housing were welfare recipients.
This dispute over facts augmented by a controversial assertion by the
Authority that "crime' was lower in public housing than in surround-
ing neighborhoods, made intelligent discussion of cause and effect re-
lationships that much more difficult. See Appendix II for data on
population trends in New York City public housing.
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issue, in which a person was either on one side or the other, with
people who wanted to be identified as "liberal" or "pro public housers"
being those who favored no change at all in the original project. This
solidification of positions, in turn, made it that much easier for more
people to take a stand on the issue without knowing the details or the
history of the project, but on the basis of the company of persons with
whom they wanted to be associated. And the stronger statements one
issued, the more commitment one was deemed to have.
In the long run this was self-defeating. For, as Jerry Birbach
acknowledged in a radio interview in 1974 in answering the question of
what was the key to "mobilizing the middle-class, " it was that you
"have to put the emphasis on headlines and the media. I might have been
the catalyst, but without the headlines I couldn' t have done it. ,27 He
further acknowledged that the charges of his being a racist were helpful
"because it meant they were focusing on Forest Hills. If not (for that),
maybe it wouldn't have made headlines. " 28
A whole series of other issues arose in connection with the
Forest Hills issue. I would like to briefly discuss two of them, com-
munity control and the stability of the neighborhood.
Community control, as Walter Goodman wrote at the height of
the controversy,
. . . was a highly selective principle, useful
mainly for baiting the white E stablishment. No one
ever really meant that communities should be put in
the control of the anti-busing housewives of Pontiac,
Michigan, or the Ku Kluxers of Birmingham, Alabama,
or the burghers of Queens. Yet, in all fairness, are
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not these citizens entitled to take to the streets with
their fears, their rages, their greed? Thus argued
the residents of Lindenwood, another white middle-
class section of Queens . . .
What community control would mean in general
practice is that little low-cost housing would be built
anywhere, outside of Indian reservations. This rule
would also cover hospitals and other institutions that
everyone considers desirable but nobody wants next
door . . . The 19th-century New England town hall
still holds its charm . . . but the idea that our century' s
cities can be operated in bits and pieces is an invitation
to immediate chaos and eventual stagnation. If the Forest
Hills experience only puts the quietus on propaganda for
community control, it will not have been a dead loss. 29
The reference here was to the argument of community control
of schools and other institutions advanced by blacks in the late 1960' s,
especially in the New York City school decentralization debates. I agree
with the thrust of Goodman' s reasoning, but I think it important not to
overreact to the concept of community control with the Forest Hills ex-
ample. Rather it should be used to clarify the distinction between those
types of large-scale decisions that must remain with a higher level of
government and those decisions that are in many ways just as important
as the larger decision, but which are at a different scale of values and
can be carried out within the framework of the larger decision. Com-
munity control of schools in New York, for example, never meant that
the local community had the ability to decide to spend money for the
construction of a new school, which was the type of decision with long-
range impact that, once implemented, could not be reversed. The de-
cision as to which community school districts in the city got new schools
remained a decision of the central planning agency, whereas the local
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district had control of more day-to-day decisions, such as hiring,
within overall guidelines, such as the rule that hiring could not be
discriminatory.
The same type of process can be constructed for the housing
of low-income households in middle-income areas, if that is the
policy which the central government feels it wants. City Planning
Commissioner Martin Gallent suggested one possible process - having
the Planning Commission allocate a certain number of units to each
Community Board, which would then have to select sites. 30 But there
are many other variants possible to take in a wider range of circum-
stances, and these could include the choice of type of housing - new,
rehabilitation, leased units, cooperative or rental, etc. - as an input
into the city-wide housing plan to be submitted to HUD for federal funds.
Other options include discussion on architectural design. (A case in
Cambridge comes to mind in which the local citizens committee insisted
on wood frame buildings with basements as essential for a subsidized
development even at the expense of smaller bedroom sizes. The ulti-
mate residents now agree that those features are part of what make the
development so successful. ) Clearly, however, this type of community
input is not by any means a cure-all for all situations. With such possible
problems as a community' s refusing to cooperate at all on the implemen-
tation of its unit allocation, there can be no substitute for good judgment
on the part of higher level governmental officials on when to step in to
overrule a local group.
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Another issue to consider is just what does lead to instability
in a Jewish or other ethnic community. Most people considered Forest
Hills a stable community, and therefore, readily able to absorb the
housing project. Yet it suffered from physical problems of trans-
portation congestion and increasingly dense development, and had an
aging population (see Table 10 ), a combination which can mark the
beginning of downgrading in a neighborhood. Nathan Glazer argued that
the primary reason for the migration of people from the older sections
of the city to the newer Jewish areas was a search for safety rather than
a fear of minorities, 31 but it was also a search for an improved physi-
cal environment and higher status. One could at least question whether
Forest Hills was not in its turn becoming somewhere to move from, to
places like suburban Suffolk county, whether or not the housing project
was built. 32
As a person who considered himself a liberal in support of in-
tegrated housing and scatter-site public housing, I found the "principled"
viewpoint appealing, as it was expressed by Donald Elliott in late 1971
in an official letter to the HUD area office and again in December, 1971,
in the State Senate Committee public hearings. In essence he stated that
the tests to be met for scatter-site housing were that a site be on vacant
land, that community facilities be adequate (by New York City standards),
that it be in a stable middle-income non-minority neighborhood, and that
the project meet federal cost limits. Once these tests were met, he
argued, the principle of "open housing" had to be upheld in siting public
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housing in the city, just as suburban large lot zoning was being attacked
as exclusionary. This required that once the site was legally approved,
we must build public housing on it "or abandon the ideal we say we pur-
sure. "33 He then jumped from the ideal to the specific by saying that
any change in the project would mean killing it, and that one should sup-
port the project as planned. His reasoning was expressed in an earlier
letter: "Our analysis of the opposition to this project shows that there
are virtually no substantive issues. Our concern is rather that . . .
(the city approved the project in 1966 and that ) since then, for nearly
five years this project has been delayed while largely irrelevant issues
have been raised in an attempt to block this project, which will provide
housing for those families and older citizens who need it most. "34
That all sounds very good, especially to those who did not know
the project' s history and would accept the implication that obstreperous
citizens, rather than governmental problems, had held up the project for
five years. But I grew up in a family in which the construction of in-
tegrated housing in the all-white housing market was an item of daily per-
sonal concern, and I have learned that nothing is simple about racially
integrated housing, let alone economic integration. I had no personal
problem in maintaining my sense of identification with the causes of open
housing and housing production and at the same time, when I had seriously
gotten into the study, being critical of the Forest Hills project and the
situation that had developed. I did not, and do not, share Roger Starr' s
discomfort with the concept of scatter-site housing and the economic
integration of neighborhoods, 35 nor do I accept the premise of his state-
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ment that "If, by definition, scatter-site housing cannot be numerically
significant, its significance must be symbolic: it must demonstrate that
higher-income families stand ready spontaneously to embrace these new-
comers, or that city officials will force their acceptance. ,36
I do share Simeon Golar' s concern for the reality of the situ-
ation he faced, so that even though one might feel that such approaches
as mixed income developments should be built instead of straight public
housing, 3 one had to work as a local official with the tools one had until
the federal policies and funding had changed. But unlike Simeon Golar,
who asked rhetorically during the Forest Hills controversy, "When does the
consultation process come to a halt? When can we rely on commitments
once made ?,,38 I think in the complicated field of integrated housing one
must keep changing to adapt successfully to the social situation at hand.
Consultation itself never ends in any field, for there are always problems
to resolve. What changes are the nature of the problems and the scale
of the issues discussed.
It is true that the ability of a society, through its government,
to resolve problems depends upon its citizens' belief that the commit-
ments it makes at any point in time will in fact be carried out. Frequently
the resolution of a current issue is hindered by the refusal of people to
believe that a particular detail of a proposed agreement will be carried out
(such as whether the government actually would build expensive park deck-
ing over a proposed new West Side Highway on the Manhattan shoreline).
But government commitments are a two-way responsibility. Until the
government actually carries out a commitment, there is always the possi-
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bility that it can and should be changed to meet changing conditions,
just as urban renewal plans are constantly being revised during their
implementation, or as a commitment to build popular facilities like
new schools are sometimes cancelled for lack of funds, or changing
population trends, years after the original agreement. The question
in a case like Forest Hills is not whether nothing can be changed, but
rather how to distinguish between the principle of the original commit-
ment, which should be adhered to, and the details within it that can be
changed. That is a matter of political judgment on the part of an ad-
ministrator, and it is a crucial decision.
A fact that became all too clear to me, both in my experiences
as a planner and in my exposure to the problems my father faced in his
efforts to bring about open housing, is that while the details of an indi-
vidual project are critical in one sense because they may drastically
affect the lives of those who will use it in the future, they are at the same
time only marginal if one wants the same type of thing to be repeated
over and over again throughout society, but such repetition does not occur.
For it will be repeated again only if it is considered a success, and suc-
cess in racially or economically integrated housing is measured by what
happens over the long run to the occupants. There is nothing more suc-
cessful than a project that no one has ever heard of except for experts
in the field of housing and race relations because there has been no
controversy over it.
-368-
The hard fact is that the overall social objective of integrated
housing is to have diverse people live together, and living together is
the antithesis of emotional conflict. From a liberal viewpoint, there has
never been a substantive reason for any of the emotional problems that
have had to be overcome in the field of human rights: why people would
throw bricks at the house of the first black family to move into a neighbor-
hood, why blockbusting is a problem, why there is a fear of people of
different income levels living together. But these problems do exist,
and they are not resolved by talking of the adequacy of schools and com-
munity facilities in terms of numbers, but by a process of dealing with
people to show them by experience over time that their fears are un-
founded and in trying to deal with problems when they are justified. And
this depends on people' s perceptions and images. As Simeon Golar put
it so well, "Images are reality in human affairs, and the serious thing
now is the image of public housing. "39 But he was both dead right and
dead wrong when he said, "The wellsprings of human motivation are
complex and obscure and are probably meaningless to the process any-
way. "40 They are critical to the process if one is going to be successful.
Obviously, at times it is difficult to decide what the just thing
to do is, and sometimes one has to make a public battle. But one also
has to keep the overall objective in mind and not just assume that the
glory of the "good battle" will lead to winning the war. In the case of
Forest Hills it became clear to me that throughout its entire history, its
development was littered with problems, many of which arose from mis-
understanding or confusion between rhetoric and deed. For example, in
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contradiction to the assumption held by Sylvia Chaplain and me when we
began this study that no effort was made to "bribe" the community with
additional facilities in return for acceptance of public housing, plans
were changed for this purpose. This effort, however, failed because
communication was so poor that the community did not perceive that it
was getting anything that it would not otherwise have obtained. The con-
fusion about the "switch" of the high school site has already been dis-
cussed. This shift, combined with the use of strict boundary lines to
define the "community" that was receiving capital budget funds, made
it possible to "show" in the middle of the controversy that the Forest
Hills Community Board 6 was getting the smallest amount of capital im-
provement funds of any board in the city. 41 This only increased resent-
ment and suspicion toward the government and ignored the fact that the
very expensive high school to be built a few blocks past the Board' s
*
boundary line was to serve many Forest Hills students.
In another case, in March, 1968, the Planning Department' s
specialist school planners helped bring about agreement with Adrian
Blumenfeld of the school system to sign a long-term lease with the
Housing Authority to pay for the pre-school facilities, thereby allowing
the Authority to build them into the project. This, it was agreed at the
three agency meeting, "would soothe some of the tensions within the
community caused by the project, "43 but as subsequent events showed,
*
The loss of funds for a new library - part of a citywide elimination of
planning funds for any new libraries - also contributed to charges of
government retaliation against the Forest Hills opposition to the housing
project. 42
360
-370-
this failed because the process of communication with the community
was such that it did not realize that in fact a special effort had been
made to respond to its needs.
Yet another fascinating aspect of the process is that with all
the furor about a black - Jewish conflict that the project was creating,
the only city agency that had institutional knowledge and staff expertise
in dealing with complicated race relations problems, the Human Rights
Commission, never was involved. 4 While I do not expect that planners
should necessarily be specialists in the complex field of integrated hous-
ing, I do think that the planner, in overseeing and monitoring an overall
process, should recognize that the subject is complex. He should be
aware that the Housing Authority, with its credibility problems and its
institutional inability to deliver on any promise of future community
services from another city agency, cannot be left to deal with the prob-
lems that arise, and that the planner should intervene himself or -
depending on circumstances - make sure that a person who is a specialist
in the delicate subject areas involved does get called in.
For all these reasons, and with the belief that the lives of the
people who ultimately would move into the housing project would be diffi-
cult enough, given the stigma that neighbors frequently attach to public
housing anyway - let alone to one with a history of conflict and the
potential of even more serious trouble if the upward spiral of passions
were not reversed - I felt that the project size should be reduced, and I
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proposed my compromise to Mario Cuomo. I believed, based on my
planning knowledge and the experiences of my father in developing in-
tegrated housing for the last twenty years, that it was essential to
reverse the trend of rising emotional conflict, both to give the project
itself some chance of success by promoting a feeling of normality
about it and its ultimate residents, and to try to save any chance of
getting scatter-site housing through the political process in the years
following the project' s completion. But I also believed that judging an
issue on its merits and having a compromise were not mutually ex-
clusive in the Forest Hills case. Irrespective of community opposition,
if I had not believed that recent experience has shown that the Forest
Hills project' s size and physical configuration made its chances of
ultimate success that much more difficult, I would not have proposed
*
a change. For I felt that any change had to be intellectually honest in
its rationale and not solely a reaction to community pressure. Despite
the opposition of some people, I still believe that considerations such
as the economics of neighborhood provision of goods and services, the
impact on population composition of neighborhood schools, changing
trends in employment patterns, and a whole host of other factors still
make racial and economic integration of housing important goals to
pursue.
*
A reliance on costly management services to compensate for negative
aspects of a facility, for example, becomes increasingly difficult to rely
on in the future in view of the rising costs of operation that have outpaced
rent levels.
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Because long-range success is composed of many short-
run successes, I proposed a compromise. Its success did not rely
on everyone in the community supporting it verbally at a public hear-
ing but rather on 1) enough support so that their behavior patterns
would change after it was adopted, and 2) the total ambience or com-
munity life style in and around the public housing project itself being
better than it might have been otherwise. Only time will tell if the
compromise that was adopted was right, and whether in the long run
the causes of both racial and economic integration and the provision
of more and better housing for low-income people will have been
served. For that success, the providing of the proper physical struc-
tures and the framework for a better atmosphere at the opening of the
development is only half the job. The other half now lies ahead, in
the proper on-going operation of the buildings and in fostering the
friendly day-to-day personal relationships as these are formed by the
adults and children living in the buildings and the surrounding neighbor-
hood.
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APPENDIX I - CHRONOLOGY
January 1, 1966
March, 1966
Spring 1966
April 20, 1966
May 11, 1966
May 11, 1966
May 31, 1966
John Lindsay sworn in as Mayor; transit strike
hits city.
Special interagency committee appointed by Mayor
to select public housing sites, headed by Ed Robin,
deputy counsel to Mayor.
Housing Task Force submits recommendation to
merge 9 housing departments into one agency.
Edward Logue hired for further study.
City Planning Com. hearings - residents of 6 middle
class neighborhoods attack HA for proposing projects
in their areas.
CPC hearings on proposed public housing projects in
Kingsbridge (Bronx), and Woodlawn and Flushing
(Queens).
N. Y. Times reports special interagency committee
bars Borough Pres. veto of sites in advance, seen as
move to spur integration. Borough Pres. split in
opinion of new procedure.
Letter to CPC Chairman, William Ballard, from Adrian
Blumenfeld, Administrator of School Planning and Re-
search, Board of Education, stating that proposed housing
-425-
June 1, 1966
June 7, 1966
June 15, 1966
June 21, 1966
June 28, 1966
-426-
project site in Corona coincides with potential high
school site and that alternative high school site "will
be difficult, if not impossible, " to find.
CPC hearing - Queens Borough Pres. Cariello asks
delay on Corona and Howard Beach (Lindinwood) sites
until fall. Ballard refuses on grounds that Federal
aid hinges on site selection by June 30.
Lindsay announces plan to build low-income units in
rehabed and "small" new buildings averaging 6-8
stories, mainly in 4 slum areas.
CPC hearing - 700 Queens residents oppose public
housing in middle-income areas; United Taxpayers
Party chairman, Vito Battista, opposes projects;
Cariello says CPC uses 'steamroller tactics';
Councilman Manes says projects will encourage
flight of middle-income families; Human Rights Com-
mission chairman Booth says program is only hope
to get people out of ghettos.
CPC approves last 4 Housing Authority scatter-sites,
including 5 1/2 acre Corona site; hears testimony on
plan to build 4, 000 low-income units in slum areas.
Board of Estimate hearing on Housing Authority re-
quest for approval of Corona site for public housing
deferred because Board of Education requests site for
high school.
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October 1, 1966
October 27, 1966
November 9, 196
November 16, 19
Study under Ed Logue recommends building 450, 000
apartments in 10 years and placing all city housing
and planning functions in one agency.
Board of Estimate - Exec. Assist. to Mayor, with
Queens Borough Pres. Cariello's concurrence, re-
quests layover of Corona public housing site (Lewis
Ave. and 100th St.) to December 9th meeting in order
that necessary steps to locate a high school there and
the public housing at 108th Street and 62nd Drive
(Forest Hills - Rego Park) may be commenced.
Cariello says "this planning solution, which we have
sought for so long, is a victory for everything that is
good and visionary for the Borough of Queens. "
6 Housing Authority requests plan and project approval
for public housing for Forest Hills site from CPC.
66 Board of Education refers Corona 12 acre high school
site to local school board.
November 23, 1966 Housing and Development Administration Superagency
created by Lindsay. Jay Nathan appointed head. Walter
Washington appointed chairman of Housing Authority.
Donald Elliot, counsel to Mayor, appointed CPC chair-
man.
November 30, 1966 CPC hearing on proposal for 828 units of public housing
on 8. 4 acre Forest Hills site.
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December 2, 1966 CPC approves plan and project for Forest Hills by
7-0 vote.
December 9, 1966 Board of Estimate approves plan and project for 828
units for Forest Hills by 22-0 vote.
January 18, 1967
January 18, 1967
January 25, 1967
March 20, 1967
March 31, 1967
May 29, 1967
June 8, 1967
June 19, 1967
Development program for 848 units received by HUD.
Simeon Golar named deputy City Administrator.
Board of Education submits Corona high school site
to Site Selection Board.
Site Selection Board hearing on Board of Education's
request for 12 1/2 acre high school site in Corona.
Request is approved.
Mayor approves high school site.
Housing Authority notifies CPC of change from 828
units to 848 units.
CPC writes Housing Authority that change in units is
minor and does not affect prior approval.
Site Selection Board re-hears high school site because
of litigation.
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July 13, 1967
July 24, 1967
September 1,
Lindsay names 5 leading architects for 6 public housing
projects in move to get away from stereotyped design.
Site Selection Board re-approves Corona high school
site by 3-2 vote necessitating condemnation of 69 homes
(Mayor's 3 appointees for, B. P. Cariello and Comptroller
Proccacino against); Cariello says he had worked out
alternative sites that would have saved most homes and
have met facility requirements.
1967 Mayor approves high school site.
September 7, 1967 Walter Washington resigns as head of Housing Authority
to become first Negro executive of major U. S. city -
Washington, D. C.
October 26, 1967 Original development program for Forest Hills housing
approved by HUD.
November 2, 1967 Site approval authorized by HUD.
November 9, 1967 Annual Contribution Contract executed by HUD for pro-
ject (total devel. cost of $17, 155, 000).
November 27, 1967 Housing Authority designates Franzen Assoc. as
architects.
November 28, 1967 Lindsay formally creates HDA superagency after City
Council approval and names 23 officials; Eugenia Flatow
1968
August 26, 1968
February 1969
February 1969
May, 1969
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as head of Model Cities, Frank Kristof for Programs
and Policy, Robert Hazen for Development, etc.
Oceanhill- Brownsville school decentralization dispute
and lengthy city-wide teachers strike.
Title vested to Forest Hills Housing site.
Simeon Golar appointed Chairman of City Commission
on Human Rights.
Snow storm makes Queens streets impassable.
Court of Appeals confirms lower court decision that
Board of Estimate is not required to hold a second
hearing on a capital project after the Site Selection
Board has approved site for high school.
September 5, 1969 Franzen Associates fired as architects for Forest Hills.
September 12, 1969 Sam Paul hired as architect for Forest Hills project.
October 1, 1969
November 1969
January 1970
January 1970
Title vested in high school site.
Lindsay wins re-election over Mario Proccacino and
John Marchi.
Paul's Phase 1 design submitted to Housing Authority.
Simeon Golar appointed chairman of Housing Authority.
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April 14, 1970
April 21, 1970
July 9, 1970
August 1970
August 20, 1970
September 1970
Agreement reached on modifying Phase 1 design by
eliminating 8 low rise buildings and adding those units
to high rise ones.
Agreement of April 14 confirmed by letter from HUD
to Housing Authority.
HUD authorizes HA to proceed with design, based on
one of two of the submitted site plans.
CPC approves map change closing streets on Corona
High School site.
Phase II design submitted to Housing Authority.
Governor Rockefeller asks State Commissioner of
Housing and Community Renewal, Charles Urstadt, for
report on Corona high school site.
Late October 1970 Urstadt report says 2 other feasible sites exist for
school - Flushing Meadows Park and the site of a
"defunct" public housing project in Forest Hills.
November 13, 1970 Board of Estimate unanimously approves map clos-
ings of streets at school site.
December 1, 1970 Mayor Lindsay announces first proposed Corona com-
promise, negotiated between Deputy Mayor Richard
Aurelio and lawyer Mario Cuomo, to reduce school site
size, put recreation in park, return 31 homes to owners,
and physically move others to new lots.
422
-432-
December 1970
January 1971
January 1971
May 1971
June 1971
June 1971
July 6, 1971
June-July 1971
July 24, 1971
August 10, 1971
October 29, 1971
October 29, 1971
Assemblyman Battista and others oppose Corona
compromise - want entire school site moved.
Simeon Golar announces goal of starting construction
on 14, 000 public housing units in year.
Community opposition to Forest Hills project starts
organizing. Jerry Birbach takes leadership role.
Housing Authority issues Forest Hills Fact Sheet.
Golar gives Flushing Remonstrance speech.
Congressman Rosenthal asks for General Accounting
Office investigation.
Bids for Forest Hills project advertised by HA.
Corona compromise enabling legislation fails to win
State approval.
Injunction issued against Forest Hills project.
Bids opened by HA.
Court approves Forest Hills project.
HA requests HUD concurrence in award of bids.
November 5, 1971 HA submits draft environmental clearance worksheet to HUD.
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November 8, 1971
November 16, 1971
November 18, 1971
November 21, 1971
November 23, 1971
November 23, 1971
November 24, 1971
Mid-December 1971
December 4, 1971
December 16, 1971
HUD amends Annual Contribution Contract for
project and concurs in award of contract (total
dev. cost of $29,980,000)
Senator Buckley says HUD Secretary Romney
will review project.
Large protest rally makes front page of Times
because of threat of violence.
Birbach and Golar call each other 'bigot" and
"liar" in TV debate.
Board of Estimate kills Lindenwood public housing
project.
HUD Sec. Romney reaffirms approval of project,
saying he cannot see "any basis on which I can re-
verse prior firm contractual committments. "
20 month study by Urban Design Council of New
York recommends radical changes in city's "Kgtka-
like building process.
Construction of Forest Hills project begins.
Dick Aurelio proposes new Corona compromise.
Application for preliminary injunction to stay con-
struction filed in Federal District Court, alleging
HUD failure to comply with National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
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December 16, 1971
December 17, 1971
December 19, 1971
December 20, 1971
January 14, 1972
January 18, 1972
February 2, 1972
February 8, 1972
February 9, 1972
Several Jewish groups refuse to attend meeting
with Lindsay on 17th, but American Jewish Cong.
and Anti-defamation League will go.
"Secret" meeting held in Lindsay's office at
which he declares project will be built and no
compromise is possible.
Jerry Birbach's West Side Manhattan real estate
office picketed.
State hearings on scatter-site housing
Draft environmental impact statement released
for comments by HUD.
Housing Authority releases White Paper on
Forest Hills project.
Secret meeting at Gracie Mansion. Lindsay sug-
gests secret meetings be held between Jewish and
black groups.
New York Times' architectural critic, Ada Louise
Huxtable, criticizes Forst Hills project's design and
praises Franzen's.
President elect of N. Y. Board of Rabbis says Forest
Hills project is a "city hall sellout" and part of
February 10, 1972
February 15, 1972
February 17, 1972
March 10, 1972
March 13, 1972
March 14, 1972
March 28, 1972
April 4, 1972
May 3, 1972
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Lindsay's aspirations for the Presidency. Attack
gets split reaction from Jewish leaders.
Construction of high rise middle-income project of
Sam Lefrak in Forest Hills-Kew Gardens stopped by
City Board of Standards and Appeals. Lawyer for
C
opposition is Mario Juomo.
New York State Supreme Court Judge Saypol issues
order halting project on grounds that current project
differs markedly from that approved in 1966 by CPC
and Board of Estimate in terms of building's height,
but execution of order is stayed. City appeals.
Opponents meet with aides to President Nixon (arranged
by Senator Buckley). President reported as feeling pro-
ject has "national significance.
Panel of black housing experts support Forest Hills project.
New York State Assembly passes bill (80-49) to require
County referendum for public housing projects, with a
retroactive provision tailored specifically for the Forest
Hills project. City believes bill unconstitutional.
Lindsay places fifth in Florida presidential primary.
Environmental Impact Statement issued by HUD.
Lindsay places sixth in Wisconsin and withdraws from
presidential campaign.
Lindsay says compromise on project is possible.
City wins appeal of Saypol decision.
25
May 4, 1972
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May 5, 1972
May 13, 1972
May 16, 1972
June 1972
June 21, 1972
June 24, 1972
July 25, 1972
August 20, 1972
Life Magazine prints color photo of Pruitt-Igoe Public
Housing project in St. Louis being dynamited.
Rockefeller vetoes bill requiring Forest Hills project
to go back to Board of Estimate for approval.
Lindsay names Mario Cuomo to "make an independent
exploration of possible revisions in project. "
Legislation for Corona compromise approved by State.
Birbach loses primary election to Gold.
I meet with Cuomo.
Cuomo report recommends halving project size and
building heights.
Lindsay accepts Cuomo recommendation; Golar unhappy
but will comply.
September 5, 1972 Queens Borough President Donald Manes proposes
making project a cooperative.
October 4, 1972
October 26, 1972
Winter, 1973
City Planning Commission votes 4-2 to accept halving
project.
Board of Estimate votes 20-2 to halve project and
make it a cooperative.
Planning Commission denies construction funds for
1974-1975 budget for Corona high school because
Board of Education wants to redesign school for one-
half size.
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June 1974
July 1974
HUD approves plan to make Forest Hills project
a cooperative, the first of its type in U. S.
Housing Authority has over 10, 000 applications for
project. Occupancy expected to start in fall, 1974.
APPENDIX II
TABLE 16
Occupancy Characteristics by Percent,
New York City Public Housing Projects,
January 1, 1973 and Changes Since January 1,
Puerto
White Negro Rican Other Total
Number of Families 25. 3 50. 0 22. 8 1. 9 100. 0
Percentage point
change, '65-'73 -14.5 10.6 3.2 1.9 100.0
Number of Persons 19. 2 52. 4 26. 4 2. 0 100. 0
Percentage point
change, '65-'73 -14.8 9.5 3.3 2.0 100.0
Percent of Household 49. 0 18. 7 11. 7
Heads 62+
Percentage point
change, '65-'73 16.0 8.7 3.7
Percent of Broken
Families 8. 5 33. 6 28. 4
Percentage point
change, '65-'73 -2.1 9.6 13.2
Percent of Families
on Welfare 15.0 37. 0 43.9 32.7
Percentage point
change, '65-'73 9.6 23.7 27.6 22.0
Source: Table 1 and
New York City Housing Authority
Confidential Material
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1965
ANBRIDIX III
LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM
1966-1968
S siftsproposed
A Sit. approved by Board of Etimate
Vet pocket ie..
43~9
N.
Source: New York City Planning
Department, dommunity Renewal
Program, Between Promise and
Performance ... A Proposed~TO-Year
Program of Cmiunity RenewaTfor
New York~City, December, 1968, p. 86.
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AkiENDIX IV One-half iage Advertisement in the New York Times,
October 24, 1972 (just before the Boardof' Estimate
henring on the Forent Hills compromise plan), p.Io.
Th Foest ils-mogo Park residents
and concerned Taxpayers everywhere
ACT M©W
SAVE i EDLE ECI
COMIMPUITES EVER~YWiNERE'
THE BIRBACH PLAN
" Garden complex for Senior citizens.
" Geriatric center and recreational facilities.
" Placement of lower income families in existing buildings
throughout the community for TRUE integration so...
" ... the poor would have a true middle income environment.
" Evaluation of program to determine the effects
of true scatter site housing.
" Approved by Forest Hills-Rego Park communities.
THIS IS TRUE
SCATTER SITE HOUSING
Thursday October 26,1972 is destined to be the most
crucial day to the communities of Forest Hills-Rego
Park and middle income communities everywhere.
On this day Mayor John V. Lindsay and the Board
of Estimate will determine the outcome of the pro-
posed 108th Street project. Voice your opposition,
your presence is a must.
For 2 years the Forest Hills Residents' Association
has been leading the fight against John Lindsay,
THE LINDSAY PLAN
Forest Hills tomorrow
0 3 welfare towers
" Cost approx.
$70,000 per apt.
(can you afford a
$70,000 home or
condominium?)
e Project stigmatizes
the poor-Isolation
S~ rnot Integration.
Simeon Golar and Donald Elliot in their plan to
build "warehouses for the poor" in Forest Hills-
Rego Park. ACT NOW! Join us in our fight and you
will win. Remember! Board of Estimate hearing
October 26, 1972 at 10 AM in City Hall. Imperative
your voice be heard. Don't allow Forest Hills-Rego
Park to be destroyed or your community will be
next.
JOIN US IN OUR FIGHT AGAINST CITY HALL.
HELP US! HELP YOURSELF!
--.s----..----= - -. me m .== m ... m.. m ig
I I support your effort. Enclosed, please find my check made out to the 3
*Forest Hills Residents Association, Inc.
* 3
(Pease check one) $5 $10- $25 $50.- $100.
NAME:
I ADDRESS:
I
I
I
Phone: -
FOREST HILLS RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, IN.
62-32 102 St., Forest Hills, New York 11375
U
U
I
I .. . . .. . . .. .. = -=. . .m. . ..- =.... I
Paid For by the Forest Hills Residents' Association, Inc.
TO QUEENS BOROUGH
PRESIDENT MANES
As our elected representative, it is your duty to do the job that
has not been done by ...
Congressman.........................Benjamin Rosenthal
State Senator..............................Emanuel Gold
Councilman..........................Edward Sadowsky
Assemblyman ............................. Alan Hevesi
It is up to you to lead the way for the other Board of Estimate
members or you will be as guilty as the Mayor of destroying
middle income communities.
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